Me CONTEMPORARY FRENCH OPINION 
-ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


BY 
W. REED WEST 


: A DISSERTATION 
Submitted to the Board of University Studies of the Johns 
Hopkins University in Conformity with the Requirements 
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
1922 | 


BALTIMORE 
1924 








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CONTEMPORARY FRENCH OPINION 
ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


BY 
W. REED WEST 


A DISSERTATION 
Submitted to the Board of University Studies of the Johns 
Hopkins University in Conformity with the Requirements 
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
1922 


BALTIMORE 
1924 


COPYRIGHT 1924 BY 
THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS 


LANCASTER PRESS, INC. 
LANCASTER, PA. 


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CONTENTS 
MEERUT CET ea Sue Sat ites a) aehad allo eh ev monatig cists) nese sau rel ore amin Vil 
Chapter De we E ER SSH eS ay shat iene meray ie cols nlere le uit sas 9 
aptenieie ave Une rent A TAIT fy cls ies S20 ahi esate 40 
Chapter III. Distress Among the Workmen........ 56 
Shapers iver Eroposals of Mediation... 4). 6/02 )sa/b. 65 
Chapter V. The Armistice Proposal and the Ques- 
TOPO Pe ER CCOSTIIEIOD vi y70 fa) sieln) Upeiain ae 9 4 ate 87 
Chapter VI. The Confederate Propaganda........ 105 
Chapter VII. The Empire in Mexico............-- II5 
_Chapter VIII; From Gettysburg to the Close of the 
War ee eer tice wie ye crotanlee, we 130 
hapter’s LX.) Concltsion saie sie. lars ee 25) alatatale se) 150 
Vv 


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PREFACE 





The neutrality of the great maritime powers of Europe 
made possible the victory of the Union in the great crisis of 
the republic. However, there were times when that neutral- 
ity was in danger of being broken, and an appreciation of the 
development of public opinion in those countries helps in 
an understanding of the attitude of their governments. 
Moreover, the opinions of intelligent Europeans upon the 
issues in dispute are of interest when it is realized that 
America was looked upon as a battleground upon which 
were being fought out those principles that were believed 
to be in dispute on the continent of Europe. The develop- 
ment of English opinion during the period is fairly well 
known in its outline, but the French phase has suffered com- 
parative neglect, and this is offered in excuse for the pres- 
ent study. 

In the preparation of this monograph, a study has been 
made of the principal French newspapers and other periodi- 
cals representing various political groups, and of the de- 
bates in the legislature. These have been supplemented by 
the opinions of observers representing both the Union and the 
Southern Confederacy, and the original correspondence of 
the Confederate State Department, the so-called ‘“ Pickett 
Papers,” now in the Library of Congress, has been used in 
this connection. 

The matter of references naturally has caused some dif- 
ficulty, and this has been met by inserting only those that 
bear directly upon the text, but it is believed that they are 
representative and quite ample. No attempt has been made 
to follow the French discussions of the military develop- 
ments in America as these were frequently based upon erro- 
neous, and always upon tardy, information. The inclusion 


Vii 


Viil FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


of these discussions would only have been confusing and 
would have clouded the really important issues. Neither 
has any attempt been made to enter into the diplomatic phases 
of Franco-American relations, though it is to be hoped that 
some day, when the French archives are open to the public, 
this will be done by some investigator. 

Finally, while accepting full responsibility for all errors 
and shortcomings in this monograph, the author desires to 
express his sense of obligation for suggestions and criticism 
to Dr. John H. Latané, Dr. John M. Vincent and Professor 
Gilbert Chinard, of the Johns Hopkins University, and to 
Dr. Charles C. Tansill of the Library of Congress, to Mr. 
John C. Fitzpatrick of the Manuscripts Division, Library of 
Congress, for his courtesy, and to Mr. Merle I. Protzman of 
the George Washington University, who has been kind 
enough to revise a great many translations for the author. 


W.R. W. 


CONTEMPORARY FRENCH OPINION ON THE 
AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


CHAPTER I 


THE ISSUES 


Long before the outbreak of our Civil War, the future of 
the American Union had been the subject of speculation 
among European observers. History afforded no example 
of a democracy upon so large a scale, and it was not con- 
sidered improbable that the Union would be broken up into 
sections. Even so good a friend of America as De Tocque- 
ville commented upon the gradual weakening of the Federal 
bond, and the forces of sectionalism were well understood. 
The Americans were subjecting themselves to an experiment 
which Europeans would do well to watch. 

The revolt of the Southern States intensified this interest. 
Although things of great importance were taking place in 
Europe, and developments in Italy, Russia and Germany 
might well have absorbed the thoughts of intelligent French- 
men, the American war yielded nothing in importance to 
these in the editorial comment of the great French news- 
papers. Events were followed with the closest interest; 
the issues were discussed from all points of view, and be- 
came the subject of bitter controversy. 

In abhorrence of slavery, Frenchmen could agree almost 
without exception. The institution had been abolished in the 
French colonies in 1848, and their ideas of the situation in 





chap. xviii; Michel Chevalier, Lettres sur l’Amérique du Nord, 
letter xxxi, Symptémes de Révolution; Philaréte Chasles, Etudes 
sur la Littérature et les Moeurs des Anglo-Americains au xix® Siécle 
(Avenir de l’Amérique Septentrionale et des Etats-Unis, sect. 12). 


IO FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


America were influenced greatly by the writings of Harriet 
Beecher Stowe and William Ellery Channing. Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin, in translation, had been popular in France and it 
went through several editions. Liberals, especially, accus- 
tomed to the defense of individual rights, felt the strongest 
horror of an institution that was repugnant to all liberal 
thought. Even the Constitutionnel, an Imperialist organ, 
which was later to become one of the most devoted adherents 
of the South, said in December, 1860, referring to the sur- 
render of fugitive slaves: “ Without doubt, it would appear 
to be just that a piece of property should be reclaimed 
everywhere and given back to whomever it belongs. But 
when that property is a man, one can understand that the 
citizens of a free state feel some repugnance in arresting 
the unfortunate individual to deliver him anew to slavery 
and the whip. . . . As for us, our wishes at the very same 
time are for the safety of the great American republic and 
for the gradual diminution of slavery.”* A year later, 
after that paper had definitely thrown its influence upon the 
side of the South, it said: “There remains the question of 
slavery. As for us, we believe it useless to protest against 
the strange imputation of favoring that detestable institu- 
tion.” * The Revue Germanique called the Montgomery con- 
stitution “a crime arranged in cold blood, for it rests upon 
an outrage against human nature and divine justice,” the 
institution of slavery. The Pays, an Imperialist paper, ad- 
mitted that “certainly, the abolition of slavery is a noble 
cause to defend and bring to a triumphant conclusion.” ® 
The North and South were compared in growth of popula- 
tion, in commerce, the production of writers, artists, and 
inventors, in the value of improved land, in manufacturing, 





2 Constitutionnel, Dec. 26, 1860, H.-Marie Martin. On this subject 
of slavery, see also Victor Hugo, letters entitled “ John Brown” 
(1859), “Les Noirs et John Brown” (1860), and “La Médaille de 
John Brown” (1867), in GEuvres Complétes (Hetzel edition), Actes 
et Paroles, vol. ii. 

SIbid., Dec. 13, 1861, Auguste Vitu. 

* Revue Germanique, vol. xiv, p. 176, Mar. 15, 1861, Charles Dollfus. 

5 Pays, Nov. 22, 1860, A. Esparbié. 


THE ISSUES II 


in attraction of free men from the other section, all show- 
ing the superiority of the North, which was not cursed with 
the leprosy of slavery. Why the South could desire slavery 
when it led to such results was a mystery to most liberals. 
“Although the history of man is full of cases in which one 
sees a mysterious and merciless Jupiter deluding those whom 
he wishes to destroy, perhaps the world has not seen many 
examples of an equal infatuation.” ° 

Not’ that the peculiar institution of the South did not 
have some adherents. The Journal des Débats, organ of the 
Orleanists, and perhaps the most influential paper in 
France, pays them this sarcastic comment: “In our coun- 
try where a true aristocracy is so cruelly lacking, there are 
those who imagine that they are giving themselves a varnish 
of aristocracy by embracing some opinion contrary to natu- 
ral feeling or the inspiration of good sense. There is noth- 
ing more vulgar than not to love slavery, nothing more ele- 
gant than, with an air of profundity, to wish its contin- 
uance and extension in the world.’’7 

Not long after this it notes a more serious manifestation 
of pro-slavery feeling. Le Monde, an organ of the Cath- 
olics, had published an article which it attributed to Arch- 
bishop Hughes of New York, in which were set forth the 
extenuating circumstances in favor of slavery. In justice to 
the Archbishop, however, it should be added that he denied 
having written the article. In 1861 he went to France where 
he defended the Union cause. The Debats “could not read 
without a profound disgust, that strange dissertation, la- 

6 Journal des Débats, Apr. 22, 1861, J.-J. Weiss; Correspondant, 
Jan., 1861, vol. lii, pp. 114-136, Augustin Cochin; Revue des Deux 
Mondes, vol. xxxi, pp. 142-143, 151, Jan. 1, 1861, Elisée Reclus. John 
Bigelow says of the writer last mentioned: “M. Reclus was about 
thirty years old when I made his acquaintance in Paris. He was the 
most violent reactionary against dynastic government that I had ever 
met. He later became a Socialist and finally a philosophic but not a 
criminal anarchist. He revolted against conventionalism of all kinds, 
and, to show his superiority to social prejudices, he married an 
African lady from Senegal.” He was the author of La Nouvelle 
Géographie Universelle, in 20 volumes (Retrospections of an Active 
Life, vol. ii, p. 88). 

7 Journal des Débats, Dec. 7, 1861, Prévost-Paradol. 


I2 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


boriously built upon arguments borrowed from all sources, 
from philosophy, history, religion, the Bible, and even from 
the Evangelist,” in which the author “ while conceding that 
slavery is not of divine institution’ contented himself with 
demonstrating that it went back to the most remote times, 
and consoled himself with the thought “that after all, it 
is the consequence of original sin.” The author was ac- 
cused of concluding that the abolitionists were guilty of de- 
siring “to anticipate the moment when it shall please Provi- 
dence to bring about a change in the social life of the coun- 
tries where slavery still exists.”’ ‘“ Such,” says the Débats, 
“is the resumé of the doctrines that le Monde recommends 
to its readers as “truths well worthy of their attention.’ It is 
only fitting for the party which has thrown anathema against 
the most elevated principles and the most precious con- 
quests of modern societies, to the party which has denounced 
the liberty of the press, liberty of thought, liberty of con- 
science, as the inventions of Hell; it was only fitting for 
that party to constitute itself the official defender and the 
patron of slavery. In stating the fact for the very great 
edification of the public, we do not have the simplicity to 
be astonished.” ® It is to be noted, however, that le Monde 
had only referred with approval to the article. It had not 
itself openly defended slavery. 

The Pays, while condemning slavery in principle, offered 
historical evidence in extenuation of the institution. This 
brought out answers by the Siécle, organ of the Republi- 
cans, and the Constitutionnel, which latter called upon the 
Americans to imitate their ancestors who in the Constitution 
inscribed the declaration of “the rights of man, without dis- 
tinction of color or of race,” a proposition which the Pays 
denied. When attacked by the Opinion Nationale, the Pays 
summed up its position in three points: First, that the found- 
ers of the republic had not found slavery incompatible with 


99 





8 Ibid. Dec. 25, 1861, Louis Alloury. The issue of Feb. 3, 1862, 
contains "the Archbishop’ s letter disclaiming authorship of the article. 
a Pays) Wet ate 7, 29, 1860, A. Granier de Cassagnac. 


THE ISSUES 13 


a republic, just as the Romans and Greeks had not; sec- 
ond, that the States had entered the Union with all their 
local institutions reserved to them, and among the first of 
these was slavery; third, that all the Presidents and Con- 
gresses had protected the States in the institution.° At the 
same time, the Pays was defending the censorship of the 
French press, and the Gazette de France accused it of de- 
fending the servile cause both for America and France.1? 
Soon after this, the Pays opened its columns to three articles 
by Paul Pecquet du Bellet, a citizen of the United States, 
born in New Orleans, who presented the whole argument 
from the Southern point of view, and called upon French- 
men not to reserve all their sympathies for the blacks, but to 
remember that the South was exposed to fears of a slave in- 
surrection.?? 

Prevost-Paradol, of the Journal des Débats, one of the 
most brilliant of French editorial writers, was a consistent 
defender of the Union. He published a number of letters 
in the Courrier du Dimanche, some of which dealt with the 
American question. A letter of February 24, 1861, showeda 
sympathetic understanding of the Southern attitude unusual 
among the liberals. ‘Let us suppose that we had received 
from our fathers our slaves at the same time we received our 
fields, that there existed for us no other instruments of labor 
than those docile hands, that we were admitted as possessors 
of slaves in the great republic by a free contract and with- 
out contest; and that after long years of concord, there 
arose around and against us a sort of sudden gale, prevent- 
ing us from spreading out equally with our neighbors, hold- 
ing us back as a plague from the free spaces where we de- 
sired to establish ourselves; keeping us at home the better 
to destroy us, and bringing even into the midst of our slaves, 

10 Tbid., Jan. 3, 1861, A. Granier de Cassagnac. 

11 Tbid., Jan. 6, 1861, A. Granier de Cassagnac. 

12 Tbid., Feb. 9, 13, 21, 1861, Paul Pecquet du Bellet. In the Library 
of Congress is a typewritten copy of this writer’s manuscript intended 
for publication, entitled, “The Diplomacy of the Confederate Cabinet 


of Richmond and its Agents Abroad,” which throws some light upon 
his own activities. 


14 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


to the very foot of the domestic altar, menacing words, 
which in the North would mean liberty, but which would 
change their sense in coming to servile ears and would 
mean among us only murder and pillage.” But his support 
of the North is no less strong because of this, for if the 
North consented to the demands of the South, the struggle 
would come later and be more terrible. “ The atmosphere 
which we breathe is fatal to slavery.” The South is in 
opposition to the opinion of the whole world. ‘What is 
the North in this conflict, but the involuntary and unfor- 
tunate instrument of the rest of the world.” “The North can 
not serve by its laws, its customs, its love of concord, as a 
rampart for slavery and be any longer for the South a kind 
of protecting belt against that moral contagion.” 1% What- 
ever palliating circumstances liberals might admit in ex- 
tenuation of the attitude of the Southerners, their opposi- 
tion to the institution of slavery itself was uncompromising. 

The liberal press of France showed a surprising warmth 
in the defense of the Union. Articles on the Civil War oc- 
cupied a prominent place even while events of great impor- 
tance to France were taking place in Europe. In a large 
measure, this was due to inability to discuss the internal 
politics of France. While the decree of November 24, 1860, 
which permitted the publication of the debates in the Corps 
Législatif and Sénat upon the Address, is regarded as 
marking the beginning of the Liberal Empire, still the ad- 
ministrative control of the press remained. Liberals could 
not carry on a campaign in favor of principles they held at 
heart. But upon American affairs they could offer praise of 
the democracy they discreetly held up as an ideal. To them, 
the North represented freedom and democracy, while the 
South stood for slavery and aristocracy. Skilful writers, 
familiar with the intricacies of the censorship, made great 
success in the method of indirect attack, and to such writers 
fell the heritage of the cliéntéle that formerly had belonged 
to the less adroit editors of the Opposition who succumbed 





13 Courrier du Dimanche, Feb. 24, 1861, Prévost-Paradol. 


THE ISSUES 15 


to the censorship.'* To them, the Civil War was an oppor- 
tunity. In America, they believed, there were being fought 
out those essential principles which they were not free to 
apply in France. It was a battle of ideals in which they 
were free to take sides. Union ideals and Northern insti- 
tutions were held up for admiration.1> The South stood for 
those principles which they held detestable. Their readers 
could draw their own conclusions as to what they desired 
for France. Sometimes the parallel was too closely drawn, 
and the official suspicion was aroused. John Bigelow tells 
us that once upon the publication of two volumes of United 
States Diplomatic Correspondence, the Opinion Nationale 
published an article, inspired by Bigelow, entitled “ Ameri- 
can Diplomacy,” and dealing with the subject of open diplo- 
macy. The comparatively large volumes of the United 
States were there contrasted with the French “ Yellow Book.” 
Perhaps this paper had been led to such boldness by the 
fact that it was the organ of the Prince Imperial, and de- 
pended upon him for support. Guéroult, the chief editor, 
was called before the Minister of the Interior, with whom 
was also Chaix d’Estange, who was the Vice-President of 
the “ Commission Municipale”’ of Paris. The Minister re- 
ferred to the fact that Guéroult had chosen the precise mo- 
ment when the Yellow Book was being prepared to publish 
his article, and asked if it was intended as a warning or 
censure to the government. ‘“ The object of this article could 
hardly have been merely to make a eulogy—a little pompous 
but perhaps merited—of American diplomacy, but rather 
to criticise European diplomacy and especially that of 
France,” said the Minister, who added that formerly 
the Department of Foreign Affairs had given the public 
nothing while now they gave the Yellow Book, and yet 
Guéroult was not satisfied. The editor replied, “ We can- 
not help contrasting the meagre French Livre Jaune with 





14a Gorce, Histoire du Second Empire, vol. iv, p. 198. 

15 “ Pourquoi donc voulez-vous déchirer en deux cette radieuse ré- 
publique américaine, la joie et_la gloire de Phumanité? ” From Eu- 
géne Pelletan’s “Adresse au Roi Coton.” 


16 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


the large volumes, so complete, published by Mr. Seward.” 
The Minister answered that “ one would almost be tempted 
to think there was a fixed determination or combination to 
offer the United States always as an example for every- 
thing. Only yesterday you were exalting the American mu- 
nicipal system at the expense of ours.” D’Estange then 
asked Guéroult if he was entirely sure of the correctness of 
his information about the municipal organization of the 
District of Columbia."® 

It is no doubt true, too, that the Opposition took pleasure 
in supporting the North because it was evident that the 
Emperor was using his influence in favor of the South. As 
a matter of politics it was advisable to oppose the govern- 
ment policy. When the American issue was joined to the 
Mexican venture and Napoleon’s plan for the establishment 
of an American empire was associated with his scheme for 
aiding in the establishment of Southern independence, there 
was only another reason to support the Union. Hence, prac- 
tical politics, as well as sentimental inclination and a desire 
to air their theories of government, urged the Liberals to 
support the Union. As a result, the ablest writers, the most 
influential journals and the foremost politicians joined in 
discussions upon the American question. 

From the election of Abraham Lincoln and the threats of 
disunion by the South, the newspapers showed a keen in- 
terest in the matter, although the disruption of the Union 
was not expected at first. The threats of the Southerners 
were looked upon as only what might be expected of a de- 
feated party in America. ‘France had become accustomed to 
hearing such things from America and did not take the 
latest crisis too seriously. Extraordinary prudence and mod- 
eration from both factions were necessary, but other elec- 
tions had been reputed to be dangerous and nothing had 
come of them.’ The Southern States would be afraid to 








16 Retrospections of an Active Life, vol. ii, p. 245, Bigelow to 
Seward, Dec. 9, 1864. 
17 Constitutionnel, Nov. 21, 1860, H.-Marie Martin. 


THE ISSUES 17 


introduce the principle of secession. The states of the Union 
knew well that the first germ of dissolution introduced into 
the federation would be the source of thousands of evils 
more terrible than slavery itself, and perhaps only a little 
time would pass before the destruction of the whole of that 
enormous giant which had grown too quickly, and which ran 
the risk, if it were shaken too strongly, of perishing as much 
by its good qualities as by its faults. Both the North and 
the South understood this, and whether they believed in 
emancipation or in slavery, they were, above all, federalists.*® 

The threats were looked upon simply as political ma- 
neuvers. They were only “electoral threats,’ such as the 
politicians of the South, ‘“‘ accustomed to dominate by fear,” 
had made many times before, and many of them would be 
embarrassed if taken at their word. While South Carolina 
seemed to be making an appearance of desiring to put the 
separatist program into execution, still that State was the 
“enfant terrible ” of the Democratic party, and not too much 
importance was to be placed upon what it said. Five or six 
States might follow it, but that would be all, and such would 
not form a new confederation. Moreover, it would be un- 
reasonable for states to declare their independence merely 
because the American people had chosen for the first time a 
president who did not satisfy the South, especially as most 
of the Republicans did not desire to suppress slavery but 
merely to prevent its extension.?® 

As time passed, however, and matters took on a more seri- 
ous aspect, even the Liberal friends of the Union came to 
believe that the South would be successful to some degree. 
The early position of the Journal des Débats had been that 
the Democratic party, defeated in the elections, would not 
be so unreasonable as to provoke a conflict in which it would 
meet superior forces and be given over to the servile war 
that Frenchmen expected would result from a conflict. It 
was thought that the South needed the North, even the aboli- 

18 Pays, Nov. 22, 1860, A. Esparbié. 


19 Revue Contemporaine, vol. liii, p. 384, Nov. 29, 1860, E. Hervé. 
Zz 


18 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


tionists, to keep down slave uprisings. The Debats be- 
lieved that the predictions of civil war came from those who 
desired to use the agitation in America as an argument against 
free institutions.2° But only a month later that journal 
took the position that there would be a separation of some 
states though it hoped that these would be of small number.*+ 
What astonished Europe was not so much to see a powerful 
state seized with an irresistible desire to cease to exist, so 
much as to see that work accomplished in an instant and al- 
most without effort. The secession was regarded as a fait 
accompli.??_ But in later articles, for a long time, the liberal 
paper continued to maintain hopes of the preservation of the 
Union, though the separation of a limited number of States 
was regarded as more probable. In an interesting article of 
February 14, 1861, the possibility was referred to that a 
party might rise up within the seceding States and reestab- 
lish the power of the federal government. It was pointed 
out also that there were elements of discord in the South, 
for Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina and Ken- 
tucky did not need slavery, except to raise slaves for the cot- 
ton, rice and sugar-cane growing States, and Southern vic- 
tory with the restoration of the African slave trade would 
remove even this incentive to retain the institution. In any 
case the North would never permit New Orleans and the 
region around it and the control of the Mississippi to pass 
away from it, for that river was absolutely necessary for the 
exportation of their products. The Western States would 
not permit the loss of this region. “If the whim struck 
them, the intrepid pioneers of the states of the Northwest 

. would conquer America, not merely to the mouths of 
the Mississippi, but down to Cape Horn.” ‘The new slave 
government would only extend from the Gulf of Mexico to 
a line south of the Chesapeake and from the Atlantic to a 
' line east of the Mississippi. “ What figure would it make 
in the world beside the immense agglomeration which would 





20 Journal des Débats, Dec. 7, 1860, John Lemoinne. 
21 Tbid., Jan. 7, 1861, F. Camus. 
22 Tbid., Jan. 20, 1861, A. Léo. 


} 
THE ISSUES 19 


remain grouped under the banner of the liberty of races?” ?8 
This article showed a surprisingly correct knowledge of the 
great forces at work in America, and a philosophical view of 
the situation of which only an outsider could be capable. 
The fall of Fort Sumter was not regarded as of great mili- 
tary significance, but its political consequences it was thought 
might be grave, for in diminishing the possibility of concilia- 
tion, it might render the rupture and separation irremedi- 
able.** It advised that the two sides get together and recog- 
nize that the North could not force the Southern States to 
reenter the Union. At any rate the character of the war 
would depend upon the action of the South, which might at- 
tempt to free the Potomac, or might limit itself to privateer- 
ing.?° 

On August 15, the probable results of the war were 
capitulated: 1, Dismemberment of the Union, with two new 
governments, the South being limited to seven or eight 
States east of the Mississippi; 2, Abolition by the North, or 
at least further restriction of slavery; 3, The North would 
become a great naval power as a result of the war; 4, Eventu- 
ally institutions in North America would become more cen- 
tralized and the executive become more powerful; 5, Eventu- 
ally, the South would start upon a career of conquest against 
Cuba and Mexico, while the North would receive more sym- 
pathy from Canada in its desire to annex that country; 6, It 
was considered certain that Europe would lose America as a 
market for its goods during the war; 7, Europe would lose 
its cotton supply during the war.** Near the end of Sep- 
tember, 1861, the hope was expressed that the North would 
submit to the separation as an “inexorable fatality,” for 
war would mean the loss of liberties to the people, restric- 
tion of travel by passports, preventative arrests, restrictions 
upon the press, seizure of goods presumed to belong to 

23 Tbid., Feb. 14, 1861, F. Camus. See also Laboulaye, “ Pourquoi le 
Nord ne peut accepter la séparation,” Revue Nationale, Dec., 1862. 

24 Tbid., April 27, 1861, L. Alloury. 


25 [bid., June 3, 1861, Baudrillart. 
26 Tbid., Aug. 15, 1861, F. Camus. 


20 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


Southerners, and in addition, the raising of the imposts, and 
direct taxes. The people probably would not endure these 
illegal and unconstitutional things, and Congress would have 
to pass laws of violence and terror. If the people should 
submit to such laws, they would be under a rule of force, 
and some audacious general, possessing popularity, might 
establish a new order of things “upon the ruins of that 
which the great men of the independence had instituted with 
so much care and sagacity.” And to this might be added the 
horrors of a servile war. But, though America seemed con- 
demned to go through cruel experiences, the belief was ex- 
pressed that it would come out stronger than ever before as 
did France from the horrors of 1793.27 Liberals resigned 
themselves to what they believed inevitable. The Revue 
des Deux Mondes feared that the last acts of Buchanan’s ad- 
ministration had rendered the dissolution of the confedera- 
tion irrevocable,?® but it hoped that by avoiding the shedding 
of blood and by merely blockading and surrounding the 
South, the North could bring about a reaction within the 
new confederation and the parts of the Republic would be 
reunited, for the shedding of blood would mean the end of 
the Union, as it could not be imagined that the North could 
conquer and govern the Southern States.2® If the South 
were conquered it would be only an Ireland, a Hungary, a 
Poland.*° A long war would mean a large permanent army, 
with great budgets and debts. The American Republic would 
no longer be what Europe had known; transformations 
would take place to the loss of liberty. To prevent this, the 
war must be short.*t The Revue Germanique believed that 
the North would be victorious in the end; that the planters 





27 Tbid., Sept. 28, 1861, F. Camus. 

28 Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. xxxii, p. 758, Apr. 1, 1861, E. For- 
cade. For the opinions of this brilliant editor, see L. M. Sears, “A 
Neglected Critic of our Civil War,” in Miss. Valley Hist. Rev., vol. i, 
p. 532, March, 1915. 

29 Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. xxxiii, pp. 1001-2, June 15, 1861, 
E. Forcade. 

30 Tbid., vol. xxxv, pp. 243-4, Sept. 1, 1861, E. Forcade. 

81 Tbid., vol. xxxv, pp. 512-14, Sept. 15, 1861, E. Forcade. 


THE ISSUES 2M | 


did not represent the whole South, and that even though they 
might dominate by terror, there were many there who did 
not own slaves, who might be expected to sympathize with 
the Union. With slavery abolished new elements and new 
interests would come forward and the new generations would 
rebuild amid peace and liberty that which war had de- 
stroyed.*2, When the Liberals could take such a gloomy 
view of the situation, the Imperialists could not be expected 
to entertain the idea of the preservation of the republic of 
the new world. As early as January 20, 1861, the Constitu- 
tionnel took a serious view of affairs. “ It is, indeed, unfor- 
tunately probable, after the turn that events are taking, that 
we shall see consummated the scission of the great American 
republic.”” For even if the separatist States were defeated 
in their first resistance, there would remain a moral rupture 
that could not be healed. The only hope of preservation of 
the Union, it thought, lay in the possibility that the North, 
though victorious both at the polls and in the field, would 
accept the role of the defeated.** The idea was derided that 
it was possible to subjugate ten or twelve million men spread 
over an immense territory.** The Pays believed that an 
agglomeration of states opposed in interests, different in ori- 
gin, with individual tendencies, badly united by the federal 
political bond, such as the United States, was destined sooner 
or later to disintegrate,*®> and the Patrie thought it probable 
that there would be republics of the North, Center, South, 
West and Pacific.** At the end of the year 1861, the papers 
of France, no matter where their sympathies lay, had given 
up the idea that the Union would be preserved in its entirety. 
The greatest hope of the friends of the Union was that the 
new confederation would be limited to a few states, and 
they feared that if their ideal state were subjected to the 








Senate Germanique, vol. xvi, p. 480, Aug. 15, 1861, Charles 
ollfus. 

83 Constitutionnel, Jan. 20, 1861, H.-Marie Martin. 

84 Tbid., July 7, 1861, A. Grandguillot. 

35 Pays, May 29, 1861, Durangel. 

86 Patrie, Mar. 25, 1861, Oscar de Watteville. 


ged FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


trials of a long civil war, it would come out of the conflict 
transformed, to the loss of liberty for the whole world. 

Throughout the war an editorial battle was waged between 
the papers in France as to what were the real causes of the 
conflict. The supporters of the Union knew that if they 
could pin the issue down to slavery and prove that slavery 
was the thing at stake, the sympathies of the French people 
would be with the North. French newspapers supporting 
the South could make only the most timid efforts to exten- 
uate the institution of slavery, and they bent their energies 
toward proving that slavery was not the issue. 

The position taken by the Journal des Débats from the 
very beginning of the conflict is representative of the Liberal 
argument throughout the war. Upon receipt of the news of 
the election of Lincoln to the presidency, that paper asserted 
that the victory of the Republican party was the result of 
Northern indignation against Southern encroachments. The 
disregard of the slavery party for its most solemn agree- 
ments, such as the Missouri Compromise, the declaration that 
slavery was established by divine right, that even the people 
of a state could not pronounce slavery illegal, and Southern 
threats of resistance to the Union, it said, were outrages to 
humanity and to reason, and had produced their fruit. The 
election of Lincoln had put an end to the encroachments of 
the slavery party. Even though it declared that it would not 
interfere in the peculiar affairs of the South, the basis of the 
Republican party was abolition. The slave territory would 
be enclosed in a circle of free states where escaped negroes 
would find an assured asylum, and if then they should at- 
tempt to separate from the Union, they would find them- 
selves without allies, for, asked the Débats, what nation 
would not repulse with disgust the hand offered to it by the 
new American republic? ** In a satirical analysis of Bu- 
chanan’s annual message, it maintained that the South was 
threatening to dissolve the Union because the North had 
exercised its constitutional rights in choosing a president. 


87 Journal des Débats, Dec. 4, 1860, Auguste Léo. 








THE ISSUES 23 


“The South insisted that the Constitution admit slavery in 
principle, it claimed the right of spreading slavery abroad, 
it accepted, then repudiated, the Missouri Compromise, and 
now it desires to forbid other states to declare that liberty 
is a common right on their soil.”” By separation, with a de- 
parture from the northern protective policy, the South hopes 
to develop southern ports to supplant those of the North. 
As for Buchanan’s proposition for the return of fugitive 
slaves, “ Let one imagine for an instant what would happen 
in our streets and our public squares if we should see a 
negro seized by the police, bound in chains, placed in prison, 
then led out like a beast of burden to be turned over to a 
master who reclaimed him.” It is just such scenes as this, 
says the Debats, that have led to a revulsion of feeling in 
the North against Southern domination. If a conflict now 
results which leads to the fall of the Union, it will not be 
because of any fault inherent in its constitution, but because 
of the impossibility of leaving side by side in the same state, 
liberty and the most degrading servitude.** This evidently 
was intended as a reply to those who held that the dissen- 
sions in America only showed the failure of republican in- 
stitutions. Commenting upon the South Carolina declara- 
tion of independence and the statement that the yoke of the 
North has been broken, the Débats exclaims, “as if not to 
be longer assured of always oppressing was for them an in- 
tolerable oppression.” *° 

With the French liberal, the issue of slavery blinded him 
to the broader movement for nationality in the South. How- 
ever, some appreciation of other issues was shown in an 
article of February 20, 1860, when it was admitted that slav- 
ery was not the only thing that threatened the Union, for 
there was also the desire, maintained for ten or twelve years 
in the South, to win commercial freedom from the North, 
especially from New York. A means to this end was a pro- 
posed canal by way of the James and Kenawah Rivers to 





38 Tbid, Dec. 30, 1860, Auguste Léo. 
39 [bid., Jan. 10, 1861, J.-J. Weiss. 


24 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


connect the Mississippi Valley and the Atlantic. Another 
means was direct commerce with the cotton consuming coun- 
tries. But the Débats believed that this latter would be a 
doubtful scheme, as commercial routes and habits change 
slowly, and New York and Boston probably would remain 
for a long time the great emporia of the world commerce 
of the United States. It maintained that a more practicable 
proposal was to build up Southern cotton manufacturies; 
for, it said, even then of the 2,600,000 spindles in the 
United States, 350,000 were in the South.*° 

The slavery argument was, however, soon resumed, and 
it was reasserted that: “ The cause of the war is the deter- 
mination that the South took three quarters of a century 
ago, and in which it has imperturbably persisted, of perpetu- 
ating and extending slavery in place of having applied its 
care to limiting and diminishing it by degrees.” 42 As for 
the contention that the tariff was an important issue in the 
conflict, that was brushed aside with the declaration that 
“the South . . . perverted the truth when it strove . 
to persuade Europe that men united by bonds of nationality 
and parentage were going to butcher one another over an 
affair of the tariff.” 4? The annual message of Jefferson 
Davis was read carefully in France, but liberals could not see 
a moral issue from the Southern point of view, and com- 
menting upon a clause in which he placed his faith in the 
greatness and justice of his cause, the Débats says: “ Those 
certainly are fine and magnificent words. But, in the mouth 
of Mr. Davis, applied to the cause that he represents and 
which he defends, they are not only a monstrous misstate- 
ment, a scandal, they are a blasphemy.” #? The Davis mes- 
sage had not gone into the question of slavery, and this is 
explained by the assertion that slavery “is the arch saint 
which no one may touch, it is the legitimate and necessary 
base of well constituted states. It is no longer slavery, 








40 Tbid., Feb. 20, 1861, Chemin-Duponteés, 
41 Tbid., May 17, 1861, Baudrillart. 

42 Thid., Oct. 19, 1861, Auguste Léo. 

43 Tbid., Dec. 10, 1861, Louis Alloury. 


THE ISSUES 25 


humble and modest, such as showed itself when Washington 
admitted it into his republic, it is slavery carrying its head 
high, flying its flag, resting upon its rights and claiming 
proudly its place in the sun, threatening us, if we refuse 
it, to turn our workmen into the street.” ** 

The French, especially those who supported the North, 
had little to say about the constitutional question in America. 
Accustomed to a unitary state, with no question about the 
location of sovereignty, they had little comprehension of the 
subtle constitutional arguments to which the United States 
had become accustomed. The illegality of secession was 
taken almost for granted by the liberal journals. It was ad- 
mitted that the separation of a State of the United States 
was not of the serious character that the rebellion of a mere 
province would be, for historically and constitutionally the 
States of the United States had had characteristics of sep- 
arate countries. However, the Constitution created a new 
being and did “not foresee and could not be expected to 
foresee such a separation. It has not at all regulated as to 
the manner according to which an act so grave could be ac- 
complished.” 4#* The truth of the doctrine of Lincoln, it 
said, “that a federation can not be broken legally without 
the consent of all the federated states” was obvious.*® The 
arguments of Mr. Lincoln were, however, found to be too 
subtle “and more worthy perhaps of a jurist than of a 
statesman”; but it was agreed that “he had no difficulty in 
proving that a constitution can not consecrate the legality of 
acts which tend to annihilate it.” It was presumed that 
these arguments were intended for political effect at home, 
but Europe could not be expected to be concerned with them. 
The thing that did appeal to Europe, said the Débats, from 
one end to the other, was the feeling of the North which 
the South denounced as intolerable fanaticism—the horror 
of slavery.*? 








44 Tbid., Dec. 14, 1861, Auguste Léo. 
45 Tbid., June 24, 1861, F. Camus. 
46 Tbid., July 20, 1861, J.-J.Weiss. 
47 Ibid., July 31, 1861, Auguste Léo. 


26 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


These opinions of the Débats were the Liberal argument 
upon the issues of the war, expressed in perhaps its best 
and most emphatic form. But the other Liberal organs 
were not less positive in the belief that the essential thing 
was slavery. The Revue des Deux Mondes was the lead- 
ing literary periodical of France and was intended for the 
cultured classes. Near the close of the year 1861 it con- 
tained an article which summed up this side of the liberal 
argument. The South did not fight either for a separate 
political organization, or because it possessed a separate 
nationality, or to secure economic freedom. An evil tariff 
could cause only temporary inconvenience, while secession 
and civil war would do irreparable injury. The Republicans 
still were in a minority in the Senate and if the secessionists 
had not withdrawn they could have prevented the enactment 
of new laws they did not want. The real cause of the rup- 
ture was slavery. ‘“‘ The war is from now on a war against 
slavery, not in form but in essence, not in words, but in ac- 
tion. . . . If foreign war should complicate the civil war, 
immediate emancipation will be proclaimed as a measure of 
public safety.” #8 Charivari felt that the war would solve the 
question of slavery and that John Brown would not have 
died in vain.*® 

While the Liberals from the beginning gave their sym- 
pathies to the Union and maintained consistently throughout 
the war that slavery was the real issue, the Imperialists 
were much less unanimous and consistent. At first they 
were friendly enough toward the Union, but as the war 
progressed they openly sided with the Confederacy. An ex- 
ample of this was the Constitutionnel, controlled by the 
Count Persigny, a member of Napoleon’s cabinet, who had 
followed that individual’s fortunes through all their vicissi- 
tudes. It was commonly regarded as having a semi-official 
character. After the American election of 1860, that jour- 
nal expressed its pleasure in signs eae opinion thus pro- 


48 Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. x XXXVI, pp. 152-57, 162, Nov. 1, 1861, 
Auguste Laugel. 
49 Charivari, May 5, 1861, Clément Caraguel. 








THE ISSUES 27 
nounce itself against slavery, but it hoped that Lincoln would 
not prove to be the tool of his party instead of its leader, 
and be led into extremes by the radical element.®° Like 
the Débats, it gave a sarcastic review to Buchanan’s annual 
message, and summed it up as saying, “Do all that the 
South requests, then it will be satisfied and will not separate 
from you.” Referring to the repudiation by the South of 
the Missouri Compromise,.it asked whether the South was 
not the aggressor.*! On January 10, summing up the sit- 
uation, it said that, “After having followed constantly a 
policy of encroachment, it [the South] declares itself men- 
aced before being attacked, and separates from the Union 
which has not committed toward it any other crime than to 
elect constitutionally a president representing the sentiments 
of an immense majority. For, it is important to state again 
that the election of Lincoln did not mean the abolition of 
slavery, but simply a firm resolution to prevent its indefinite 
extension.” It is true that the tariff and a desire for indus- 
trial independence from the North have been influences in 
the South. However, “It is to safeguard that dear ‘ peculiar 
institution,’ it is in the name of its security in the midst of 
its slaves, that the South proclaims itself in rebellion against 
the federal constitution.” ** It was even suggested that if 
the North had divined the serious character of the matter 
and foreseen the coming execution, it would have subordi- 
nated its scruples in regard to slavery, voluntarily, as before, 
to its grave interests in the maintenance of the Union.*? As 
for the question of legality, this paper found that from a 
strict interpretation of the Constitution, the South certainly 
was correct in insisting upon the repeal of laws restricting 
the return of fugitive slaves. From this point of view, 
therefore, the North was the section that was revolutionary, 
but revolutionary in the best sense, for it was carrying out 
the revolutionary principle of the founders of the republic, 





50 Constitutionnel, Nov. 21, 1860, H.-Marie Martin. 
51 Tbid., Dec. 26, 1860, H.-Marie Martin. 
52 Tbid., Jan. 10, 1861, H.-Marie Martin. 
®3 Tbid., Jan. 20, 1861, H.-Marie Martin. 


28 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


while “the South has turned its back upon the Revolution 
and deceived the hopes of 1776.” It was admitted that if 
the doctrine of States’ Rights were accepted, the South had 
the right of rebellion. But when the Southerners demand the 
right to carry slaves with them through free territory or into 
new territories, they are demanding too much, for it is 
not just that the 350,000 proprietors of four million negroes 
should raise the claim to “ dominate in a republic of thirty- 
two million men, as they have done in reality for such a long 
time, and to impose upon them forever their law and the 
shame of their ‘ peculiar institution.’ ’’ °* 

Up to this time, it is evident that the Constitutionnel had 
been favorable to the cause of the Union. An article of 
May 7, however, paved the way for an easy transition to the 
other side. It began to appear that its former elaborate ar- 
guments were useless, for the war that is now probable, it 
said, is a “ war without meaning, for one knows too well that 
the extermination of slavery is not the immediate end of the 
armies of the North,’ and “the negroes have not many 
friends among those who will defend Washington.” * On 
May 16, the transition was completed, and the Constitution- 
nel enlisted in the cause of the South. “In fact, war for 
war and nothing else than war, is the strange enterprise of 
which the North dreams.” “It is only too true that the 
movement which now draws from their firesides all the able- 
bodied men from Canada to the Mason-Dixon’s line to throw 
them upon the South, has no raison d’étre. No principle 
justifies it; one searches vainly for an explanation in it.” 
Emancipation “evidently would be a reason for us, but, 
without examining whether that would be a right, it is suf- 
ficient to question the men of the North or the papers 
which represent their opinions, to oppose the most formal 
negation to the existence of that motive in the Yankee heads. 
It is truly puerile to discuss that point.” It is doubted even 


54 Tbid., Jan. 24, 1861, H.-Marie Martin. 
55 Tbid., May 7, 1861, Edouard Gaulhiac. 


THE ISSUES 29 


that emancipation can be a result of the war. Continuing, 
the Constitutionnel says: 

Did the North desire or did it not, that emancipation a priori? In- 
deed the frank abolitionists of New England would not hesitate to 
recognize that truth, that their numbers are restricted and certainly 
do not constitute the majority of those who recognize Mr. Lincoln 
as president. . . . If it is not liberty of the negroes, is it liberty 
of the inhabitants of the North which is at stake, in any of its forms, 
civil liberty, commercial liberty, political liberty? Not at all. A sep- 
aration of states has taken place. What difference does it make 
whether it be based upon a true or false interpretation of the federal 
compact. . . . It is proper for us to be silent, not having participated 
intimately in its signature. 

The thing that is incontestable, the thing that we have the right 
to say, as witnesses, is that at the time of our last interview, téte a 
téte, with the Union, upon the reciprocal presentation of Lafayette and 
Franklin, the American faith had for its credo: governments depend 
only upon the consent of the governed. 

By what right, today, does the North desire to impose its gov- 
ernment upon the South which does not desire it? 5° 

Finally, on November 19, appears an article which evi- 
dently is intended to sum up the situation. It is pointed 
out that the people of the North and of the South are dif- 
ferent in political and social ideas, and have followed dif- 
ferent lines of industrial development. Moreover, the found- 
ers of the republic left germs of discord in the first place in 
permitting slavery, for which the eight States having only a 
small number of slaves and therefore a small interest at 
stake, are the most to blame; and in the second place a mis- 
take was made in trying to form a nation out of states 
which intended to retain their sovereignty. As for the se- 
cession, the people of the North knew that the election of 
Lincoln was considered by the South a danger justifying 
withdrawal from the Union, but they persisted in electing 
him and did nothing to allay the fears of the South, reject- 
ing all compromise. As a matter of fact, the Constitutionnel 
seems to believe that too much democracy has been the cause 
of it all. Finally, it is summed up: The citizens of the United 
States will end by seeing that it is folly “to want to join 
forcibly things between which conscience and the human lan- 


guage have placed an abyss,—slavery and liberty, the in- 


56 Tbid., May 16, 1861, Edouard Gaulhiac. 


30 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


dependence of states and their conquest by force of arms,” *7 
Thus, to borrow an expression from the Débats, the Consti- 
tutionnel veers from North to South.®§ 

The Pays, also regarded as semi-official, had very early 
offered to extenuate slavery and had opened its columns to 
pro-Southern articles, as shown above. This paper made a 
great deal of the legal argument. The United States was 
only a confederation, from which the States had a perfect 
right to withdraw. The Pays engaged in a controversy with 
the Opinion Nationale on the status of the secessionists. 
“The Opinion Nationale calls the Southern states rebels 
because they refuse to sanction the usurpation of powers 
which have never been delegated to the federal govern- 
ment.” °° Du Bellet in this paper attempted to prove that 
the North was the real supporter of slavery while the South 
was opposed to the institution. He said that in 1826 and 
1827, the Northern majority had defeated two measures for 
buying freedom for the slaves, and that Virginia, Maryland 
and Kentucky had been preparing for gradual emancipa- 
tion, but the abolitionists by opposing the execution of the 
fugitive slave laws and by presenting the Wilmot Proviso, 
“ which denied to the inhabitants of the South entrance into 
the territories ” prevented this.°* In fact, slavery would al- 
ready have been abolished in the South had it not been for 
the fact that most of the European immigrants had gone to 
the Northern States, thus increasing the political power of 
the North and threatening little by little the loss to the South 
of its legitimate share of political power, particularly in ref- 
erence to the tariff. 

Despite their protests to the contrary, the Imperialists 
were not at all averse to seeing the passing away of the dem- 








57 Tbid., Nov. 19, 1861, F. Gaillardet. 

58 The Patrie went through a similar and almost contemporaneous 
transition. Compare Jan. 30, 1861, Cucheval-Clarigny, with May 15, 
1861, Camille de la Boulie. 

59 Pays, Apr. 29, 1861, Paul Pecquet du Bellet; May 14, 1861. 
C. Girard. 

60 Tbid., May 15, 1861, Paul Pecquet du Bellet. 

61 Ibid., July 27, 1861, Louis Couture. 


THE ISSUES | 3I 


ocratic republic across the sea, and in fact were willing to 
assist at the demise. Liberals could only sorrowfully take 
their stand with the cause of the North, “ the cause of human 
liberty and emancipation against the cvnical and violent party 
of slavery,” finding consolation in the great and influential 
book of the Count Agénor de Gasparin, “ The Uprising of a 
Great People,” which foretold that over the crime of slavery 
there would arise from this war a greater and grander 
people.** But they could not help but fear that war would 
alter the character of the Union. ‘‘ What grieves and hu- 
miliates us in the unfortunate civil war in which the United 
States founder, is the possible miscarriage of that plan of a 
society constructed by human reason.” * 

The Constitutionnel found the American troubles a sub- 
ject for moralizing against self-government. America, it 
says, which has been pointed out as the ideal of government, 
which the old nations of Europe would do well to imitate, 
now finds that its first crisis leads to a reign of terror, with 
hostility to the rich, the well born and the intellectual, lib- 
erty suspended, justice annulled, the law of suspects in ef- 
fect, the press censured by a wild demagogy, which 
searches for traitors in order to justify itself with its de- 
feats, its mistakes and its fears. Such is the failure of self- 
government. On the other hand the democracy of France 
each day grows in strength, for it recognizes the distinctions 
of class, intellectual eminence, and social superiority. Thus, 
Frenchmen are invited to waste no tears upon the down- 
fall of American democracy.** The Pays predicted that if 
the South were conquered by the North there would be a 
dictatorship by the North. “ That is what war would make 
of that government that has been represented as a model 
of perfection worthy of serving as an example for the as- 
pirations of all the peoples of the world.” ® 








62 Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. xxxiii, pp. 240-1, May 1, 1861, 
E. Forcade. 

83 Tbid., vol. xxxiv, pp. 1003-4, Aug. 15, 1861, E. Forcade. 

64 Constitutionnel, Sept. 26, 1861, A. Grenier. 

65 Pays, Jan. 31, 1861, Camille de la Boulie. 


32 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


Frenchmen naturally were interested in the war from the 
point of view of practical considerations for France. The 
Débats saw in a united and powerful United States a natural 
ally for France, a necessary support upon the seas, a coun- 
try so constituted as to be dangerous to no one.** Victory 
of the North would bring an end to those filibustering ex- 
peditions which had been directed from the United States 
against nations to the south.** The war tariff, however, 
could not find favor even in the eyes of its best friends in 
France, and on May 1, 1861, the Débats complained that 
“hardly had the first threatening symptoms broken out, 
than from one end of the republic to the other there was 
raised the cry ‘To the tariffs!’ Immediately abolitionists 
and the supporters of slavery, republicans and democrats, ran 
to the arsenal of customs duties, and began conscientiously 
to bombard with master strokes of taxes on imports and 
exports, ad valorem duties and specific duties; each raising, 
lowering, modifying, according to his great advantage and 
the greatest detriment of his neighbors.” ° 

The Revue des Deux Mondes felt. that France had “a 
great interest in the maintenance of a power for the founda- 
tion of which it had labored so generously, and which could 
contribute to the maintenance of the maritime equilibrium.” °° 

The Constitutionnel upheld a policy of holy egoism. “ The 
sword of Charlemagne and Napoleon leaves the scabbard 
only when the interest and the glory of the French people 
are at stake.” *° As for Southern expeditions against Cen- 
tral American states, it held that that danger had been greatly 
exaggerated, and the insignificance of the expeditions of the 
past was proof of the small interest maintained there in such 
conquests.** In answer to the assertions of those who held 





ri Journal des Débats, Oct. 25, 1861, F. Camus, “ pour extrait,” from 
a letter. 

67 Tbid., Dec. 4, 1860, Auguste Léo. 

68 Tbid., May 1, 1861, Auguste Léo. ' 

69 Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. xxxi, pp. 752-4, Feb. 1, 1861, E. 
Forcade, and vol. xxxiii, pp. 1001-2, June 15,-1861, E. Forcade. 

70 Constitutionnel, Dec. 15, 1861, Auguste Vi 

71 Ibid., Feb. 24, 1861, Paul Merruau. ; 


THE ISSUES 33 


that France should have a natural sympathy in upholding 
the integrity of a country established by its aid, the Imperial- 
ist organ answered that Washington and Lafayette estab- 
lished the independence of both the North and the South, 
and France had no right to choose between the two. And as 
for any gratitude the United States might entertain toward 
France for its aid, the Constitutionnel maintained that it | 
did not exist, for “if one should place on one side of the bal- 
ances the proofs of affection and of gratitude of the United 
States and upon the other the marks of their spirit of hostil- 
ity, distrust, jealousy, opposition, ingratitude, the pan loaded 
with their ingratitude would be, without doubt, heavier and 
more completely filled than the one which carried the pledges 
of their thankfulness.” 7? The Pays hoped that if a rec- 
onciliation were brought about between the two sections that 
one of the clauses of the transaction would be the abolition 
of the tariff, while if the Union were not established, the 
Southern program of free exchanges would open to French 
agriculture and industry a way for fruitful relations with 
liberal compensation.”* The North is the industrial rival of 
France. Up to the present it has made itself the intermedi- 
ary between the manufactured products of Europe and the 
consumption of the South, and receives annually for those 
services, two hundred and fifty million francs which could 
be directed in large part to Paris, “if France knew how to 
profit by the favorable occasion which was offered her ot 
monopolizing the commerce of direct exchange between her 
and the new Confederation.” If Europe refused to make 
- commercial treaties with the South which would permit the 
payment for its tobacco and cotton in manufactured prod- 
ucts, European finances and industry would be sensibly af- 
fected, for it would be necessary to export in specie the nine 
hundred millions which constituted the price of its com- 
modities and to this should be added the sums necessary to 
pay for the importations of wheat which the periodical crop 


72 Tbid., Dec. I0, © he A, Grenier. 
73 Pays, Feb. 28, ..1, A. de Lauziéres. 


3 


34. FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


failures made necessary. Du Bellet followed this appeal to 
the pocketbook by advising the recognition of the Southern 
Confederation, which “reposing upon a force legally and 
morally exercised by the unanimity of its inhabitants, is a 
government de facto regularly constituted.” “4 

The Patrie argued that, the right of secession being ad- 
mitted, it was in the interest of Europe to “ favor or at least 
not to hinder, a revolution which caused to disappear from 
European politics a great state whose rdle could have become 
embarrassing at any time,” and simplified, by separation, the 
commercial relations of the Occident with the different 
states of North America.”® 

In September, 1861, the rumor went the rounds that 
Garibaldi had been offered the command of the Union ar- 
mies. Bigelow says that this report “was bread to the im- 
perialistic journals in Paris.” Later it was heard that Gari- 
baldi had refused the offer or had been dissuaded by his 
friends."° Bigelow gives a somewhat different version of 
the incident, based upon the testimony of his friend, Mr. 
Beckwith. It seems that the United States consul at Ant- 
werp had written to Garibaldi expressing a wish that he 
would throw himself into the struggle, and Garibaldi an- 
swered that he would be glad to do so, if Italy would spare 
him. Then, Henry S. Sanford, Minister Resident at Brus- 
sels, took the matter up and wrote to Garibaldi asking if he 
would entertain a proposition to enter the service of the 
United States. The Italian hero then wrote to the King, 
saying, in substance, “The Americans desire me to take 
command of their armies; does your Majesty need me here, 
or shall I go?” The King gave his permission, and Sanford 
went to Italy, taking Beckwith along, and offered a major- 
generalship, which was all he had authority to offer. Gari- 
baldi rejected it. He said he would take only the supreme 

74 Ibid., May 7, 1861, Paul Pecquet du Bellet. 

* Patrie, July 26, 1861, A. Esparbié. 

76 Journal des Débats, Sept. 19, 1861, Louis Alloury; Revue des 


Deux Mondes, vol. xxxv, pp. 755-757, Oct. 1, 1861, E. Forcade; 
Charivari, Sept. 16, 1861, Henri Rochefort. 


THE ISSUES 35 


command with authority to proclaim the freedom of all the 
blacks in the United States.” 

Perhaps the French turned their thoughts to Garibaldi 
because they did not believe that in America any great man 
had risen to the occasion. Lincoln was not recognized as 
much above the common level. Upon his election, the Con- 
stitutionnel, then friendly to the Union, while admitting that 
he had the reputation of being an upright man, a lawyer of 
talent and a remarkable orator, recognized that he had not 
yet been in a position to show himself a statesman, or to 
prove that he possessed the qualities to govern with fore- 
sight and firmness.** Lincoln was classed with Buchanan. 
“The American Union would need, in such a peril, a supe- 
rior man, whose respected voice, dominating the tumult, 
would address to patriotism a solemn appeal, and would 
rally the spirits under the old federal banner, held high and 
firm. In default of a Washington, it is Mr. Buchanan, then 
Mr. Lincoln, upon whom the heavy task has fallen of sav- 
ing the republic.” 7° Soon after his inauguration, however, 
it was predicted in a letter from Washington that Lincoln 
would not be able to leave the presidential office, “ without 
being recognized as great as Washington or as incapable as 
Romulus Augustulus.” ®° The Pays thought that the new 
president revealed a character of weakness in complete dis- 
accord with the gravity of the circumstances. His Indian- 
apolis speech was summed up as saying, First, that there 
was no right of secession, Second, that he would not under- 
take to force the separated States to re-enter the Union, and 
Third, that he would retake the Federal forts and buildings 
of which the South had taken possession. These “ hesitating 
and timid declarations’? had not been improved upon at 
Cincinnati, Columbus, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and New York, 
where “everything reveals vagueness of ideas, hesitation, 

77 Retrospections of an Active Life, vol. 1, pp. 371-372. 

78 Constitutionnel, Nov. 21, 1860, H.-Marie Martin. 

79 Ibid., Dec. 26, 1860, H.-Marie Martin. See also Charivari, Mar. 


29, 1861, Pierre Véron. 
80 Tbid., Mar. 11, 1861, Edward Amun. 


36 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


mistrust of himself.” ** Even the Débats, with all its faith 
in democracy, had to admit that no one had risen to the 
crisis: “ Who will dare to make the fanatics of the South 
hear the voice of truth and justice and defend their interests 
against their passions. Where, in America, is the statesman, 
independent enough, so superior to circumstances as to seek 
without mental reservation, in that perilous crisis, only the 
well-being of his country? Alas, it is too probable that 
America will not find even an Agrippa.” §* And on Febru- 
ary 14: “ Where is the superior spirit who will discover the 
proper combination to satisfy everyone? Where is the influ- 
ential man before whom small jealousies and small inter- 
ests would give away with respect? Alas! in America truly 
superior statesmen have disappeared, and the eye searches 
there in vain for one of those great influences before which 
the vulgar are silent.” 

In March, 1861, the Confederate Secretary of State sent 
a commission of three men, W. L. Yancey, Judge P. A. Rost, 
and A. Dudley Mann, to represent the Confederate States 
in Europe. In May, they wrote from Paris that they were 
convinced that England and France would act together in 
their relations with the Confederacy, and that for the pres- 
ent those countries would observe a strict neutrality. Mean- 
time, there was nothing for the commissioners to do but to 
influence public opinion in as unobtrusive a manner as pos- 
sible, awaiting some favorable event that would enable them 
to press the matter of recognition.6* Soon after this, while 
the other two commissioners remained in London, Rost was 
sent to Paris, where he had a most favorable interview with 
the Count de Morny, “the confidential friend of the Em- 
peror.” Perhaps association in official circles made the 
commissioners more optimistic than the facts warranted, 

82 Journal des Débats, Jan. 20, 1861, A. Léo. 

83 Ibid., Feb. 14, 1861, F. Camus. 

84 Yancey and Rost to Toombs, May 10, 1861 (Pickett Papers; 


Confederate Diplomatic Correspondence; MS. archives now in the 
Library of Congress). 


THE ISSUES 37 
for they reported that the “ opinions of the French people 
and of the Government, as far as could be learned, are con- 
sidered to be quite favorable to our cause. The public jour- 
nals are generally favorable. The Anti-Slavery sentiment is 
weak, and not active, in Paris. The Imperialists are con- 
sidered as not averse to see a division of the late United 
States, while large numbers of the Red Republicans and Or- 
leanists view it in an unfavorable light as destroying a naval 
power, which they had looked to as a counterpoise to that 
of Great Britain.” *° They continued their efforts to in- 
fluence opinion, and seemed to think they had considerable 
success,®* although their evident belief that the Opinion 
Nationale, organ of the Prince Napoleon, was becoming fa- 
vorable to the Confederate cause,*’ was contradicted by the 
subsequent attitude of that journal. It was recognized that 
the worst enemies of the Confederacy were the Orleanists 
and the Red Republicans.®® 

The Federals were no less diligent in keeping in touch 
with public opinion. In March, Faulkner wrote to Black 
that the Emperor would be acting “in opposition to the well 
understood feelings of the French people, if he should pre- 
cipitately adopt any step whatever tending to give force and 
efficacy to those movements of separation, so long as a rea- 
sonable hope remains that the federal authority can or should 
be maintained over the seceding states.” °° 

An interesting incident, as showing the attitude taken by 
this government in regard to semi-official utterances, occurred 
in June. The Patrie, which had been regarded as semi- 
official, published an article reporting that negotiations were 
under way looking toward the recognition of the Kingdom 
of Italy, and concluded: “ France in her new attitude, would 
not purpose to interfere at all with the internal or external 








85 Yancey and Mann to Toombs, No. 1, May 21, 1861; Yancey, 
Rost and Mann to Toombs, June 1, 1861 (Pickett Papers). 

86 Yancey and Mann to Toombs, No. 4, Aug. 1, 1861 (Pickett 
Papers). 

87 Mann to Davis, “ private,” Aug. 24, 1861 (Pickett Papers). 

88 Yancey and Rost to Hunter, No. 8, Oct. 5, 1861 (Pickett Papers). 

89 Faulkner to Black, No. 111, Mar. 19, 1861. 


38 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


affairs of the Italian kingdom, which must be sole judge 
of its administration, as it is of its future and its destinies. 
It will act towards it as at some future day the great Euro- 
pean powers will act upon the American question, by recog- 
nizing the new republic of the southern States when that 
republic shall have established a government resting on foun- 
dations which will permit the formation of international re- 
lations with it conducive to general interests.” °° This article 
was republished in the Moniteur without other remark than 
to say that it was taken from the Patrie, but the Moniteur 
was of so purely an official character that the mere repro- 
duction of such an article was regarded as of great signifi- 
cance. Dayton said it attracted much attention and caused 
some anxiety. At the first opportunity he brought the mat- 
ter to the attention of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The 
Minister “at once said that his own attention had been ar- 
rested by it; that it was a ‘silliness’; that Mr. Persigny 
(minister of the interior) was more dissatisfied with it even 
than he was; that the Patrie had ceased, ten days ago, to be 
a semi-official paper; that he did not know how the para- 
graph had crept into the Moniteur, but that Count Walew- 
ski (minister of state) had been out of the city for ten days 
past, and that as a consequence matters had not had the usual 
oversight. He read me a note from the count, in answer 
to one he (Mr. Thouvenel) had written, inquiring if it would 
not be better to insert something to show that the para- 
graph was printed in the Moniteur by mistake, to which note 
the count replied that he thought it would be giving an un- 
necessary importance to the matter, and in that view Mr. 
Thouvenel upon reflection, concurred.” ®t Mr. Seward re- 
plied to Dayton’s report of the matter: “ We are pleased 
that you called Mr. Thouvenel’s attention to the mischiev- 
ous paragraph in the Momniteur, because it has drawn out 
renewed and most satisfactory assurances of the friendly 








90 Patrie, June 15, 1861, Louis Bellet. Translation taken from 
American Diplomatic Correspondence, accompanying Dayton’s note 
to Seward, No. 11, June -, 1861. 

91 Dayton to Seward, No. 11, June -, 1861. 


THE ISSUES 39 


feelings and good wishes of the government of France. At 
the same time, it is but just to ourselves that you shall now 
inform Mr. Thouvenel that it is our settled habit never to 
overhear what the press, or the ministers, or even the mon- 
arch of a foreign country with which we are in amity, says 
concerning us, and never to ask any explanations so long as 
such observations are not directly communicated by the 
government itself to us, and it, at the same time, discharges 
all its customary functions without hostility or injury to 
us.” Belief in the friendship and in the good will of 
France was such a settled habit of mind on the part of the 
American people that if “anything is hastily written or 
spoken on either side that would seem to indicate a different 
sentiment, it is wise to let it pass without sensibility, and 
certainly without querulous animadversion.” ® After this, 
although the semi-official press devoted themselves to the 
support of the Confederacy, they were free to publish ob- 
noxious articles about the United States without complaint 
from the American minister. 

It was while public opinion was in this formative stage, 
and parties were taking their positions upon the American 
question rather because of tendencies and general principles, 
that an event occurred that brought about a crystallization of 
opinion, and which for a while seemed likely to draw two 
great powers of Europe into the conflict. 


82 Seward to Dayton, No. 26, July 6, 1861. 


CHAPTER 


THE TRENT AFFAIR 


On November 8, 1861, the British mail steamer Trent 
was stopped in the open sea by the United States man-of-war 
San Jacinto, and from it were removed the two Confederate 
commissioners, James M. Mason, of Virginia, who had been 
accredited to England, and John Slidell, of Louisiana, ac- 
credited to France, together with the commissioners’ secre- 
taries. This act, if approved by the government at Wash- 
ington, would have amounted to a complete reversal of the 
historic policy of the United States, but it was received with 
the wildest enthusiasm throughout the North, not so much 
because of a fear of what the commissioners might have ac- 
complished in Europe, as because it was recognized as a 
flout at England which was thought to be too friendly to the 
Confederacy. Indignation in England ran correspondingly 
high. The case was referred to the legal advisers of the 
Crown, who pronounced the act of Captain Wilkes illegal. 
The cabinet made immediate preparations for war, and an 
ultimatum was sent to the United States, giving the Ameri- 
can government seven days to reply. Lord Lyons formally 
read the note to Seward on December 23. The British po- 
sition was sustained in a note of Thouvenel, minister of for- 
eign affairs, dated December 3, which was read by the 
French minister at Washington to Seward. It was Napo- 
leon’s policy to maintain the understanding with Great Brit- 
ain, and the comments of the “ officious ” papers show that 
he was willing to go to extreme lengths in this matter of the 
Trent. 

The act of Captain Wilkes took France by surprise. No 
one had suspected that the United States at such a time 
would beard England on the seas. It was recognized imme- 
diately as a matter of extreme gravity. It was thought at 


40 


THE TRENT AFFAIR 41 


first that the officer must have acted upon his own respon- 
sibility, or if he did obey instructions from the cabinet at 
Washington, that the latter had not sufficiently weighed the 
consequences. ‘“‘ That would be the consecration of the 
right of visit, against which they have always protested and 
which was one of the principal causes of the war made by 
them against that same England, in 1812.” It was hoped that 
the United States would repair the mistake. Even the 
Constitutionnel did not predict a war. That paper stated 
that it has no sympathy with the Morning Post when it 
threatened the United States with cannon; that the mere de- 
mand of a great nation should suffice in a question of inter- 
national law and justice.2 The Patrie was more aggressive. 
In its opinion, the law officers of the Crown were clearly cor- 
rect in their decision, and it appeared that it would be diffi- 
cult for the great maritime nations to remain indifferent upon 
a question which touched their rights and interests.? Ina 
cold-blooded analysis of the dispute, the Constitutionnel said 
that the United States might: 1, Surrender Mason and Sli- 
dell with the provision that England renounce the right of 
visit; 2, Say it preferred a direct war to what it considered 
indirect war on the part of England when it supported the 
South secretly, arm its slaves and go to war, though this 
did not accord with the past policy of the United States; 
or 3, It might turn its arms against Canada. In any case, if 
England desired war, this was a good time to secure it, for 
now it could procure cotton and destroy a marine which 
gave it umbrage, while having the air of only defending its 
honor. But, whatever the solution might be, France had 
nothing to lose. If the matter were settled by the “ abolition 
of the right of visit and the absolute recognition of the 
principle that the flag covers the goods,” it would be a bene- 
fit for liberty of commerce and the seas. War between 
England and the United States was regarded with consider- 
able complacency. “War would close momentarily, it is 

1 Constitutionnel, Nov. 29, 1861, F. Guilldrdeted penne day» ©, 


2 Tbid., Nov. 30, 1861, Paulin Limayrac. 
3 Patrie, Dec. 1, 1861, A. Esparbié. 


42 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


true, the markets of the North, already so restrained for our 
products, but it would open for us again those of the South 
which do not have the Morrill tariff, and it would give us 
cotton again, while leaving us on good terms with the union- 
ists and the separatists.”* It was not contemplated that 
France should be drawn into the conflict when it could se- 
cure all the advantages by maintaining neutrality. An article 
in the Morning Post was quoted with approval, predicting 
that France probably would remain a spectator of events, 
but that its moral support would be accorded to those who 
defended the laws of nations.5 The unanimity of the French 
press, in condemning the act of Wilkes, was referred to, 
but it was made clear that the interests and the traditions of 
France traced for it the role of neutrality.6 On December 
IO, an article appeared which caused considerable apprehen- 
sion to Dayton, because of the semi-official character of the 
Constitutionnel. In this, it was pointed out that the United 
States would have captured Mason and Slidell as well under 
the tricolor as under the flag of England. Some space was 
devoted to showing that France had no more historic bonds 
with the North than with the South, for France had helped to 
establish the independence of all the colonies. The proofs of 
affection and gratitude of the United States toward France 
were discounted. The idea was scouted that slavery was the 
alpha and omega of the struggle. “ In sum, we do not see the 
shadow of a reason to refuse or to grudge our sympathies to 
the states of the South.” It could see no reason for sacrific- 
ing the English alliance in the present conflict. From this, the 
Constitutionnel launched into a panegyric upon that alliance: 
“The Anglo-French alliance is itself the general peace and 
security, it is the basis of civilization, it is the pivot of the 
modern world. For our part, we desire with all our heart 
that that union of two great intelligent peoples, strong and lib- 
eral, may be eternal. In the particular circumstances that 
we now pass through, we pray that England, having justice 








# Constitutionnel, Dec. 2, 1861, F. Gaillardet. 
5 Ibid., Dec. 6, 1861, Auguste Vitu. 
6 Ibid., Dec. 7, 1861, F. Gaillardet. 


THE TRENT AFFAIR 43 


on its side, may obtain the satisfaction to which it has a 
right; and, returning very naturally to our own interests, 
we earnestly invoke the moment when the important market 
of America will be reopened to our industry and to our 
commerce, both languishing because of a crisis which is pro- 
longed to the detriment of the entire world.” 7 Dayton felt 
that this article was of a very obnoxious character. ‘‘ That 
article, as you will observe if you have had time to look it 
over, advocates the policy of France making common cause 
with England against us. It looks likewise to the early rec- 
ognition, by France and Great Britain, of the South as an in- 
dependent power.” ® No doubt Dayton’s interpretation of 
this article was correct, despite the subsequent protestations 
of that Napoleonic organ that France should maintain its 
neutrality. Napoleon preferred to keep his policies to him- 
self, paving the way with public opinion for action either 
way. On December 13, while calling attention to “the 
affinities of race and the traditions of origin” between 
France and the different “ provinces ” of the South, the Con- 
stitutionnel affirmed that the commercial interests of France 
were balanced between the South which furnished its cotton 
and the North which consumed its manufactured products 
and its wines, and the role for France to follow was that of 
neutrality.2 On December 15, this argument from the point 
of view of the selfish interests of France is made more clear, 
in the paragraph already quoted,’® to the effect that the 
sword of Charlemagne and Napoleon was only drawn when 
the interests and the glory of France were at stake. The 
idea, expressed by “two or three French papers,” of French 
mediation, or that France should offer to England its armed 
support, was rejected. 

Among these “two or three”? was the semi-official Pays. 
This paper had no difficulty in disposing of the question of 


’ 


7Ibid., Dec. 10, 1861, A. Grenier. 

8 Dayton to Seward, No. 95, Dec. 11, 1861. 

® Constitutionnel, Dec. 13, 1861, Auguste Vitu. 
10 See above, p. 32. 

11 Constitutionnel, Dec. 15, 1861, Auguste Vitu. 


44 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


law. Mason and Slidell were on an English ship and there- 
fore on English territory. The Washington government 
could not claim the right to take the commissioners on the 
ground that they belonged to a nation at war with the United 
States for that would be to give to them the quality of bel- 
ligerents and to admit a legal existence for the Confederacy. 
They could be recognized only as rebels and could be re- 
claimed from English territory only by extradition, though 
extradition would not apply here as their offense was politi- 
cal in its nature. Also, Wilkes had made a mistake when he 
made a definite seizure instead of a provisory one to be re- 
viewed by a prize court. The commissioners could not be 
seized as soldiers, for they were not such. Neither could 
they be seized as diplomatic agents, for that carries inviola- 
bility.1? There was no escape from the dilemma except to 
surrender the prisoners. But perhaps the most interest- 
ing articles of the whole controversy appear in this paper 
during the latter part of December. This becomes clear in a 
letter of Rost to Jefferson Davis, in which he says: “ While 
the Emperor wishes to continue on good terms with the 
Government of the United States and would regret to see the 
Federal Navy destroyed, I cannot doubt that his sympathies 
and those of his Government are with us. A series of ar- 
ticles headed ‘ Reconnaissance des Etats Confédérés’ now 
in course of publication in the ‘ Pays’ newspaper are writ- 
ten in the bureaux of the Ministry of the Interior: they ad- 
vocate the right of Secession, the cause of the South gener- 
ally and its right to be recognized. Other articles of the 
same character have been recommended for publication in 
other papers by the Director of the press, but thus far have 
not been published, because most probably the editors of 
those papers expect money from us.’ 8 The first of the ar- 
ticles in the Pays appeared on December 20. In this, the ex- 
tent of the rebellion was put forth in its favor. “‘ May we 
observe first, that eight million men, united in the same 





12 Pays, Dec. 6, 1861, A. Lomon. 
13 Rost to Davis, No. 9, Dec. 24, 1861. 


THE TRENT AFFAIR 45 


thought and the same end, are not, properly speaking, or- 
dinary rebels.””’ What did it matter if the former defenders 
of the famous right of insurrection found the right of sep- 
aration ridiculous and deplorable. The Constitution was 
before all a work of precaution against the invasions of the 
central power. It was evident that the South was within its 
absolute right. There remained the question whether it 
was making proper use of that right. That was to raise the 
question of the true causes of the war. Among these, slav- 
ery could not be counted, for the war was brought about by 
an economic question complicated with an agrarian ques- 
tion.4* On December 22, the second article dealt with the 
slavery question. Slavery could not be the real cause for the 
reason that the blacks were not liked even in the North. 
Mrs. Stowe’s great work, which had had tremendous influ- 
ence in France, was quoted in proof of this.t* On December 
28, in the last article of the series, the matter of nationality 
was returned to, and it was asked why the Journal des Dé- 
bats, the Siécle and the Temps could defend the cause of 
Italy, Hungary and Poland against Austria and Russia, and 
express so much hatred against the South, which fought for 
an essentially identical cause. Referring to the Orleans 
princes fighting in the ranks of the Northern armies, it was 
asked why they should oppose in America a cause for which 
they contended in Europe. ‘ The Convention said: ‘ Perish 
the colonies rather than a principle. —Do the Journal des 
Débats, the Siécle, the Temps and the princes of Or- 
léans go beyond this and say: ‘ Perish logic rather than our 
malice ’?” +® In view of the relations of this paper with 
the Ministry of the Interior, an article appearing near the 
close of the year, sheds some light upon the significance of 
Thouvenel’s note of December 3, to Mercier, supporting the 
British contention. It discussed the question whether that 
note might be regarded as the preface to intervention, or as 
' 14 Pays, Dec. 20, 1861, A. Grandguillot. 


15 Tbid., Dec. 22, 1861, A. Grandguillot. 
16 Tbid., Dec. 20, 1861, A. Grandguillot. 


46 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


an offer of mediation, and concluded that it appeared to be “a 
declaration of principles in an international question; a res- 
ervation for the future; at the most a warning to the Wash- 
ington cabinet.” 27 

Liberals were divided between their adherence to the cause 
of the Union, and their belief that the act of Wilkes was a 
violation of law and the consecration of a principle inimical 
to the interests of France and to the world. The Journal des 
Debats could only regret that the incident had occurred. It 
said: “ Whatever may be the opinion that one adopts upon 
that subject, whether one approves or disapproves of the de- 
cision of the official jurisconsults [of England], the act | 
of the officers of the federal ship is, however, profoundly re- 
grettable, for at the same time that it furnishes at least a 
specious grief to the adversaries of the cause that the gov- 
ernment at Washington represents in its battle with the states 
of the South, it will have for effect to weaken the just sym- 
pathies that that cause, which for us is the good cause, has 
met, and which it deserves to retain in Europe.” At the 
same time the inconsistency of the English in intrenching 
themselves behind doctrines of the freedom of the seas 
was pointed out; and while it was admitted that the position 
of the United States would be equally inconsistent if it 
should defend the action of the Federal officer, the Débats 
expressed considerable doubt as to whether the captain of 
the San Jacinto had acted upon an order from the Federal 
government.1* The next day, it was admitted that it looked 
as if the officer had acted upon orders given some time be- 
fore, but again the British position was shown to be weak. 
England had committed violations of the law of nations in 
the past beside which the acts of the San Jacinto would pass 
for trifles. Now the British were reversing themselves. “To 
repent is very fine and very virtuous, without doubt.” 7° 
The Moniteur was felicitated upon an article taking a mod- 





17 Tbid., Dec. 27, 1861, Robert Mitchell. 
18 Journal des Débats, Dec. 1, 1861, Louis Alloury. 
19 Tbid., Dec. 2, 1861, Xavier Raymond. 


THE TRENT AFFAIR 47 


erate view of the matter, in contrast with the journals that 
advised making common cause with England and recog- 
nizing the Confederacy.2® An article in the Morning Post 
had declared that the discussion was exhausted upon the 
Trent affair. The Débats answered that it might be closed 
for the English government, but it was not closed for pub- 
lic opinion in Europe and even in England. Reference was 
made to an article in the Independence Belge to the effect 
that the question of law was quite open to question, condemn- 
ing the “ strange precipitation” of the English government, 
and expressing the hope that the religious party and the 
party of the Bible with its anti-slavery sentiments would 
make itself heard in England, for recognition of the South 
would aid the cause of slavery.24 But even if England did 
desire the disruption of the Union, France was not in the 
same position. England had a double interest that France 
did not have; first, it would put off the development of 
the maritime and political power of the United States; and 
second, it would put, it was hoped, the southern agricultural 
republic under the exploitation of the industry and marine 
of England, which would in this case occupy the position 
held by the North in the past. Moreover, France had an 
interest in the maintenance of the Union, for in the 
event of war with England it would “feel cruelly the ab- 
sence of the neutral American flag, the only one which 
England is accustomed and interested to respect, and which 
could in time of war, maintain to our profit the liberty of 
the seas.” In addition to this, it would be to the interest of 
France to remain neutral in case of a war between Eng- 
land and the United States, for then there would be an 
abundant harvest for its maritime commerce. “And it is 
just at the moment when that unfortunate struggle is 
brewing, it is in the face of the duties and interests so clear 
of our country, that certain journals dare to speak to the 
public of seeking for us on this score some new adventure, 


20 Tbid., Dec. 5, 1861, L. Alloury. 
21 [bid., Dec. 6, 1861, Louis Alloury. 


48 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


or rather let us say they dare to threaten it.” 2? However, 
the belief was expressed “almost alone against everyone,” 
that war was not inevitable between England and the 
United States, though it was admitted that history shows 
that it is difficult to keep out of great wars, especially 
maritime wars. It was hoped that Palmerston would frame 
his demands so that the United States could meet them 
without offending national pride.2? While it was admitted 
that if France should recognize the Confederacy, “the 
jurisconsults and the ‘classiques’ of international law, 
could still sustain, code in hand, that France has not broken 
neutrality,” still, “from the moral and political point of 
view, that pretended neutrality would no longer exist.’ ** 
“Tf England desires to accept the hand which a republic 
based upon slavery offers to it, let her do so! France, free 
in its actions, is not obliged to imitate it.”?° From the 
moral and political point of view, France by recognizing the 
Confederacy, would commit a very serious act of inter- 
vention, however indirect, in favor of the South, since 
without throwing her sword into the balance, she would 
bring the weight of her influence into it. Thus, she would 
give her influence in the service of “a flag contrary to her 
political traditions, her sympathies and her principles.’ 7° 
But it was hoped that the United States would submit to 
England without being seduced by a desire to conquer 


22 Tbid., Dec. 7, 1861, Prévost-Paradol. In this connection, an 
Englishman said: “I find in Paris a general wish for the success 
of the North, partly on the ground that the North is supposed to be 
fighting for liberty against slavery, but much more because the 
United States are supposed to be the enemies of England” (Nassau 
William Senior, in his Conversations with Distinguished Persons, 
vol. 2, p. 168, April 11, 1862). This, no doubt, exaggerates the im- 
portance of the English side of the matter. Louis Blanc probably 
better expressed Liberal opinion, when he said, “It is of consequence 
to the whole earth that slavery should cease to dishonour civilization; 
but it is of less consequence to the whole earth whether the United 
States form two nations or only one” (Letters on England, trans. 
by James Hutton, letter No. xxx, Sept. 15, 1861). 

23 Journal des Débats, Dec. 13, 1861, F. Camus. 

24 Tbid., Dec. 14, 1861, Louis Alloury. 

25 Tbid., Dec. 14, 1861, Auguste Léo. 

26 Tbid., Dec. 16, 1861, Louis Alloury. 


THE TRENT AFFAIR 49 


America to the pole.27_ Upon receiving the text of Thou- 
venel’s note of December 3, the Débats in commenting upon 
it, expressed the hope that “the cabinet at Washington, 
taking counsel of its wisdom, its conciliating disposition, 
and its best interests, will hasten to disavow the commander 
of the San Jacinto and to accord to England the legitimate 
reparation which it demands.” ?§ However, if England 
should force war upon the United States it may be making 
the same mistake it made in 1812, and may simply bring 
the result of forcing the United States to build up a navy, 
and add another maritime power to the world.?® On De- 
cember 27, discussing Wilkes’ report upon the affair, it 
says: ‘It may be said that Captain Wilkes has been guilty 
of an error, an infinitely regrettable mistake, and we have 
never, as for us, pretended the contrary; one can not say im- 
partially that he has committed an étouderie, an act of 
provocation and of hostility without motive, a premeditated 
insult to the British flag, a deliberate crime against inter- 
national law and the rights of neutrals.” And it is added 
that it should not be proclaimed so loudly that the rights 
are all on one side and the wrongs on the other.*® On Jan- 
uary 9, it says that according to its opponents “if we do 
not shortly recognize the South, that will be an abomina- 
tion in the eyes of Vattel, Pufendorf and Grotius. Eh bien! 
with all the respect that we owe to those estimable jurists, 
when it is a question of the official recognition of slavery, 
we are not able to attach an exclusive importance to the 
legal point of view, even if it were as clear as day.” The 
Débats sympathized with the maritime powers in the en- 
deavor to settle the legal question now, once for all, but it 
did not believe in going to war over the question, which 
would be as if “two advocates should take up their swords 
over the interpretation of an article of the Civil Code.” ** 








27 [bid., Dec. 16, 1861, Xavier Raymond. 
28 Tbid., Dec. 24, 1861, Louis Alloury. 
29 Tbid., Dec. 24, 1861, F. Camus. 

30 Tbid., Dec. 27, 1861, Louis Alloury. 
31 Tbid., Jan. 9, 1862, Auguste Léo. 


4 


50 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


The Revue des Deux Mondes was astonished. It was an 
“incomprehensible provocation,” and England, suffering 
from a cotton famine, might invoke the supreme law of 
public safety, recognize the Confederacy, and open the seas 
to the cotton commerce.*? It was hoped that Wilkes would 
not be sustained. In disavowing his action, the United 
' States would only pay homage to a doctrine it had always 
professed. It would be really a triumph for that doctrine 
to apply it against a nation and a government which had al- 
ways contested or violated the rights of neutrals, but which 
would be forced to abandon its arbitrary pretensions after 
such a precedent. But it had no sympathy with that part 
of the press that wanted to involve France against the 
United States in distress, if war should break out between 
it and England. That country might desire the dissolution 
of the United States in order to weaken a political rival or 
to secure cotton, but France had no such political or com- 
mercial interest. Moreover, while the seizure of the com- 
missioners was a violation of neutral rights, still the Trent 
affair was only an isolated exception in the maritime his- 
tory of the United States. It was a manifestation of hos- 
tility against English policy, not a menace to the principles 
and the security of France. The United States would not 
cease to be what it had always been, the defender of the 
freedom of the seas. It was the traditional friend of 
France, while the South was fighting for the institution of 
slavery, with which the French could have no sympathy. 
“All ideas of generosity prevent us from giving a hasty 
recognition to the Southern Confederacy.” It was true that 
France was in need of cotton, and it was losing its rev- 
enue from tobacco. But if England should go to war, the 
blockade would be removed and cotton and tobacco released, 
while a large part of the belligerent commerce would pass 
under the French flag. ‘“ Thus selfish interests agree with 
liberal principles in recommending neutrality.” ** 





32 Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. xxxvi, pp. 754-6, Dec. 1, 1861, 
E. Forcade. 
83 Tbid., vol. xxxvi, pp. 1012-18, Dec. 15, 1861, E. Forcade. 


THE TRENT AFFAIR 51 


To the Revue Contemporaine, the removal of the com- 
missioners appeared as a barbarism of another age,** but 
some excuse for the Americans was found in the fact that 
the United States had not subscribed to the Declaration of 
Paris. The right of visit being admitted, the commis- 
sioners might have been removed as contraband of war, on 
the ground that they were emissaries of war and carriers 
of rebel dispatches. They were not protected by a diplo- 
matic character as the Confederacy had not been recog- 
nized, and as emissaries of rebels they did not have the 
right of asylum that belongs to fugitives. The case of 
Henry Laurens, seized by England in 1780, under similar 
circumstances, was recalled, and it was argued that he 
could only have been seized as “an emissary of rebels, a 
hired plotter.” °° However, it would be difficult for France 
to remain a passive spectator in case of war. The French 
flag must float on the side of the freedom of the seas, the 
rights of neutrals and the progress of maritime law.*® For 
the remainder of the war, this periodical was the consistent 
friend of the South. 

The London correspondent of the Revue Britannique 
said that perhaps the right of asylum had been violated, 
but the English government was even more to blame, for 
if the country of Clarkson and Wilberforce had declared 
from the beginning that it would in no case recognize the 
independence of the Southern States so long as they did not 
recognize gradual, if not immediate, emancipation, the 
present dispute would not have arisen.*?7 The Revue Ger- 
manique felt that while Wilkes would have been without 
excuse if he had committed the act against France, still 
toward England he was only applying British precedents, 
a fact that French public opinion was beginning to realize.*® 








34 Revue Contemporaine vol. lix, p. 393, Nov. 29, 1861, J.-E. Horn. 

35 Tbid., vol. lix, pp. 540-53, Dec. 15, 1861, Xavier Eyma. 

36 [bid., vol. lix, p. 582, Dec. 15, 1861, J. -E, Horn. 

37 Revue Britannique, 1861, vol. vi, pp. 471-2, Dec., 1861, Endymion 
Pieraggi. 

88 Revue Germanique, vol. xix, p. 157, Jan. 1, 1862, A. Nefftzer. 


52 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


As for the recognition of the South, which was _ being 
preached at Liverpool and Manchester and in the “ de- 
voted’ Paris journals, that would only push the North to 
fury. It would ally itself with the negroes in a slave in- 
surrection with its attendant horrors, and nothing would be 
gained for Europe.*® The Correspondant admitted that 
the arrest of the commissioners was a mistake (“une 
faute’’), but asked if it could be called a crime when the 
right of visit was admitted, the right to seize dispatches 
was not contested, and the right of conducting the ship to 
a prize court was not contested. Moreover, the captain of 
the Trent was not without reproach, for he knew the char- 
acter of his passengers and knew that the Queen’s declara- 
tion of neutrality had prohibited the carrying of dis- 
patches.*° 

Even with the anti-Southern press, the dispatch of Thou- 
venel was received with approval and even enthusiasm.** 
The Presse gave to it the credit of any solution that might 
be arrived at.42 The Siécle, organ of the Republicans, be- 
lieved that Thouvenel had expressed the doctrine that 
France had always sustained upon the inviolability of a 
neutral flag, and hoped that from the dispute would come 
a more explicit recognition of the rights of neutrals, a more 
strict delimitation of what goods, objects or persons could 
be considered contraband of war, and even hoped that all 
maritime property abstaining from hostile acts would be 
declared inviolable. The only regret of the Siécle was that 
the note had stated the position of France so absolutely that 
the government of France could not now offer its good of- 
fices or accept a demand for arbitration. While supporting 
the British contention as the correct principle of interna- 
tional law, this paper evidently believed the present matter 

40 Correspondant, vol. liv, pp. 754-9, Dec., 1861, P. Douhaire. 

41 But see Charivari, Dec. 25, 1861, Clément Caraguel, which feared 
that the note would draw France into the struggle on the side 


of “that odious institution, slavery.” 
42 Presse, Jan. 2-3, 1862, J. Mahias; Jan. 11, 1862, J. Mahias. 


THE TRENT AFFAIR 53 


was a proper subject for arbitration, particularly as the 
British were reversing themselves upon the question. The 
case of Henry Laurens, who went from the United States 
to Martinique, in 1780, took passage on the Dutch packet 
boat Mercury, and was seized by the British cruiser Vestal, 
was given as an example. The only difference in the cases 
was that Martinique belonged to an ally of the revolted 
colonies; and the San Jacinto had not seized the ship, while 
the Vestal had taken envoy, dispatches and ship. In each 
case the envoys were on their way to a neutral port on a 
neutral ship.** 

In short, even the best friends of the Union could find 
no excuse for Wilkes in international law, except that he 
was applying to England her own precedents which were 
admittedly barbarous, while the semi-official press, “ inde- 
pendent and devoted,” went so far as to advocate recog- 
nition of the Confederacy and war with England against 
the Union, if an Anglo-American war should break out. 
Bigelow says that our friends among the French people 
were demoralized; that there was a time within the three 
days after the news was received when “one could have 
counted on his fingers about all the people in Europe not 
Americans who still retained any hope or expectation of 
the perpetuity of our Union.” They took it for granted 
that we would fight until we were satisfied that there was 
no use of fighting longer, and then we would agree upon 
some terms of separation. At the suggestion of Garnier- 
Pages, a republican deputy, Bigelow prepared a letter pre- 
senting the matter in a more favorable light to the Union, 
to which the venerable General Scott, then in Paris, affixed 
his name, and which was published in the Paris papers.** 
But hopes for the preservation of the Union were almost 
gone, and the friends of the Union were much perturbed to 
see their ideal democracy apparently involved on the side of 
despotism on the open seas. 


43 Siecle, Jan. 3, 1862, T.—-N. Benard. 
44 Bigelow, Retrospections of an Active Life, vol. 1, pp. 384-00. 


54 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


Faced by the imminence of war, the news of the surren- 
der of Mason and Slidell came as a great relief to Europe. 
The satisfaction of the liberal public was “ of the kind that 
ignorant and superstitious populations experience when they 
suddenly see the kindly sunlight reappear in the sky after 
they had thought it extinguished by a passing eclipse.” The 
Débats seemed to draw a peculiar satisfaction from the 
contemplation of the gains of England. “ The first advan- 
tage that England will draw from the extradition of Messrs. 
Mason and Slidell is a striking condemnation pronounced by 
itself upon itself. The second, which is just as good as the 
first, is the resentment of the American people.” After 
this danger the American people would fight only the harder, 
while England would become more prudent in its relations 
with the South. “ Already the clearest result of the Trent 
incident, is the explosion of sympathy which broke out in 
France, and even in a portion of the English nation, in favor 
of the unionist cause.” ‘When the Trent incident trans- 
ported us from the domain of abstraction into that of reality, 
when it was necessary to represent New York burned by 
English bombs, and the nation abolitionist par excellence, ex- 
tending a beseeching hand to the planters, when a certain 
press forced us to place before our minds, as a possible 
eventuality, the image of a democratic France destroying in 
the United States one of the most glorious works of mo- 
narchical France, and the tricolored flag consecrating itself 
to slavery in the same places where the flag of white was de- 
ployed for the cause of the liberty of peoples; on that day, 
France made up its mind, and the quarrel of the South and 
North became with us definitely decided against the South. 
Had America only this consolation for the diplomatic check 
which it accepts with characteristic nobility, this consolation 
should suffice.” #* There is no doubt that the final settlement 
of the matter redounded to the advantage of the Union. 
Liberals had been justified in their faith in it; their oppo- 
nents had been confounded; the Union had been true to lib- 





45 Journal des Débats, Jan. 11, 1862, J.-J. Weiss. 


THE TRENT AFFAIR 55 


eral principles. They looked back with some shame on those 
six weeks when Europe was full of alarms and rumors of 
war, so much in contrast with the coolness and moderation 
which the American government had manifested throughout. 
Such things might be avoided if the governments of France 
and Great Britain would make it clear that the South would 
not be recognized, for this was the thing upon which the 
South counted. The secession was a speculation upon cot- 
ton. Europe should hasten to show that that speculation was 
a poor one.*® Upon receiving the full text of Seward’s note, 
the leading liberal organ passed this final judgment: ‘‘ The 
ground upon which he places himself is chosen with a skill 
that no impartial person can misunderstand. . . . America 
was condemned upon a question of fact; but in accepting the 
condemnation as just, she has consecrated a principle which 
is all in her favor.” ** It was a proof of strength, not of 
weakness, and America only paid homage to the principles 
she had herself defended for so many years.*® 








46 Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. xxxvii, pp. 498-504, Jan. 15, 1862, 
E. Forcade. 

47 Journal des Débats, Jan. 15, 1862, J.-J. Weiss. 

48 Siecle, Jan. 10, 1862, Emile de la Bédolliére. 


CHAPUERIIT 


Distress AMONG THE WORKMEN 


A certain unsympathetic French writer referred to the 
Southern cause as a speculation in cotton. It is true that 
the South had based many hopes upon the belief that cotton 
was king, but there were economic forces at work other than 
those resulting from a shortage of cotton. One of these 
was the failure of the wheat harvest. In England, where 
the wheat crop failed at the same time, necessitating large 
importations from the United States, the opponents of inter- 
vention were able to point out that war with the United 
States might break the blockade and bring cotton to England, 
but it would cut ‘off the much more essential staple of wheat.* 
The situation of the English did not pass unnoticed in 
France.? But as the French were much less dependent upon 
foreign supply, even in time of a crop failure, it is not likely 
that they were deterred by the same considerations. On the 
contrary, the failure of the harvests caused a rise in the cost 
of bread, and this in conjunction with widespread unemploy- 
ment, led to greater suffering, and furnished those who de- 
sired to break the blockade with that much more force be- 
hind the humanitarian argument. 

The wheat shortage was particularly marked in 1861 and 
1862, just when the danger of intervention was greatest. 
Yancey and Rost wrote in the fall of 1861 that the deficiency 
in the harvest was estimated to equal in value two hundred 
million dollars. The Pays gave the deficit as about twelve 
millicn hectolitres below normal. But this was made worse 
by the fact that drought in the southwest, where maize or- 








1 Louis Bernard Schmidt, in The Iowa Journal of History and 
Politics, vol. xvi, July, 1918, pp. 400-439. 

2 Presse, July 20, 1862, Ad. Gaiffe. 

3 Yancey and Rost to Hunter, No. 8, Oct. 5, 1861. 


56 


DISTRESS AMONG THE WORKMEN 57 


dinarily took the place of wheat, had reduced the maize crop 
by two-thirds, thus leading to increased demand for wheat.* 
The crop of 1862 was better, and wheat to the value of only 
147 million francs was imported as compared with 325.6 
million for 1861.° 

The earliest effects of the war were felt in other fields than 
the cotton industry. The government itself experienced a 
large loss of revenue through the cessation of importation of 
American tobacco. French exportation was even more seri- 
ously affected. French exports to America were mostly lux- 
uries, wines, brandy, millinery, furniture, worsteds, mixed 
goods and especially silks.6 These were things that could 
well be dispensed with for a period, and the disorders of the 
war led to the cessation of their importation. The following 
table 7 shows how abrupt this was, but to these figures should 
be added those for the large indirect trade through England. 


1860 I861 
First eight First eight Diminution 
months months 

Linens 186,485 77330 109,155 
Silks 73,150,418 22,385,204 50,765,124 
Silk floss goods O35 724i Nia ele y 63,572 
Worsteds 22,799,649 6,520,622 16,270,027 
Mohair “ Tissus de poil”’ 577 ANP uae hes he 5,775 
Hair-cloth BAO MMR siasleca wits 840 
Cottons 2,886,207 264,318 2,621,979 
Prepared skins 4,436,370 882,502 3,553,808 
Skin and leather goods 5,419,237 1,451,546 3,907,691 


108,948,643 31,581,612 77,367,031 


For the full year 1860, exportations of millinery amounted 
to 5,533,000 fr., for 1861, 3,905,000 fr.; furniture dropped 
from 6,900,000 fr. to 6,481,000 fr. Wine exportation 
dropped from 195 millions of litres in 1860 to 177% millions 
in 1861, but these figures for wines are not of much value, 
as French wine production was poor for the crop exported 








4 Pays, Oct. 4, 1861, A. Lomon. 

5 Revue Contemporaine, vol. Ixvi, pp. 637-638, Feb. 15, 1863, 
J.-E. Horn. 

6 Constitutionnel, May 8, 1862, Paulin Limayrac. 

7Ibid., Oct. 7, 1861, Auguste Vitu. 


58 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


in 1861.8 The manufacturing situation seems to have been 
relieved somewhat in 1861, by numerous orders from Eng- 
land, Germany and Russia, to Lyons and Saint-Etienne,® 
and French exportations went from 1,926,300,000 in 1861 
to 2,189,000,000 in 1862.1° 

The most serious complaint came from the silk industry. 
In Lyons and Saint-Etienne, which were the centers of that 
industry, there was great suffering. The papers appealed 
for private aid for the workmen and the minister of the in- 
terior placed 350,000 fr. for Lyons and 220,000 for Saint- 
Etienne, to be applied in charity.‘ Charles Levavasseur, a 
manufacturer of Rouen, reported that at Paris the cabinet- 
making, millinery, glove, and bronze industries, and others 
devoted to luxuries, were affected or paralyzed by the civil 
wars and revolutions in the United States, Chile, Mexico, 
Buenos Ayres, Peru, and Venezuela.’? In addition to this, 
the high tariff in the United States came in for its share of 
blame.13 Yancey and Rost wrote that the immense number 
of poor laborers thrown out of employ were suffering very 
greatly, and that discontent was being manifested. “ We 
have heard of large numbers of them assembling in murmur- 
ing complaints not far from Paris, and that on night before 
last, an attempt at insurrection was made and suppressed in 
one of the suburbs.” +4 The government even had to defend 
itself against the accusation that the sufferings of French 
industry were due to the recent commercial treaty with Eng- 
land.*® 

By the beginning of the year 1862, conditions had become 
serious, and Thouvenel told Dayton that petitions and memo- 

8 Journal des Débats, Feb. 25, 1862, Chemin-Dupontés. 

9 Constitutionnel, Oct. 7, 1861, Auguste Vitu. 
ay Revue Contemporaine, vol. Ixvi, pp. 637-8, Feb. 15, 1863, J.-E. 

dt Gaaeenaconnel: Jan. 21, 1862, Auguste Vitu. 

12 Journal des Débats, Apr. 15, 1862, Henri Baudrillart. 

18 Tbid., Oct. 19, 1861, J.-J. Weiss. 

14 Yancey and Rost to Hunter, No. 8, Oct. 5, 1861. 


15 Constitutionnel, Sept. 30, 1861, Auguste Vitu; Journal des 
Débats, Apr. 15, 1862, Henri Baudrillart. 


DISTRESS AMONG THE WORKMEN 59 


rials were being addressed daily to the Emperor.® The 
condition of the workers in the cotton manufacturing dis- 
tricts began to receive much notice in the newspapers. The 
Débats gave the value of the annual product of French cot- 
ton manufacture at from seven hundred to eight hundred 
million francs, which was small compared with the English 
product, where the annual exportation alone amounted to 
1,000,000,000 fr.17 The Siécle gave the French product as 
five hundred million.1% In November, 1862, the number of 
persons in distress from the cotton crisis was given as 100,- 
000, with the number increasing.1® The Moniteur said that 
the cotton industry existed in forty departments, but in only 
fifteen or twenty was it of any real importance, while a 
quarter of the spindles were in the department of the Seine- 
Inférieure.”° By the end of the year 1862, there were 130,- 
ooo men out of work in the Seine-Inférieure, or 260,000 
to 390,000 persons, counting dependents.2. The distress 
seems to have been mostly in this one department. The ar- 
rondissement most affected was Yvetol, and after this, 
Rouen. In the arrondissement of Dieppe, there were 10,000 
workmen out of work, and about 14,000 in that of Havre. 
In the parish of Robertot, with a population of 600, there 
were 468 weavers with no resource against hunger and cold. 
Some of them tried to sustain themselves with a kind of 
pasty made of coarse bran, water and herbs. Those who 
could sometimes get bread were considered fortunate. Half 
naked children went into the country to beg soup or potatoes 
from the farmers. Sometimes they had to go so far that 
they could not return to their homes until the next day. 
The Siécle said there were nearly three hundred thousand 
workmen in the Seine-Inférieure in mid-winter in the great- 











16 Dayton to Seward, No. 127, Mar. 18, 1862. 

17 Journal des Débats, Apr. 18, 1862, F. Camus. 

18 Siécle, Jan. 27, 1863, Emile de la Bédolliére. 

19 Tbid., Nov. 17, 1862, Emile de la Bédolliére. 

20 Moniteur, Dec. 8, 1862. 

21 Reyue des Deux Mondes, vel. xliii, pp. 230-1, Jan. 1, 1863, E. 
Forcade. 


60 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


est destitution.2* To aid this misery there was little help 
coming from the rich or well-to-do classes. After constant 
appeals through the newspapers, with the greatest publicity, 
the sum of 234,000 fr. was subscribed in Paris by January 
8, 1863, for relief, where ten million was necessary. Per- 
haps double that was subscribed in Rouen. Yet the loss in 
wages to the workmen was perhaps six million francs a 
month.?? The government had to come to the relief of the 
sufferers. 

As early as February, 1862, there had been voted, without 
opposition in either the Corps Législatif or Sénat, two mil- 
lion francs for the relief of the suffering by providing work 
or in direct charity.2* On January 26, 1863, another five 
million was voted by the Corps Législatif without opposition. 
This was intended to be applied, in part in public works, 
but as some persons, such as women, could not be aided in 
this way, and the amounts needed would be large, the news- 
papers insisted that contributions should continue to come 
from individuals.2> Some relief to the cotton industry came 
through the efforts of the Societé du Prince Impérial which 
aided the cotton artisans to enter the wool manufacturing in- 
dustry.”° 

In 1862, all industry had suffered from the effects of the 
Civil War. In 1863, it was only the cotton industry, but 
what was lost in extent was gained in intensity,?’ and in the 
first few months of this year the poor endured great hard- 
ships in the Seine-Inférieure. The city of Havre suffered 
more than any other French port, for it had enjoyed a great 
amount of trade with America. Its cotton trade with the 
United States had afforded support for thousands of labor- 
ers and small tradesmen, and as the war progressed, the flag 








22 Siecle, Dec. 27, 1862, Taxile Delord. Based upon an article 
in the Temps. 

23 Journal des Débats, Jan. 8, 1863, J.-J. Weiss; Presse, Jan. 12, © 
1863, Jules Ferry. 

24 Corps Législatif, Feb. 28, 1862; Senate, Mar. 1, 1862. 

25 Journal des Débats, Jan. 28, 1863, Auguste Léo; Constitutionnel, 
Jan 28, 1863, Jonciéres. 

26 Constitutionnel, Apr. 1, 1864, Emile Chédieu; May 7, 1864. 

27 Journal des Débats, Jan. 28, 1863, Auguste Léo. 


DISTRESS AMONG THE WORKMEN 61 


of the United States became a comparatively rare visitant 
there. Cotton operators realized great fortunes, but with 
these exceptions the town was a great sufferer.”® 

There was some controversy in France as to why it was 
that the cotton district of the Seine-Inférieure suffered so 
greatly while the rival district in Alsace around Mulhouse 
went through no such suffering, and the looms continued to 
run at Guebwiller, in the Vosges. Imbert-Keechlin, a manu- 
facturer of Mulhouse, wrote to the Industrial Alsacien in 
the latter part of 1862, that the shortage in cotton was not 
so great as might be supposed, and that cotton could be 
procured if the buyer was willing to pay the price. He gave 
the Liverpool stock at 264,000 bales, and that of Havre at 
53,011 bales. He admitted that cotton was scarce in Alsace, 
but the looms were running there. Some manufacturers 
were receiving great credit for liberality in caring for the 
existence of their men while out of work, but he asserted 
that there was more of calculation than philanthropy in this, 
as these manufacturers were making great profits by ceasing 
production and putting cottons at a premium.?® If there was 
a famine in cotton, how was it that the hand looms of Picardy 
to the number of 50,000, and those of Caux with 64,000 
more, had not ceased to run, asked the Presse? The stock 
of Liverpool for the end of the year 1862 was given as 
433,950 bales, or nearly two-thirds of the stock of the year 
before, with, at an offhand calculation, 2,000,000 bales ar- 
riving during the year, of which 100,000 came from the 
United States. The manufacturers excused themselves on 
the ground of the weakness of the resources of a large num- 
ber, the fear of the commercial treaty with England, and 
the like. The Presse asserted that the manufacturers of Nor- 
mandy, as well as the cotton lords of Lancashire, had ‘‘ some- 
thing on their consciences.” *° 





28 "28 Dispatch of James O. Putnam, U. S. Consul at Havre, Jan. 25, 
1864, Commercial Relations of the United States, 1864, p. 1990. 

29 Presse, Dec. 28, 1862, Alfred Darimon. 

30 Tbid., Jan 12, 1863, Jules Ferry. 


62 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


Alphonse Cordier, writing in the Temps of January 21, 
1863, asserted that there was a cotton famine; that the an- 
nual consumption was 350,000 bales a month for Europe, 
while the stock at Liverpool was only 433,950 bales, or about 
enough to last five weeks, as the consumption was counted 
in American bales and the stock in Indian bales. On the 
other hand, the English Economist estimated that the arrivals 
from India, Egypt, Brazil and Asia Minor would provide 
the English with 28,000 bales a week, or enough to provide 
work four out of six days in the week. The Presse pointed 
out that the Liverpool stock had passed the estimates of the 
Economist by 35,000 bales. The Indian cotton crop of 1862, 
which would begin to arrive at Liverpool in May, 1863, was 
estimated at 1,500,000 bales, while Egypt, Brazil, Asia 
Minor and Algeria were expected to send 500,000 more. 
The total stock of Europe for 1863, without counting any 
possible arrivals from the United States, was expected to 
reach 2,560,000 bales, or enough to keep the looms running 
throughout Europe, three days a week. When the Presse 
denied the correctness of the findings of the committee of 
Rouen, that there was a famine in cotton, it asserted that it 
was supported by all of Alsace, the journals of Rouen, and 
the Courrier du Havre. It was even said that the assertions 
of the existence of a famine were intended to bring about 
the breaking of the blockade of the South.*t | The Constitu- 
tionnel admitted that work was not stopped in Alsace and the 
Pas-de-Calais.*? The Siecle admitted the scarcity of cotton, 
but denied that there was a famine.*® 

By July, 1864, the Presse felt able to assert that King 
Cotton had been dethroned, and gave the following table: ** 








31 Ibid., Jan. 26, 1863, Jules Ferry. 

82 Constitutionnel, Feb. 1, 1863, Auguste Vitu. 
83 Siecle, Nov. 7, 1862, T.-N. Benard. 

34 Presse, July 8, 1864, A. Sanson. 


DISTRESS AMONG THE WORKMEN 63 


First First First 
Importations into Trimester Trimester Trimester 

England 1862 1863 1864 

Cwt. Cwt. Cwt. 
PR STALES in 'a.t's oie So o!a'a.cddee's naka tgs 5,276 3,401 1,787 
Pematminseanc Bermudas. ac utece sees el (soe eee 11,071 63,940 
LES 6 Als 2 | GG gk aan RPMS re UA Poy ete « Rg 14,781 49,227 
epee OR ie ds: «'Lclhis ole became aoe 39,469 49,749 61,210 
Oe el an Oats Outen or 4,432 12,601 47,756 
BYE acne cceccvevcnesseedenersrs 196,085 233,642 309,091 
BIBER NICIA) o'e's'sie's e Pac wae eae tune 260,605 387,701 459,028 
I en's ofovws oes a's hres calc nae 9 26,951 105,476 








MIPEREOUTUIIES I), oss bcos nln tete ee cee 68,262 52,179 34,453 
| 574,138 793,036 1,131,968 


In fact, the large importations from Egypt and India 
brought about a curious monetary disturbance in England 
and France. The cotton bought from the United States had 
been paid for in the manufactures of Europe, but the Orien- 
tal cotton had to be paid for in the precious metals and it was 
not known how far the drainage of the precious metals from 
Europe might go.*® 

France had been making strenuous efforts to develop cot- 
ton production in its own colonies, particularly Algeria, while 
something was hoped for from other colonies, such as French 
Guiana. Shares of stock in a company to develop Algerian 
cotton were advertised in the papers, and great hopes were 
built upon that colony, though the Revue Contemporaine 
had pointed out that Algeria had not been a successful cot- 
ton producing country, partly due to the small European 
population of only 200,000.°* It was even thought that 
cotton might be grown in France, and it was reported that 
efforts in this direction were being made in some of the de- 
partments.*7 As a matter of fact, the quantity of Algerian 
cotton did not increase during the war. This was partly ex- 
plained by the fact that in 1852, the government had begun 








"BS Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. xlviii, p. 995, Dec. 15, 1863, E. 
Forcade. 
A Revue Contemporaine, vol. Ixi, pp. 810-14, Apr. 30, 1862, J.-E. 
orn. 
87 Nation, Jan. 8, 1863. See Commercial Relations of the United 
States with Foreign Nations, 1863, p. 146. 


64 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


the policy of aiding Algerian cotton with premiums and 
the like, which were regulated to decrease gradually. While 
the premiums were high the culture grew, but when the gov- 
ernment ceased to guarantee the profits by ceasing to buy 
directly and by decreasing the premiums, the growth had 
almost stopped, despite the effects of the American civil 
war.*8 

To recapitulate, the economic effects of the war upon 
France were, during 1861, principally the decrease of French 
exportation, particularly in the silk industry; during 1862, 
this was added to the cotton crisis; during 1863, there seems 
to have been no distress except in the cotton manufacturing 
industry, and this was limited mostly to one department, 
though here it was of great intensity; while by 1864, impor- 
tations from other countries brought relief to the cotton in- 
dustry. 

This chapter has anticipated the progress of events, but 
it helps to explain what follows. 





88 Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. lili, pp. 692-717, Aug. 1, 1864, 
Louis Reybaud (de I’Institut). 


Cr tena 


PROPOSALS OF MEDIATION 


The discussions arising out of the Trent affair mark the 
beginning of a campaign that was carried on by the Im- 
perialist press for a year and a half in favor of action in 
behalf of the South. It took various forms—proposals of 
arbitration, active intervention, breaking the blockade, an 
armistice, recognition of the Confederacy—but all were 
intended to serve the same end, to aid the South. A propa- 
ganda against the Union was carried on, and every effort 
was made to show the insincerity of the North, its brutal- 
ity, its inferiority. The war was held to be hopeless, a 
needless shedding of blood, a campaign of hatred, contrary 
to the Constitution and with no intelligent purpose. And 
above all it was insisted that slavery counted for nothing 
among the causes of the struggle. At the same time, the 
sufferings of Europe were dwelt upon, and the appeal was 
made to patriotism, self-interest and humanity. In opposi- 
tion to this campaign stood the press of the Liberal Coali- 
tion, muzzled to the extent that it could not attack directly 
the government policy, although free to discuss the issues. 
The same conflict occurred among the orators in the Cham- 
bers, where the Liberals had an opportunity to attack the 
government. These debates were published in the papers and 
spread among the people. 

The obstruction of the port of Charleston by the sink- 
ing of the “stone fleet” afforded an opportunity for the 
Imperialists. It was called “barbarous.” What would the 
Liberals say if the French government, under the pretext of 
civil war, should block the port of Havre or Marseilles?? 
Even the Moniteur was moved to break its official reserve. 
It spoke of “a sentiment of profound regret and repulsion ” 





1 Constitutionnel, Jan. 12, 1862, Auguste Vitu. 
5 65 


66 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


at “that act, not of war, but of vengeance.” ? The Opinion 
Nationale found this article to be imprudent, and offered 
a defense of the Federal action. In a somewhat violent 
answer, the Constitutionnel asserted that the destruction of 
the port of Charleston consummated the ruin of the Fed- 
eral compact and condemned definitely the aggressive policy 
of the North. The North had treated the South as an en- 
emy, and a foreign enemy even. Did that not render the 
two nations irreconcilable? ? The Presse thought it would 
be more logical in those who were so exercised over the 
matter, to confine their wrath to those who aimed at the 
preservation and extension of the odious institution of 
slavery and who, to that end, had involved their country in 
the disasters of a civil war.* Dayton wrote that “ the effect 
of the blockade, the permanent destruction of the harbor at 
Charleston, the hopelessness of our cause, all taken for 
granted, and all impressed upon the public mind here by the 
English press, have had a damaging influence.” ® The Con- 
federate commissioners even had hopes of active interfer- 
ence from Europe. “ The prevailing and doubtless correct - 
impression here is, that these two Governments have remon- 
strated in strong terms and also protested against the sink- 
ing of the ‘stone fleet’ in the main channel at Charleston, 
and that they will directly interfere in some way. Some in- 
dications are that the interference will go to the extent of a 
demand for an armistice and that the differences of bound- 
ary between the North and South shall be settled by these 
Powers.” ® Even at that early period, an armistice was be- 
ing discussed. 

The effects of the Federal blockade were being felt by 
this time, and the Debats felt called upon to show that an 
attempt to break it would be useless, for even if the block- 

2 Moniteur, Jan. 11, 1862. 

3 Constitutionnel, Jan. 20, 1862, Auguste Vitu. 

4 Presse, Feb. 13, 1862, J. Mahias. 

5 Dayton to Seward, No. 109, Jan. 27, 1862. 


6 'Yancey and Mann to Hunter, No. 14, Jan. 27, 1862 (Pickett 
Papers). 


PROPOSALS OF MEDIATION 67 


ade were broken there was little likelihood that cotton in any 
quantities could be got to the ports from the interior. Be- 
sides, “ Under what pretext will they declare that blockade 
non-existent? Is it not because it would not be effective? 
Then how does that ineffective blockade, which has no real 
existence, prevent cotton from arriving in Europe?” 7 

The Débats was able to take the aggressive when it 
quoted with approval an article in the Courrier du Havre at- 
tacking the South for maintaining commerce destroyers, 
which it said were not necessarily to be excused simply be- 
cause they had been maintained in the wars of the Revolu-. 
tion and the Empire; and an article in the Journal du Havre 
which reminded its readers that the right of seizure was lim- 
ited in international law by the necessity that the capture be 
submitted to a prize court. In fact, said the Journal du 
Havre, simple good sense teaches that it is impossible to 
permit ships provided with more or less regular titles to at- 
tack, burn or sink ships in the open sea without exposing all 
ships to suffer those acts of violence. It feared that the 
ships of France and Great Britain would be thus destroyed 
for the possible precious metals in them. The two Havre 
papers called upon the maritime powers of Europe to con- 
sider means of putting an end to the enterprises of the Con- 
federate ships, Sumter and Nashville, which they did not 
hesitate to call “ pirates.” § 

The matter of French interference in America was brought 
to a head by a debate in the Senate over the projet d’adresse 
to the Emperor, reported February 17, 1862, and providing 
that: “ Like Your Majesty, it [the government] has recog- 
nized that the amicable relations of France with the United 
States dictated to the French cabinet a policy of neutrality 
upon the basis of that distressing dispute, and that the strug- 
gle would be so much the shorter in that it were not compli- 
cated with foreign interferences.” ® On February 24, this 


7 Journal des Débats, Jan. 13, 1862, Prévost-Paradol; Jan. 28, 1862, 


Auguste Léo. 
8 Ibid., Feb. 11, 1862, Louis Ailoury. 
9 Senate, Feb. 17, 1862. 


68 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


clause came up for discussion, and after the Marquis de 
Boissy, an anglophobe of that day, had made a fervent ap- 
peal for neutrality on the ground that such a policy was op- 
posed to the interest of England, Mr. Billault, spokesman 
for the Emperor before the Chambers, said: “In truth, the 
Emperor has a friendship for the United States, a sincere 
desire to see them become pacified, a disposition to further 
as much as he can that reconciliation which is so desirable; 
but as for doing anything that could be in contradiction to 
those sentiments, which are also those of France, the Sen- 
ate may be tranquil, the Emperor is not so disposed.” ?° 
Billault was believed to have closed, for the time being at 
least, all hopes of the South that France would interfere to 
break the blockade,’? and was considered to have applied 
practically that clause in the Emperor’s address to the Cham- 
bers, in which he declared that “So long as the rights of 
neutrals are respected, we must limit ourselves to prayers 
that those dissensions will soon end.” 

In March, the American question came before the Corps 
Législatif. The projet d’adresse in this body dealt with 
this matter as follows (paragraph 5): “The civil war 
which devastates America causes grave injury to our in- 
dustry and our commerce; we make most ardent prayers 
that those dissensions may have an early end. The Corps 
Législatif strongly approves that Your Majesty has in that 
crisis, and especially in the recent conflict between America 
and England, thought only of having the rights of neutrals 
respected. A government which takes right and justice for 
its invariable rule soon becomes the arbiter of the peace of 
the world.” An amendment, to take the place of this para- 
graph, was proposed by Jules Favre, Heéenon, Darimon, 
Ernest Picard and Emile Ollivier, which read: “ France 
should not interfere in the civil war which devastates the re- 
public of the United States of America; but it declares 
strongly that its sympathies are attached to the states of the 


10 Tbid., Feb. 24, 1862. 
11 Dayton to Seward, No. 120, Feb. 27, 1862. 


PROPOSALS OF MEDIATION 69 


North, defenders of right and humanity. It hopes that their 
victory will lead to the abolition of slavery, and that thus, 
once more, it will have proved that the most grave crises can 
not be disastrous to people who do not separate democracy 
and liberty.” However, this amendment was withdrawn in 
favor of another presented by Morin, Lemercier, Guyard- 
Delalain, the Marquis d’Andelarre and Achille Jubinal, more 
reserved in character, and reading: “ The civil war which 
devastates America causes grave injury to our industry and 
our commerce; we make most ardent prayers that those dis- 
sensions may have an early end, and that the great principle 
of the abolition of slavery may come victorious from the 
struggle engaged upon it.”’ The remainder of the paragraph 
was to remain as in the projet. Morin (de la Drome) ex- 
plained that his amendment did not mention either the North 
or the South, but only expressed a principle and did not de- 
part from the language proper for a neutral. It only re- 
mained, he said, to prove that in reality the question of 
slavery was the cause and the only cause of the conflict in 
America. He admitted that before the present crisis he had 
thought that the stories in the newspapers and the accounts 
of travelers, as well as those “ contained in a celebrated novel 
which was read so eagerly” a few years before, had exag- 
gerated the horrors of slavery. But now he had arrived 
at the conclusion that he had been mistaken, and told of the 
burning of some slaves; the application of lynch law to a 
certain Northerner who had aided a slave to escape; a slave 
trader, Nathaniel Gordon, who threw sixty negroes into the 
sea when chased by an American cruiser, half of those re- 
maining in the ship dying from suffocation and ill-treatment, 
and yet with only a third of the negroes remaining, leaving 
enough for the trader to have made three hundred per cent 
if he had reached Cuba. The tariff could not be alleged as a 
cause of the dispute, for it was only since the separation 
that the Morrill tariff, with high duties, had been imposed. 
The tariff at the time of separation had been almost one of 
free trade. The election of Lincoln had signified only the 


70 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


firm will to circumscribe slavery, to prevent its extension. 
Abolition was not proposed, but the South knew that restric- 
tion upon the extension of slavery would strike it with 
death. He offered praise for America “ which had admitted 
and practiced all the liberties” and referred to the fact that 
de Tocqueville had seen in American society the future 
model for that of Europe. There could come no danger to 
France from adopting the amendment, for the United States 
would be thankful to have had words of sympathy given to 
them, if the Union were sustained, while if the separation 
were accomplished, the Southern states would understand 
from the words of the Address that the first condition for 
entrance into the family of civilized states was to deliver 
themselves from an institution which was only a plague to 
them, and they would be thankful later to have been given 
that counsel. 

Calvet-Rogniat, in opposition to the amendment, dwelt 
upon the sufferings of the workmen in Lyons, Saint-Etienne, 
Rouen, Lille and other industrial cities, and Granier de Cas- 
sagnac argued that even the expression of a desire by the 
Chamber would amount to an interference in the internal 
politics of the United States, and that logically France would 
have to follow such an expression by demanding the abolition 
of slavery everywhere. Religiously, morally, philosophically 
considered, slavery was a question upon which nearly all 
were agreed, Billault, speaking for the government, closed 
the discussion with an address in which he contended that 
it would be impolitic in dealing with a struggle which France 
would like to see ended in a reconciliation, to agitate the 
very question that was at the basis of the dispute. Of course, 
the amendment was defeated when put to a vote, but it had 
served the purpose for which it was intended, in giving the 
Opposition an opportunity to bring their opinions before the 
public and in drawing the government into a statement of its 
position. The fifth paragraph then was adopted, but not be- 
fore Arman, a deputy who was engaged in the shipbuilding 
business, and who later acquired considerable notoriety 


PROPOSALS OF MEDIATION 71 


through having built a number of ironclads for the Confed- 
erate government, had expressed the hope that the latest 
military events might pave the way to a friendly intervention 
which would hasten the agreement that was imperiously 
called for by humanity as well as commercial interests.?? 

There was agitation among industrial and commercial in- 
terests in France as well as in England, to relieve their 
troubles by the policy that they thought would work its re- 
sults most quickly, that is, to favor the South. As a matter 
of fact, the loss of Northern trade, in the event of war, 
would have been a serious blow to France, and cotton might 
have been as far off as ever.1® Liberals were convinced 
that the means least likely to end the war was to persist in 
the “equivocal and indecisive policy’ of which the English 
journals and the Constitutionnel were the organs, of main- 
taining and perpetuating in the separated States the illusion 
that Europe would intervene in the quarrel. The Emperor’s 
address to the Chambers and the statement of Mr. Billault, 
in the Senate, were quoted in support of this statement of the 
position of France, and contrasted with the position of the 
government journals. This policy, expressed by the Emperor 
and defended by Mr. Billault, was accepted by the Liberals 
as their own.?* The wide variance between the official utter- 
ances and the arguments of the semi-official papers, how- 
ever, was sufficient evidence to them of the real policy of the 
Emperor, although they did not know all that was going on 
behind the scenes. For at this very time the Emperor was 
intriguing to secure the support of England in breaking the 
blockade, and on April 11, accorded an interview with Lind- 
say with that end in view. 

At the same time there was considerable speculation 
about a mysterious visit of Mercier, the minister at Wash- 
ington, to Richmond. The Débats refused to credit it with 
any political significance,’® but nevertheless its close interest 





12 Corps Législatif, Mar. 13, 1862. 
13 Siécle, Mar. 3, 1862, Emile de la Bédolliére. 
14 Journal des Débats, Apr. 29, 1862, L. SACUs Y, 
15 [bid., May 6, 1862, J.-J. Weiss. 


fe FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


was evidence of some nervousness. Slidell was much puzzled 
about the matter and sought an explanation from Thouvenel, 
who knew nothing about it except what had been told him 
by Lord Russell, who had learned from Lord Lyons that 
Mercier had gone to Richmond at the instance of Seward, 
who had authorized him to say that if the South would re- 
turn to the Union, any and every condition which it could 
demand would be accorded; and that when Mercier arrived 
at Richmond he met with so peremptory a denial to entertain 
such a proposition on any terms that he had not even an 
opportunity to give Mr. Seward’s view in detail. Slidell 
concluded from the fact that the Department of Foreign 
Affairs had not received a report of this from Mercier that 
there must be a private correspondence between Mercier 
and the Emperor, a thing that he had suspected before.® 
Benjamin’s statement of the affair was that Mercier had 
come to him in a purely personal capacity, with Seward’s 
knowledge and consent, but he did not say that Seward had 
asked him to come; that they had conversed in a friendly 
way; that Mercier had said he believed the solution lay in 
political independence and commercial union; and that it 
would please him personally as well as his government, if 
his good offices could be interposed in a way to restore 
peace.17 But whatever the real facts about Mercier’s visit 
were, to the public it remained an unsolved mystery. 

The papers continued to maneuver for better positions, 
each side making use of every incident that would advance 
its contentions. Upon the taking of New Orleans, it was re- 
ported that a French officer had been sent by the Federals 
under flag of truce to arrange for the protection of French- 
men in case of bombardment, but the Confederates had con- 
fined him in Fort Jackson. The Débats asked if this was not 
a violation of international law at least as clear as that with 
which the North had been so much reproached in the Trent 
affairs It was reported also that the stock of New Or- 








16 Slidell to Benjamin, No. 7, May 9, 1862; No. 9, May 15, 1862. 
17 Benjamin to Slidell, No. 5, July 10, 1862. 
18 Journal des Débats, May 15, 1862, J.-J. Weiss. 


PROPOSALS OF MEDIATION 73 


leans cotton, 18,000 bales, had been burned by the Confed- 
erates under martial law before retiring. It was an excellent 
opening for the Débats. ‘‘ We possess in France, journals 
which each day excite the suffering populace of Europe 
against the North, by trying to throw upon it the responsi- 
bility for the enforced idleness. Workmen of Lancashire 
and Lyons, if you are out of work, you will know from now 
on to whom you owe it; you will know on which side are 
the burners of cotton! ”.29 When President Lincoln annulled 
the proclamation of General Hunter freeing the slaves of 
Florida, Georgia and South Carolina, this paper saw in it 
the good sense, moderation, tact and political sagacity of Lin- 
coln. He had only reserved to himself the right to give 
judgment upon a question of competence and constitution- 
ality, while his appeal to the slaveholders to open their eyes 
to the signs of the times, was looked upon as a warning 
that he would not hesitate to determine the question in the 
same way on the day, which he evidently thought was ap- 
proaching, when all other chances being exhausted, he would 
consider it his duty to have recourse to the exercise of that 
extraordinary and rigorous power that for the present he 
did not exercise.2® As evidence of Southern brutality, the 
Siecle reproduced Farragut’s letter to the Mayor of New 
Orleans in which the Confederates are reproached for firing 
upon helpless women and children for giving expression to 
their pleasure at seeing the old flag.*4_ All these things were 
ammunition for Liberal gunners. 

In May, the journal Union came out in favor of a media- 
tion on the basis of separation and abolition of slavery. The 
Siécle thought this proposition was worthy of attention, 
though it preferred mediation on the basis of union with ab- 
olition. The argument of the Union to the effect that a State 
of the United States could break the Federal bond when it 
chose, said the Republican paper, would have astonished 
Washington and the other founders of the American re- 

19 Ibid., May 15, 1862, J.-J. Weiss. 


20 Tbid., June 1, 1862, L. Alloury. 
21 Siécle, May 18, 1862, Emile de la Bédolliére. 


74 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


public very much. “It is only necessary to read carefully 
that constitution drawn up by those great minds to be con- 
vinced that it is conceived in a way to make as indissoluble 
as possible the union between the different parts of the con- 
federation. The constitution of the United States is dis- 
tinguished from other federative constitutions by the care 
which it takes to strengthen the central power.” It was 
compared in this respect with the Swiss and German con- 
federations where the states executed the laws of the cen- 
tral government. “The right of the Federal government 
to maintain the Union is certain in our eyes.” Neither did 
the Siécle see in Lincoln a dictator, as did the Union, and 
had no fear for “ the duration of the glorious institutions of 
democratic and free America.” At any rate, while it could 
not say what would be thought of it in the United States, 
the Siécle asserted that “in France, an attempt at mediation 
upon the bases proposed by the Union, that is to say, frankly 
anti-slavery, would be favorably received by public opin- 
ion.4¢ 

There now began a campaign in France on the part of 
the supporters of the South in favor of some form of inter- 
ference in America, a campaign that continued almost un- 
abated through the year. 

On May 8, the Constitutionnel, leader of the Imperialist 
forces, came out with a strong article attacking the policy 
of the Journal des Débats, which was to allow the war to 
continue in America in the hope that in time Congress would 
be forced to proclaim the abolition of slavery. This meant 
war to the extent of the extermination of the whites in 
order to exterminate slavery. ‘‘ Our policy,” it said, “as 
for us, takes care not to defend the institution of slavery, 
but in seeking for means to bring about the disappearance 
of this odious institution, without creating revolutions and 
without piling up ruins, it concerns itself at the same time 
with the fate of French industry, and the negroes of the 
Carolinas do not make it forget the workmen of Lyons and 


22 Tbid., May 5, 1862, Taxile Delord. 


PROPOSALS OF MEDIATION 75 


Roubaix. The policy of the Constitutionnel, therefore, may 
be summed up in two words: Conciliation, Mediation.” ‘Is 
cotton the only object which concerns us? Do not our 
wines, our brandy, our millinery, our furniture, our worsteds, 
our mixed goods, and especially our silks, form the princi- 
pal part of our exportation to America? And has not our 
export commerce almost entirely been destroyed by the 
American civil war? Is there any other cause for the con- 
tinued unemployment at Lyons, at Saint-Etienne, and at 
Tarrare?”’?* Having thus elaborated upon the sufferings of 
France, which only peace could relieve, the Constitutionnel 
needed to complete the argument to show that there could be 
no peace of victory for the North. The capture of New 
Orleans afforded reflections leading to that conclusion. 
This, it said, was a great victory for the North, but it 
meant nothing in such a large country. The South was now 
fighting for its firesides and could not be defeated. The 
North was fighting for supremacy, the South for independ- 
ence. The Union could not be reestablished with cannon 
balls, all the more impossible in view of the ferment of re- 
pulsion, hatred, vengeance, that intestine wars carry with 
them. It was a question of the submission of six million 
souls. ‘‘ We are inspired by that sage and generous policy 
which, from the beginning of the war, had offered its media- 
tion; we have never desired that, under the pretext of giv- 
ing liberty to four million negroes, there should be brought 
about the subjection of six million whites. Certainly, like 
our adversaries, at least as much as they, we aspire to the 
emancipation of the slaves, but we desire that emancipa- 
tion by the progress of ideas and the conciliation of 
interests, not by ruin and massacre!’’** The burning 
of the cotton at New Orleans (here given as 11,700 bales) 
which the Débats had interpreted so unfavorably to the 
South, the Constitutionnel merely regarded as an evidence 





28 Constitutionnel, May 8, 1862, Paulin ,Limayrac. This is No. 3 
of a series entitled, ‘ The American War.” 
24 Ibid., May 22, 1862, Paulin Limayrac. 


76 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


of the determination of the South. “Can one remain impas- 
sive before such sorrowful facts?” 5 The opposition 
press were able to observe the increased activity of the gov- 
ernment organs and the trend of these observations of the 
chief of the semi-official papers. They were willing to la- 
ment with the Imperialist editor over the shedding of blood, 
and to join with him in humanitarian ideas, but, as said the 
Siécle, “‘we are disturbed at the adhesion that he seems to 
give to separation. There are, moreover, in that polemic 
[of May 22] of the Constitutionnel, clouds, the mysteries 
of which it would be difficult to penetrate.” 2° The Consti- 
tutionnel was forced to defend itself against the charges of 
the Presse, the Siecle, and the Débats that it was defending 
the cause of slavery.?’ 

By June, the question of mediation had reached an acute 
state, which was not passed until October 23, when the Eng- 
lish cabinet meeting which was to consider the American 
question was not held. It was during these five months that 
the friends of America in France fought their great fight 
for the preservation of the American Union with which they 
identified principles of universal and permanent considera- 
tion, the abolition of human servitude and democratic ideals. 
Their task was rendered more difficult by the fact that their 
government was intriguing in secret. It was in July that 
Napoleon had his interview with Slidell at Vichy, in which 
Slidell favored common action with the Confederacy against 
the North, an enemy of France as well as of the Confederacy 
in view of its opposition to Napoleon’s schemes of conquest 
in Mexico. 

In early June the two leading papers joined issues. On 
June 8, the Constitutionnel summed up its position. There 
was no chance for Southern submission, The war would 
not be brought to an end by the action of either of the two 
parties. Peace could only come from outside, and the word 

25 Ibid., May 25, 1862, A. Grenier. 


26 Siécle, May 23, 1862, Emile de la Bédolliére. 
27 Constitutionnel, May 24, 1862, P. de Troimonts. 


PROPOSALS OF MEDIATION vith 


that could solve the question was Mediation. It had an- 
swered already the question as to whence that mediation 
should come; the bases for mediation were easy to discover. 
Mediation should represent only ideas of moderation and 
justice and not be addressed either to those who desired a 
servile war or to those who regarded slavery as an institu- 
tion of divine right. Such mediation would correspond with 
the vital industrial interests of Europe and also with Lin- 
coln’s recent reference to the resolution adopted by strong 
majorities in Congress approving cooperation with such 
State as adopted gradual emancipation by compensating it 
for public and private losses resulting from the change, 
and should be in accordance with Lincoln’s address of March 
4, 1861, in which he said that it was not his intention to 
interfere with slavery in the States where it already existed. 
Such mediation should also consider Yancey’s address in 
Fishmonger’s Hall, on November 9, last, in which he said 
that the South would insist upon independence but in the 
interest of peace and humanity would make concessions on 
points of secondary importance.*§ 

Here was a definite program, and the Journal des Débats 
answered on the following day: 

Assuredly, if the North and South were disposed to act together 
and submit their difference to the arbitration of France or of any 
other European power whatever, far from turning away from it we 
should be the first to felicitate them in their own interest as well as 
in the general interest of Europe. But in the present state of 
things, is there any reason to hope that such an accord could be 
possible between the two parties? The Constitutionnel forgets to ex- 
plain itself upon that point, which for us is the principal point. 
That journal will remember that a year ago, at the beginning ef the 
war, France offered its mediation to America, and that that media- 
‘tion was not accepted. Now, after a year, events have advanced; the 
situation of the belligerents has profoundly changed. After this, 
what chance is there that the offer of mediation, refused a year back, 
would be accepted today, by either of the two parties, and especially 
by the one which can find in its military success reasons which it 


did not then have, to hope to see the fortunes of war end the strug- 
gle and solve the question to its advantage? 29 


28 Tbid., June 8, 1862, Paulin Limayrac. 

29 Journal des Débats, June 9, 1862, L. Alloury. The mediation 
of the year before, evidently referred to, had been intended to be 
a joint one of France and Great Britain. When, on Apr. 15, 1861, 





78 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


The reply of the Constitutionnel was to point to the grow- 
ing deficit in the United States treasury, and the lack of 
progress made by the North toward overcoming the South.*° 

Thus the liberal paper was challenged to show the ac- 
complishments of the defenders of the Union. Its reply 
was characteristically that of a liberal, for it dwelt not upon 
the military situation, but upon the progress of humanitarian 
ideals. The Constitutionnel, it said, had forgotten the re- 
cent capture of New Orleans; that- the Federals were in 
control of the Mississippi and had encamped within three 
leagues of Richmond. Moreover, a law had been passed 
abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia, there was a 
law inviting the South to free its slaves in consideration of 
an indemnity, there was a treaty with England, which, loy-. 
ally applied, would soon render the slave trade almost impos- 
sible, there was a President who did not resemble Mr. Bu- 
chanan and Mr. Davis, and who had the captains of negro 
ships executed in the public square instead of putting them at 
liberty with a fine, there was a law prohibiting the introduc- 
tion of slavery in the territories where slavery did not yet 
exist. There was, moreover, in America, a new code of lib- 
erty. That code did not contain any harsh measure, it did 
not decree the violent abolition of slavery, it proposed it 
gradually and with indemnity. “If the North wanted to 
annul the laws that we have just enumerated, it would raise 
against itself the opinion of the whole civilized world; if the 
South desires to accept them reconciliation is possible, and 
for that condition we fervently pray.” *! The other Im- 
perialist papers lined up behind the Constitutionnel, and the 
Liberal press came to the support of the Débats. The 
Presse feared that England would seek in fruitless negotia- 
tions a pretext to recognize the South.*? A mediation, it said, 
the ministers of those two countries presented themselves together, 
Seward refused to see them in that manner. When they presented 
their notes separately Seward courteously declined the offered me- 
diation (F. W. Seward, “Life of Seward,” vol. ii, “Seward at 
Washington,” pp. 581-582). 

80 Constitutionnel, June 11, 1862, Paulin Limayrac. 


81 Journal des Débats, June 12, 1862, L. Alloury. 
32 Presse, June 13, 1862, Elias Regnault. 


PROPOSALS OF MEDIATION 79 


is only proposed between two belligerent states recognized 
as such. What would the Convention have said if it had 
been presented with a mediation between it and the Vendée? 
What would France say today if Alsace should rise in rebel- 
lion and were supported by a demand from Germany for 
mediation? It feared that in case of a refusal of mediation, 
even if it were not followed by an armed intervention, it 
might be followed by the recognition of the South, and such 
action, far from bringing the war to a close, would only add 
fuel to the fires. If followed by armed intervention, a series 
of complications would be entered into, of which one could 
not see either the extent or the duration.** The question 
of what would be done if the mediation should fail had al- 
ready been raised by the Débats. The Times had appeared 
to admit that a failure of the mediation would lead to rec- 
ognition of the South. In other words the mediation was 
only a first step toward intervention in American affairs. 
The Constitutionnel and the Patrie were called upon to ex- 
plain their purposes in the matter.** 

The Débats explained that if the proposed mediation was 
intended simply to bring the two parties together with the 
purpose of arresting the spilling of blood, to agree upon an 
arbitration to be accepted freely by both parties, that it would 
not be behind in rejoicing in the interest of civilization and 
humanity, but before giving its approval it was deemed es- - 
sential to know in what spirit it was conceived and what 
the consequences might be. It must know if the project of 
mediation did not have for its aim to favor one of the two 
parties at the expense of the other. “If the mediation were 
to be imposed by force upon that of the two parties which 
could refuse it, if it were to lead to an armed intervention 
in American affairs, an intervention in favor of the South, 
which represents for us the cause of slavery, an inter- 
vention against the North, which represents a great prin- 
ciple of civilization and humanity, if it is thus that 


33 Tbid., June 15, 1862, Elias Regnault. 
34 Journal des Débats, June 14, 1862, Louis Alloury. 


80 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


the mediation is intended, as the language of the Con- 
stitutionnel would make us fear, we should be consistent 
in opposing mediation with all our power.’ And it was 
pointed out that this policy was in accord with that of the 
Emperor and of Mr. Billault, in the addresses above re- 
ferred to.*® 

Meantime the famous order of General Butler in New 
Orleans was being put to use by the Imperialist press. 
After denouncing this measure, the Constitutionnel added: 
“ The fate of New Orleans is the fate of all the cities which 
are occupied by the armies of the North, and each Federal 
chief hastens to regulate his conduct by the example of the 
famous Butler.” °* The Moniteur felt called upon to refer 
to the debates in the House of Commons on this order and 
the characterization of Palmerston that it was infamous, 
and the official paper added that these sentiments would be 
shared not only by the English people but by all civilized 
peoples.** The Débats interpreted this order to mean that 
“women well born, who insult the Federal flag or the Fed- 
eral soldiers in the street, will be sent to prison as if they 
were only unknown women.” “ But what European general, 
supposing him as respectful toward women as a gentleman 
should be, what European general would submit, in a cap- 
tured city, in open war and under military law, for his flag 
‘ and uniform to be insulted with impunity, even by 
women?” *5 The Constitutionnel was much exercised over 
the execution of Mr. Mumford who had overturned a Fed- 
eral flag, and complained that the papers were mute upon this 
matter, and it expected tomorrow to “read in some jour- 
nal, which believes itself liberal, that the woman of New 
Orleans who was treated as a prostitute, had merited those 
infamous insults, since she had thrown a look of scorn at 
the soldiers of Butler, and that Mr. Mumford deserved to 
be hanged, as the worst of criminals, since he had over- 

35 Tbid., June 15, 1862, Louis Alloury. 

86 Constitutionnel, June 12, 1862, A. Grenier. 


37 Moniteur, June 16, 1862. 
88 Journal des Débats, June 16, 1862, J.-J. Weiss. 


PROPOSALS OF MEDIATION SI 


thrown the flag of the oppressors of his country.” °® Such 
arguments as this were well calculated to win the sympathy 
of the French people for the South, and to secure popular 
support in the projects of mediation. It even was argued 
that mediation was the sole means of ending the war and 
the best guarantee of the abolition of slavery.*° 

After the Confederate successes before Richmond, the 
government paper showed its hand. In a long article, 
headed “The American War, The Latest Events,” of July 
19, it was asked what would happen if the party of exter- 
mination at any price got the uppermost and if the principles 
of political reason and humanity were stifled? Could Europe, 
which was suffering so profoundly from it, remain for a 
long time a spectator of that frightful war? Europe would 
be lacking in its duties toward itself, and justice to others, if 
it should, for it was no longer permissible to consider as in- 
surgents and rebels, populations which for over a year had 
fought for their independence, and which had proved by the 
most irrefutable evidences that they were a government and 
a nation. Europe did not wait so long to recognize the rev- 
olution of 1830, to recognize Belgium. The kingdom of 
Italy already had been recognized for a year by France and 
England and had just been recognized by Russia and 
Prussia. “ The situation commands and the solemn mo- 
ment approaches. Let us hope that the North will listen at 
last to the voice of reason and justice, and that it will ac- 
cept a European mediation before Europe has recognized 
the Confederate States.” * 

As a matter of fact the French government was at this 
time acting in concert with Mr. Lindsay, who in the House 
of Commons was pushing a resolution in favor of mediation. 
Liberals believed this meant the use of force, and they 
wanted to know if the proposals of the Constitutionnel had 
that meaning.*? The Constitutionnel asserted that the pol- 








89 Constitutionnel, July 7, 1862, Auguste Vitu. 

40 Tbid., June 20, 1862, Paulin Limayrac. 

41 [bid., July 19, 1862, Paulin Limayrac. 

#2 Journal des Débats, July 20, 1862, Louis Alloury. Charivari said 


6 


82 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


icy of the Débats could be summed up in one word, “ Exter- 
mination,” while that of the Constitutionnel was “ Concilia- 
tion.” ** Lord Palmerston refused to support Lindsay’s 
resolution. The Revue Contemporaine, after expressing its 
disappointment at this, added that the war had changed its 
purpose; the North was not fighting to overthrow slavery, 
but was using abolition merely as a weapon of war; the 
South was not fighting for slavery, for it realized perfectly 
that whatever the outcome of the war might be, a mortal 
blow would be given to the institution. It was merely fight- 
ing for autonomy, and to this it had as much right as Greece 
had for emancipation from the Turks, Belgium to separate 
from Holland, Venetia and Hungary to separate from Aus- 
tria, or Poland to rid itself of the Russian governors.*4 
The Presse saw in Palmerston’s attitude toward the Lind- 
say resolution a repudiation of the policy of the Imperial- 
ist journals, and added that while it was certain that the 
three government journals (Constitutionnel, Patrie and 
Pays) did not represent on this occasion the opinions of the 
French government, nevertheless it was very singular to 
see them united so cordially in their apology for the insur- 
rection in the United States.*° 

The Liberals saw clearly that the mediation proposals 
meant more than they said on their face. The Siecle insisted 
that it could not be believed for a single instant that the 
cabinet at Washington, which was increasing its efforts to 
maintain the Union, would listen to an offer of mediation. 
If mediation were refused, the powers would be pushed 
into hostile demonstrations and a rupture with America.*® 
The Presse did not see how the United States could be 








that before recognizing the Confederacy the cabinets of Europe 
must know its address. Where could they write with Richmond, 
Charleston and New Orleans controlled by the Federals? (Charivari, 
July 23, 1862, Clément Caraguel). 

43 Constitutionnel, July 22, 1862, Paulin Limayrac. 
Ha Revue Contemporaine, vol. Lxiii, p. 423, July 31, 1862, J.-E. 

orn. 

45 Presse, July 22, 1862, Ad. Gaiffe. 

46 Siecle, July 27, 1862, Emile de la Bédolliére; see also Revue 
Germanique, vol. xxii, p. 460, Aug. 1, 1862, Eugéne Maron. 


PROPOSALS OF MEDIATION 83 


forced. “‘ Where are the fleets, the armies, that would be 
needed to be brought together for such a task?” “To 
overthrow the resistance of the Mexican government we are 
forced to send a veritable army, twenty-five thousand men, 
to spend considerable sums. Compare Juarez with Lincoln, 
Zarragoza with McClellan, the three or four armies which 
have invaded the South with the handful of bachibozouks 
who skirmish around Orizaba, then count the cost of the 
military intervention of which the organs of the semi-official 
press speak so lightly.” It was suggested that the services of 
the defenders of secession might be given to the rebels in 
China—and the Tai-pings did not keep negroes.*7 A proc- 
lamation of the Mayor of New York, calling for the serv- 
ices of all loyal men, not only to repress the Southern in- 
surrection, but to prevent a foreign intervention, was offered 
in evidence of the effect of the agitation of Lindsay and the 
policy of the Constitutionnel in wounding national pride and 
increasing the irritation of the people of the United States.*® 

The Débats admitted that it was not opposed to media- 
tion in principle, but passing from theory to practice, it was 
very clearly established, on the one hand, that recognition of 
the South could not have, at present, the result hoped for 
from it, at least if it were not followed by a direct and ac- 
tive intervention; on the other hand, that a direct and ac- 
tive intervention, instead of ending the war and ameliorat- 
ing the situation from which Europe was suffering, would 
only lead to greater evils, and more suffering and greater 
harm for the intervening powers. “ What would have hap- 
pened if the insurrection of the South had been frankly dis- 
avowed and condemned by all the European press? Who 
would dare to say that before that unanimous reprobation of 
the civilized world, the South would have dared to raise the 
flag of secession? In any case, who could deny that the 
North would have found in the moral accord and in the 
general sympathy of Europe, sufficient force to conquer 


47 Presse, July 26, 1862, E.-D. Forgus. 
48 Journal des Débats, July 22, 1862, L. Alloury. 


84 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


the rebellion and terminate promptly the civil war?” +9 The 
journals that advocated European interference in American 
affairs were given the blame for the reported digging up of 
the tobacco and cultivated cotton and the failure to sow their 
fields, on the part of the secessionists, who hoped thus to ex- 
asperate the European interests affected into intervention.®° 
The Siecle admitted that from a strictly legal point of view 
France might aid either the North or the South, but from the 
moral point of view it should not aid the cause of slavery 
which was represented by the South. Moreover, recognition 
would not end the war; neither would declaring the blockade 
ineffectual, for that would mean war, and French industries 
would suffer a hundred times more than at present, and im- 
posts, now weighing so heavily on the tax-payers, would grow 
by a half or perhaps would double. Interest and honor, 
French principles and traditions, called for an alliance with 
the North rather than recognition of the South. An effective 
alliance with the North would soon end the war. “ But we 
do not dare to hope for such an event.” ** 

The Liberals continued from all sides to demand of the 
Constitutionnel what it would do if mediation were refused. 
Finally, on August 2, it answered the question so many times 
repeated: “No, a hundred times, No; mediation refused 
would not lead to war. We have always understood that 
the mediating action of the great powers could only be 
friendly; but if the hypothesis of the Journal des Debats 
should unfortunately be realized, what would happen? 
America, after all, would only give a new proof of blind- 
ness; it would only dishearten its friends more and more.” 
But Europe would have to be called in at some time anyway 
to arbitrate the various delicate questions that would have 
to be settled, such as the navigation of the Mississippi and 
the delimitation of boundaries. It was only to hasten that 











49 Tbid., July 27, 1862, L. Alloury. 
50 Siecle, Aug. 15, 1862, Taxile Delord. 
51 Ibid, Aug. 27, 1862, T.-N. Benard. 


PROPOSALS OF MEDIATION 8 5 


inevitable arbitration, and avert the catastrophes that agi- 
tated America, that the Constitutionnel desired.®? 

Lincoln’s preliminary emancipation proclamation was re- 
ceived with favor by the Liberal press, although it was not 
complete enough to give entire satisfaction. It was taken as 
a refutation of the arguments of those who had insisted that 
slavery had nothing to do with the war.®* Lincoln had not 
abolished slavery completely, an act which “would have been 
nobler and more decisive, which would perhaps have ter- 
minated the civil war by a single blow,” but he had made a 
new step toward abolition. It was evident that he was being 
drawn day by day into more radical measures.** The 
Presse was frankly unsatisfied. It recognized that the presi- 
dent was placed between “ the abolitionists, who do not want 
to compromise, and the despisers of the blacks, who oppose 
any idea of equality,” and doubtless he could not adopt any 
measure other than a compromise. ‘‘ Unfortunately, half- 
measures satisfy nobody.” *® Ina circular note to the diplo- 
matic and consular agents of the United States, Seward had 
pointed out that the proclamation was only a war measure. 
“ That gives small satisfaction to those who would have pre- 
ferred to see in it a moral act. In place of a principle, it is 
only a bomb thrown into the midst of the population of the 
South, and assuredly is but little suited to reclaim the heart 
and convince the conscience.” °* The Imperialists of course 
had no good to say of the measure. “ The proclamation of 
Mr. Abraham Lincoln, which we have already mentioned 
and which we publish today in its entirety, does not do honor 
to the moral sense of the one who signed it or to the gov- 
ernment which approved it.” If a fervent abolitionist had 
proclaimed the absolute suppression of slavery, it might have 
been looked upon as a humanitarian measure. But in this 
proclamation Lincoln does not condemn slavery in prin- 


52 Constitutionnel, Aug. 2, 1862, Paulin Limayrac. 
53 Journal des Débats, Oct. 9, 1862, J.-J. Weiss. 
54 Siecle, Oct. 12, 1862, Léon Plée. 

55 Presse, Oct. 8, 1862, Elias Regnault. 

56 Tbid., Oct. 15, 1862, Elias Regnault. 





86 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


ciple: “ Far from condemning slavery, he promises to main- 
tain it; he offers a premium to encourage it in favor of states © 
which from now until the first of January next, reenter the 
Union, so that if the proclamation could attain the end that 
it proposes, and if, supposing the impossible, all the Con- 
federate states laid down their arms within the next three 
months, slavery would be in fact and by right maintained 
in all the territories.” ‘Who then will dare to say again 
that the North fights for the suppression of slavery?” 7 
The Revue Contemporaine thought that in principle the proc- 
lamation seemed to accord to the loyal States the main- 
tenance of slavery, and simply offered emancipation in those 
places where the United States was incapable of making it 
a reality.°® 





57 Constitutionnel, Oct. 8, 1862, Auguste Vitu. 
a Revue Contemporaine, vol. lxv, pp. 913-914, Dec. 31, 1862, J.-E. 
orn. 


CHAPTERIV 


THE ARMISTICE PROPOSAL AND THE QUESTION OF 
RECOGNITION 


Looking back on events at the present time it is clear that 
after October 23, 1862, the crisis had passed, for the cabinet 
meeting that had been determined upon for that day at 
which it had been intended to discuss the British policy to- 
ward the South was not in fact held.1_ But to the people of 
that time, intervention of some sort seemed imminent. In 
fact it was in November that Napoleon made his most seri- 
ous attempt to secure European interference in American af- 
fairs, all the more dangerous because it appeared in the in- 
sidious form of pure humanitarianism. On November 10, 
there was presented at the British Foreign Office a proposal, 
dated back to October 10, looking toward united efforts on 
the part of England, Russia and France to bring about an 
armistice of six months while peace negotiations were being 
carried on.? A similar note was sent to St. Petersburg. The 
semi-official papers of both England and France had wind 
of it some days before it was presented. The proposal 
found favor, of course, with the Imperialist press, which 
hoped that reason and humanity would prevail over passion, 
and believed that it would lead to “a durable and serious 
settlement.”’ * 

The Liberal press was not entirely agreed on this matter. 
The Presse believed that the first effect of an armistice 
would be to reassure the slave owners, and permit them to 

1 Rhodes, vol. iv, p. 343, and Charles Francis Adams, “The Crisis 
of Foreign Intervention in the War of Secession, September-Novem- 
ber, 1862” (Massachusetts Historical Society, Proceedings, Apr., 1914, 
vol. xlvii, pp. 372-424), for references. 

2 Parl. Debates, vol. clxxii, July 2, 1863. Layard’s statement in the 
House of Commons. The note appeared in the Moniteur, Nov. 13, 


1862. 
8 Constitutionnel, Nov. 10, 1862, A. Grenier. 


87 


88 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


make cruel reprisals upon their revolted and fugitive negroes. 
“Tt is true that we would get cotton, but at what price? 
Just as the slave question was about to be solved, it would 
be thrown back indefinitely. . . . Ii peace were now made, 
it would be made upon the backs of the negroes.” * The 
Journal des Deéebats had no idea that the proposal would be 
accepted by the North. “It remains for us to know by 
what arguments it is hoped to convince the North. The 
armistice, if it should lead at the end of six months to a re- 
sumption of hostilities, would have turned to the single ad- 
vantage of the South. It is proposed in reality, as the 
Patrie says, to demand preliminarily of the North that the 
blockade be removed from the ports of the South. They 
will not remain open six months without the South, the re- 
sources of which are exhausted, providing itself with money, 
munitions and perhaps European recruits, so that if the 
war should be taken up again, the North, in the hypothesis 
of an armistice, would have suspended hostilities only to 
furnish means to the enemy to permit it to revictual in full 
security. That is a kind of contract which has not much in 
it to tempt the North.”*> The Siécle, however, which all 
along had favored some form of friendly mediation, said 
that while it was opposed to a mediation which would be 
an implicit recognition of the South, it, believed that the 
armistice proposal might be so prepared as to avoid the ob- 
jections seen by the Journal des Débats.6 The Constitu- 
tionnel continued its appeal for the end of a frightful 
conflict, and the relief of the industry and commerce of 
Europe.” 

Up to this time, the reports of the Emperor’s proposal 
had not been official. On November 13, it was published 
officially in the Moniteur, and was the occasion for a new 
flood of comment. The Constitutionnel pronounced the in- 
itiative for that proposition “a title of honor” for the Im- 


4 Presse, Nov. 11, 1862, Ad. Gaiffe. 

5 Journal des Débats, Nov. 11, 1862, J.-J. Weiss. 
6 Siecle, Nov. 12, 1862, Emile de la Bédolliére. 
7 Constitutionnel, Nov. 12, 1862, Paulin Limayrac. 


ARMISTICE PROPOSAL AND QUESTION OF RECOGNITION 89 


perial government “of which it should be felicitated, even 
if its efforts should remain without immediate results.” It 
was a new evidence of “that policy of disinterestedness 
and conciliation that France carries beyond the Atlantic as 
she desires to make it triumph in Europe.” § 

The Debats had no such favorable comment: 


The language is skilful, and not a word goes beyond the rights 
that the constant usages of civilized nations confer upon neutrals, 
when in a matter of the interest of humanity they propose to offer 
themselves as arbiters in a bloody quarrel. But all the skill, all the 
prudence, all the good intentions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
do not succeed in dissimulating the almost insurmountable difficulties 
which would present themselves when, leaving general considera- 
tions aside, one desires to. discuss the practical conditions of the 
armistice. What would be done with the blockade? If the blockade 
were maintained while the war was suspended upon the continent, 
it is the South that one would disarm. If the blockade were raised 
during those six months, it is the North which would open to the 
exhausted South, new sources of abundance and vigor. Thus, one or 
the other party would have right to object that the proposed armi- 
stice was to its detriment. However, we do not discuss that eventu- 
ality. The insertion of the dispatch of Mr. Drouyn de Lhuys in 
the Moniteur, when one compares the text of that document with 
the dispatches which arrived yesterday from England and Russia, 
would appear to us rather to have been done to explain the con- 
duct of the French government than to prepare the public for an ap- 
proaching mediation. England hesitates to attempt a step which 
might lead it farther than it would like, and up to the present the 
Russian government has only spoken by the organ of the St. Peters- 
burg Journal which has pronounced itself against intervention. Not 
having (at least according to the rumors which run at London) 
succeeded in having its plan accepted as quickly as it woulda have 
liked, the Imperial government could not better exonorate itself 
from the suspicion of partiality against the North than in publish- 
ing an official piece where, while admitting the designation, still 
extra-official, of “Confederate States,” it bases its reasons for ac- 
tion on the old friendship of France for the United States, and pro- 
tests highly that its good offices could not induce it to cease to be 
neutral. Since a rigorous impartiality is the first duty that it im- 
poses upon itself in that distressful affair, the imperial government 
will not have to regret having fallen in an overture at conciliation 
which might have insensibly entrained our diplomacy in a way 
where it would have been difficult to always keep exact balance be- 
tween the North and the South, and where the equilibrium, if it 
should have had to be, broken, would not have been (at least one so 
fears) in favor of that of the two causes which is the most just, the 
most popular and the most French.® 


In another article, it is admitted that the language of the 


8 Ibid. Nov. 14, 1862, Edouard Simon. 
9 Journal des Débats, Nov. 14, 1862, J.-J. Weiss. 


gO FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


minister of foreign affairs does not depart from a rigorous 
impartiality, but it is added that “it is impossible, in so 
grave a matter, to be contented with words, and it is neces- 
sary to go right to the base of things. . . . The South has 
never aspired or demanded anything other than the suspen- 
sion of hostilities and the raising of the blockade; and in 
fact, after such a measure, a treaty of peace is no more than 
a formality that it could expect,” and for the North to ac- 
cept that proposition is “ simply to recognize in fact the ex- 
istence of the Southern Confederation and the definitive 
dismemberment of the republic. . . . They propose to the 
North to accept willingly from this day what one might offer 
it as the preliminaries of peace after a war in which Europe 
in union with the South should have definitely won the vic- 
tory.” There was, therefore, left the dilemma, either of 
withdrawing while reporting the refusal of the proposition 
that was to be expected, or “it is determined in advance to 
impose by force the mediation that has been amicably of- 
fered. That is war with the North... .” It was re 
marked that the United States were no more bound before 
God and man to furnish cotton to France, than France, torn 
by civil war in 1792, was bound to furnish its ordinary con- 
tingent of wines and silks. It evidently was intended as a 
threat to those who desired intervention, when the Deébats 
pointed out that this might have results entirely different 
from those expected: “ Perhaps it is necessary that a for- 
eign flag should float before New Orleans beside the slave 
flag for the farmer of the West to feel at last that the 
mouths of that great river are part of his magnificent heri- 
tage and that his country includes them. . . . But we should 
see without too much inquietude that supreme test begin and 
a foreign hand draw near to the United States, certain as we 
are that that will not be the hand of France, and that we 
shall be faithful to the interests as to the traditions of our 
country, praying for their victory.” 1° 

Even the Siecle which had leaned toward the proposal, 


10 [bid., Nov. 14, 1862, Prévost-Paradol. 


ARMISTICE PROPOSAL AND QUESTION OF RECOGNITION OI 


placed itself in opposition when it saw that a suspension of 
the blockade was intended. This paper believed that those 
who thought that the United States would accept such a pro- 
posal were counting upon the success of the Democratic 
party in the coming elections, and it replied that even if the 
Democrats were successful, they would not admit any pro- 
posal which would affect the existence of the Union. More- 
over, the argument in the circular that there was an equi- 
librium of forces in America would not dispose the North 
to be friendly toward the proposal, and “ impartial people 
could not accept” that statement “without an extreme re- 
serve.” *1 It was asked whether France would have ac- 
cepted such a proposal when it was torn by the revolt of the 
Vendée. Moreover, it was pointed out that France had in 
Mexico, thirty or forty thousand men, very near to the 
South which would profit the most from the armistice. It 
could not have escaped the other powers that if they should 
support the French proposition they would be making them- 
selves a pedestal for France, and would be lending their aid 
to make France purely and simply the arbiter of America. 
No doubt, England and Russia had seen this, and instead 
of lending themselves to it, they took the opportunity to iso- 
late France. “‘ Their circulars, marked with so much re- 
spect for the legal government of the United States, would 
be enough alone to show the joy that they feel, and it is that 
that distresses us.” }? 

The Revue des Deux Mondes in a shrewd analysis, showed 
how intervention might come from the proposal. The offer 
of France could. be made only to the United States, as the 
Confederates were not recognized, without the permission of 
the White House. The North might answer the proposal 
by saying that to accept the armistice it must withdraw the 
emancipation proclamation and lift the blockade, and ask 
corresponding concessions from the South. Then the me- 
diator must either try to find equitable terms, in which case 


11 Siécle, Nov. 18, 1862, Taxile Delord. 
12 Tbid., Nov. 19, 1862, Léon Plée. 


92 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


it would become involved in the confusion of American af- 
fairs and soon to led to take sides, with the possible result 
of armed intervention; or, the mediator might refuse to find 
the terms, in which case the mediation would fail, and the 
mediator submitted to ridicule would accuse the Washing- 
ton government of obstinacy and become more and more 
hostile to it.2* 

As a matter of fact, the Imperialist journals believed that 
the terms must include separation, and to avoid the disagree- 
able imputation of supporting slavery, they argued that sep- 
aration would bring abolition quicker than union, for four 
or five million whites could not hold four and a half mil- 
lion blacks in slavery. The South needed the North to main- 
tain slavery and the North had shown itself willing to give 
its aid if the Union could be reestablished.** 

England refused to be drawn into the American compli- 
cations, and politely refused Napoleon’s proposal. The 
Presse, in an article remarkable for its open criticism of the 
government policy, said that England had seized with great 
skill the opportunity which Drouyn de Lhuys had afforded 
it to adjust its affairs with the United States. This act of 
England would allay the unfriendly feeling caused in the 
United States by its action in the Trent affair. “ Thanks 
to the attempt of Mr. Drouyn de Lhuys, thanks to the eva- 
sive response made by Lord Russell, no such thing is more to 
be feared, and now the credit of England has retaken at 
Washington the ascendency that various circumstances had 
lost for it.” France had exchanged the friendship of the 
North for that of the South, but asked the Presse, was not 
the friendship of the North, which was fighting “for the 
maintenance of the legal order of things, for the defense 
of the Constitution and of the choice of universal suffrage, 
worth more than that of the South defending slavery?” 7° 


13 Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. xlii, pp. 485-93, Nov. 15, 1862, E. 
Forcade. 
ra Revue Contemporaine, vol. Ixv, pp. 220-4, Nov. 14, 1862, J.-E. 
orn. 
15 Presse, Nov. 16, 1862, Ad. Gaiffe. 


ARMISTICE PROPOSAL AND QUESTION OF RECOGNITION 93 


The Constitutionnel, taking its cue from the Morning Post, 
endeavored to soften the diplomatic check by alleging that 
the action of England was due to the belief that the coming 
elections in America would bring about the fall of the Lin- 
coln government, after which the proposed mediation would 
be more likely to succeed. On the basis of reported Demo- 
cratic successes in New York and New Jersey, the Constitu- 
tionnel declared that the moment had now arrived.7® 

The journal, Union, continued even after the refusals of 
Great Britain and Russia, to favor diplomatic intervention 
in America,’ and the Débats found it necessary to reply to 
certain Parisian journals which accused it and the Revue 
des Deux Mondes of desiring the destruction of their fellow 
men in opposing mediation.1* The Constitutionnel contin- 
ued to call for mediation on the ground that neither of the 
belligerents could sue for peace without a loss of dignity,7® 
dwelling upon the sufferings of the workmen of France 
and the “ immense legions ” out of work, “ the victims of the 
most terrible crisis which has traversed the American con- 
tinent and of which Europe has suffered the effect,” ?° while 
the Débats questioned if the constant menaces of interven- 
tion not followed by action had been advantageous—if the 
manufacturers would not have preferred a hundred times if 
it had been declared from the beginning of the struggle that 
it would be long and bloody, and that it was not a question of 
the tariff or a matter that could easily be terminated by a 
compromise, but a revolution directed by a powerful and 
proud caste. But the workmen were advised to accept their 
present distress as the work of Providence and to join with 
their patrons in an effort to make the best of things, fol- 
lowing the advice of Bright to speak no word in favor of 
the monstrous creation now demanding admittance to the 
family of nations.** 

16 Constitutionnel, Noy. 16, 1862, Paulin Limayrac. 

17 Journal des Débats, Nov. 20, 1862, J.-J. Weiss. 

18 Tbid., Nov. 23, 1862, Prevost-Paradol. 

19 Constitutionnel, Nov. 24, 1862, Paulin Limayrac. 


20 Ibid., Dec. 17, 1862, Paulin Limayrac. 
21 Journal des Débats, Dec. 26, 1862, Auguste Léo. 


94 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


This matter of slavery was the stumbling block in the 
way of the adherents of the South. Even such a paper as 
the Presse admitted that “in our eyes, a Constitution, how- 
ever old or excellent it may be or may appear to be, is only 
an act. Before the act, the principle! Now, what is the 
principle to which the United States are indebted for the as- 
tonishing rapidity of their great development, for their 
immense strength, for their immense richness? No one 
disputes it: that principle is liberty. . . . From liberty 
proceeds logically voluntary separation between the South 
and the North. From the time that the South pro- 
posed it, demanded it, claimed it, the North was without 
title, without right, to refuse it.” Neither could much va- 
lidity be attached to Lincoln’s argument in regard to the 
geographical unity of America. Nevertheless the North was 
justified in the war, and its justification lay in the question 
of slavery. “ Loving liberty as we love it, desiring liberty 
as we desire it, have we need to say that we are opposed 
to slavery, and that all our sympathies are attached to the 
cause which the North represents? ” 7? 

The annual messages of both Lincoln and Davis were fol- 
lowed closely in France. Lincoln’s message of 1862 caused 
considerable comment. In expressing some disappointment 
at the attitude of European powers he had said that in the 
unusual agitation caused in foreign countries by the war, 
the United States had “forborne from taking part in any 
controversy between foreign states and between parties or 
factions in such states.” The Constitutionnel replied that 
the Monroe doctrine, according to the interpretations of its 
commentators, demanded the hegemony of the United States 
over the whole of America, and that in the years previous 
to the Civil War there had been a school of politics in New 
York and Washington which dreamed of nothing less than 
to make the United States the arbiter in the affairs of 
Europe.” Liberals, however, were attracted by Lincoln’s 


22 Presse, Dec. 19, 1862, E. de Girardin. : 
23 Constitutionnel, Dec. 18, 1862, Edouard Simon. 


ARMISTICE PROPOSAL AND QUESTION OF RECOGNITION 95 


proposal for gradual and compensated emancipation. “ Cer- 
tain now of obtaining a proper indemnity for the liberation 
of its slaves, will the South return to its duty? We hope so, 
as do all the friends of civilization, but if the Union can not 
be reestablished in the name of right and justice, let it be 
reestablished by force!” ?* In an article headed, ‘‘ The Iso- 
lation of the South,” the Siécle said that after the message 
of President Lincoln, one could hardly be a partisan of the 
South, at least without breaking entirely with ideas of civi- 
lization.?® 

The year 1863 opened with Lincoln’s Emancipation Proc- 
lamation. The principles involved in this proclamation al- 
ready had been discussed in connection with the preliminary 
proclamation of 1862. Its effects were belittled by the Im- 
perialists. It was simply one more document for the archives 
of the White House. Its platonic effects were extended over 
three million one hundred thousand slaves, while hardly a 
million remained in “ involuntary servitude.” ‘ Such, is the 
failure of Federal arms and the inefficacy of Presidential 
threats, which give such vast weight to the emancipation 
proclamation.” ?® Even the Liberal friends of the Union 
were not satisfied by the measure. They were interested in 
emancipation from the humanitarian side, and there was 
considerable weight in the argument of the Imperialists that 
it was merely “a weapon of war, and not an act of generos- 
ity and justice.” 27 

Napoleon had failed in his effort to secure support in forc- 
ing an armistice upon America. To cover up his diplomatic 
defeat, it was necéssary that he do something to show that he 
was interested only in humanity and the saving of bloodshed. 
So in a dispatch dated January 9, of this year, he made a pro- 
posal of friendly mediation which was officially published on 


24 Siecle, Dec. 18, 1862, Taxile Delord. 
25 Ibid., Dec. 22, 1862, Léon Pleée. 
ae Revue Contemporaine, vol. lxvi, pp. 438-9, Jan. 31, 1863, J.-E. 
orn. 
27 Constitutionnel, Jan. 15, 1863, Edouard Simon. 


96 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


January 28 and presented to Seward on February 3.78 This 
was mediation, but mediation with the teeth pulled out; 
simply an offer of the good offices of France to end the 
struggle. On January 20, the Constitutionnel, preparing the 
way for the publication of this note, published an article in 
which the advantages were pointed out of a commission to 
discuss peace even while the war continued. “ Some spirits 
have appeared to fear that the American people would see in 
a foreign interference, however amicable it might be, an act 
of a nature to wound its pride, and in an armistice an act of 
weakness. But could there not be other ways which might 
lead to a solution? At certain epochs in history during 
long and bloody wars, when the combatants, worn out with 
evils already suffered, hesitated before the responsibility of 
calamities to come, we have seen with the same step the work 
of peace go forward along with the work of war.” Commis- 
sioners might be appointed who would give a decision. ‘“ The 
voice of those men invested with the confidence of their co- 
citizens evidently would have great authority. The states 
of the North and those of the South would thus come from 
it to a more calm appreciation of the causes of their differ- 
ences. They would make reciprocal concessions and bring 
about that reconciliation so desired, which, while reassuring 
the interests of the world, would return the great American 
confederation to its civilizing mission and would restore to 
it in its integrity, that fine name of the United States, 
young still in history, and surrounded, nevertheless, with 
so much prestige.” 2° Slidell’s attention was attracted to 
this article, which was signed by the principal editor, by the 
fact that it gave “ almost textually ” the ideas and arguments 
on the subject of a conference which Persigny had presented 
to him three weeks before. He called on Persigny and 
found that the article had been published at the instance of 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs “who had favorably re- 

28 37th Congress, 3d sess., S. Ex. Doc. No. 38, Dispatch No. 297, 


p. 13. 
29 Constitutionnel, Jan. 20, 1863, Paulin Limayrac. 


ARMISTICE PROPOSAL AND QUESTION OF RECOGNITION 97 


ceived the suggestion of Mr. Persigny which had also been 
approved by the Emperor.” °° 

When the mediation proposal was published, it met with 
the approval of all parties. The Presse, which had inclined 
toward friendly mediation all along, said that this offer se- 
cured the approbation of all Europe.*t It was interpreted 
by the Deébats as a renunciation of the previous proposal of 
an armistice and as such it met with its approval. While it 
might not lead to peace, nevertheless it was “a great step 
indeed toward the respect of the right the North represents 
and toward that prudent and wholly French policy which is 
alarmed at mediation.” ** Comparing this proposal with the 
armistice proposal, it was said that ‘“‘ such an armistice pro- 
posed to the United States by the three great maritime 
powers of Europe resembled too nearly a summons to lay 
down their arms, and as that armistice called first of all for 
the raising of the blockade, it gave to the South powerful 
means of conquering its independence. Moreover, Europe 
must have decided in advance to impose that armistice by 
force or to make a perfectly useless overture, for it was quite 
clear that the United States would never accept of its own 
will, after having poured out torrents of blood to avoid it, 
an issue so fatal to its grandeur. The new propositition of 
France did not raise any such difficulty, and the friendliness 
of the form of that dispatch of January 9, was in accord 
with the harmlessness of the substance.” ** 

The new proposal was rejected by Seward in a note which 
the Revue des Deux Mondes said lacked “the graces of dip- 
lomatic expression,” in which raillery took proportions not 
compatible with politeness, but it was hoped that the reply 
would cure “ our Department of Foreign Affairs of its tastes 
for intervention in the American conflict.” *4 


80 Slidell to Benjamin, No. 24, Jan. 21, 1863. 

31 Presse, Feb. 1, 1863, Eugene Chatard. 

32 Journal des Débats, Jan. 30, 1863, J.-J. Weiss. 

33 Tbid., Nov. 21, 1863, Prevost-Paradol. 

i Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. xliv, p. 232, Mar. 1, 1863, E. For- 
cade. 


7 


98 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


Meantime the policies of the Emperor were being re- 
viewed in the annual discussion of the Address to the Em- 
peror in the two Chambers of the legislature. The Senate 
adopted a paragraph which read (paragraph 8) : 


It would be desirable if the United States of America permitted 
us similar hopes. But the civil war there pursues its ravages, and 
the projects of conciliation of Your Majesty have appeared prema- 
ture to the two great maritime powers of Europe. We regret it; 
it is always proper for diplomacy to offer with disinterestedness 
counsels of humanity. We regret it ali the more because as a re- 
sult of the disturbance that the secession has thrown in our commer- 
cial relations with America, stagnation of work has reached a dis- 
tressing state in several manufacturing districts... . 

No one spoke against this paragraph except the Marquis 
de Boissy, the Anglophobe, who charged that England had 
done more than consider the present time premature.*®° In 
the Corps Législatif there was a more lively session. The 
proposed paragraph on America there read (paragraph 5): 

We are profoundly grieved at the prolongation of the struggle in 
the United States and at the character that it has taken. Our senti- 
ments of humanity are more affected by it than our interests. We 
regret that your friendly and disinterested voice has not been lis- 
tened to by the great powers, and we pray that the Americans them- 
selves will recoil soon before the evils that they are causing. We 
can not desire the exhaustion of a country which has known up to 
the present how to make use of liberty to the profit of labor and 
civilization. 

An amendment was proposed by deputies Arman, Le- 
fébre, Lafond de Saint-Mtr, de Montagnac and Cavet- 
Rogniat, which would have added to the second sentence, 
after the word “ interests’ : “ which, however, could have 
found a real safeguard in a unanimous concert for the appli- 
cation, on the coasts of the Southern States, of the prin- 
ciples of maritime law solemnly proclaimed in the Treaty 
OD arisn, 

Arman, speaking in favor of this amendment, argued that 
the article of this treaty applying to blockades only stated 
a principle of maritime law, that this had been admitted by 
Marcy, and the blockade of the South evidently was not 


effective. It was replied, however, that the question of the 


35 Senate, Jan. 30, 1863. 


ARMISTICE PROPOSAL AND QUESTION OF RECOGNITION 99 


validity of the blockade should be left with the government 
and this amendment was withdrawn. 

The discussion then turned to the original paragraph, and 
the Viscount Anatole Lemercier availed himself of the oc- 
casion to discuss the whole American question. He quoted 
Napoleon I to the effect that the original cession of Louisi- 
ana was made with the purpose of humbling the pride of 
England by the creation of a rival maritime power. Thus, 
France should not destroy Napoleon’s work. He attempted 
to prove that slavery was at the bottom of the present dis- 
pute, and quoted from Stephens to that effect. “ One might 
also oppose me with the latest act of President Lincoln which 
maintains slavery for his friends and gives liberty to the 
slaves of his adversaries. That is an inconsistency, moreover, 
that I deplore, but that does not prevent me from saying 
that I give the North credit for being, in principle, the par- 
tisan of the freedom of the blacks, while I blame the South 
for considering slavery a political institution.” A peace 
now would be of short duration for the North would never 
consent that the Mississippi should be in the hands of a for- 
eign power. Jefferson himself had said that there was one 
point on the globe of which the possessor was our natural and 
habitual enemy, and that was New Orleans. The conviction 
of this truth had had more effect in bringing the First Consul 
to sell Louisiana than had the eighty millions. Neither would 
the South keep a peace based on separation, for it would be 
flooded: with abolitionist literature, and it would have to go to 
war with the North in order to preserve slavery. The only 
way to bring peace was for Europe to make it clear to the 
South that its separate existence would not be recognized. 
When the South realized the truth of this, peace would come. 
Then one could turn to the North and ask for concessions, 
loosening the bonds of the central government, making it sim- 
ilar to the Swiss or even the German confederation.** But 
the paragraph was adopted. 

The argument that there would not be peace so long as 


36 Corps Législatif, Feb. 9, 1863. 


100 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


the mouth of the Mississippi was in the hands of any power 
other than the States of the North and West who depended 
upon the Mississippi for their existence, was not a new one 
for France. It had been advanced in the Débats early in the 
war,*” and it had been presented by the Siecle in January 
of this year. “‘ Twenty million men belonging to one of the 
most industrious, tenacious and intrepid races which have ap- 
peared on the globe, peopling the valleys which extend from 
the Missouri and the Ohio to New York, carry on business 
and trade, enter and leave their homes only by way of the 
Mississippi and its numerous tributaries. Will it be possible 
to persuade those twenty million persons to leave the key 
of their house in the hands of the new republic . . . ?” *8 
But Lemercier’s suggestion regarding concessions by the 
North was not so well received, at least by the Presse, which 
said that it was not in the power of the North to make con- 
cessions, for what the South wanted was separation, and the 
North must either accept that or refuse it.*® 

The last serious effort in favor of the South was made in 
the English House of Commons when Mr. Roebuck brought 
up his resolution in favor of recognition. Before this resolu- 
tion was brought up Roebuck made a visit to Fontainebleau, 
and it was reported in the newspapers that the Emperor had 
expressed himself as favorable to recognition of the South. 
The Revue des Deux Mondes professed not to believe such 
“strange rumors,” and said that it was evident that the 
Emperor discussed questions pending between France and 
England only with the responsible ministers of the Queen of 
England, and not with a simple member of the House of 
Commons.*® As a matter of fact this resolution of Roe- 
buck’s had no chance of success, for the ministry had made 
up its mind the October before and public opinion in Eng- 
land had since that time been going steadily against the 


37 See above, p. 18. 
38 Siecle, Jan. 31, 1863, Taxile Delord. 
89 Presse, Feb. 11, 1863, Emile de Girardin. 
a Es des Deux Mondes, vol. xlvi, pp. 248-9, July 1, 1863, E. 
orcade. 


ARMISTICE PROPOSAL AND QUESTION OF RECOGNITION Io] 


South.*4 The attitude of the government of France, how- 
ever, was quite another question. An especial importance 
belongs to the statement of the Constitutionnel as a semi- 
official paper, when, in answer to the question of what 
was the position of the government of France on that ques- 
tion, it expressed surprise that anyone should be in doubt as 
to France, which was the first to invite the great powers, 
England above all, to “seek a solution called for by human- 
ity and the interest of the commerce of the whole world.” # 

The Débats held that recognition by England would only 
stir up Northern hatred, and the party desiring peace would 
be overthrown by a patriotic wave. It was said that there 
would be no reason for surprise if “the zeal manifested 
among us by a certain press in favor of the South was not 
what contributed the most to render inactive the old hatred 
of England against the United States,” although the asser- 
tion that the hatred of England was inactive was hardly jus- 
tified by the facts. The Liberal paper believed that the Mex- 
ican expedition created an extremely serious state of things 
which was beginning to occupy the minds of the English. 
“That grave fact, of extreme importance to the general his- 
tory of the world, of France disputing with the Anglo-Saxon 
race, the heritage of the Spanish republics in dissolution, 
can not fail to cause some anxiety on the part of England, 
despite the disinterested tone in which it exhorted us last 
year to conquer and colonize ‘the yellow fever empire!’ ” 
It was suggested that if the South was to be recognized, 
and a war with the United States result, England would pre- 
fer that France do it, if it was to become a neighbor of the 
United States by the conquest of Mexico. The fact that 
Mexico was discussed in the English debates seemed to bear 
this suspicion out.** 

On the same day the Constitutionnel came out with an ar- 
ticle which was clearly intended to state the case for recogni- 

41 Rhodes, vol. iv, pp. 343-362. 


42 Constitutionnel, July 2, 1863, Edouard Simon. 
43 Journal des Débats, July 3, 1863, J.-J. Weiss. 


102 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


tion. The war was causing enormous sacrifices in men and » 
money; hatred between the adversaries was growing more 
profound; and all this was due to the desire of the Federals 
to reestablish a Union that could not be reestablished. The 
history of the United States was reviewed to show that the 
original members of the Union would have refused to ad- 
here to it if they had thought that the Constitution implied 
the surrender of their individual sovereignty; the United 
States was not a centralized state, but merely a federation of 
separate republics. Europe had patiently awaited the end 
of the war while its material interests were seriously af- 
fected, but it could not listen with indifference to the recital 
of those frightful butcheries in which were perishing so 
many thousands of men who were after all the sons of 
European nations. Could Europe remain indefinitely in 
the attitude of a distressed spectator? Did it not have 
duties to fulfill toward America as well as toward itself? 
Then the debates in the House of Commons were referred 
to and it was added that it was not necessary “to say with 
what satisfaction we should see the governments of Europe 
associate themselves in a thought of which the imperial gov- 
ernment took the initiative and which was inspired as much 
by its old sympathies for the American nation as by its 
solicitude for the general interests of the world.” ** 

The Débats evidently feared that Roebuck’s motion would 
pass and only strove to keep France from joining. When 
Roebuck said, “ We shall be a much greater people, and 
London will be the imperial city of the world,” the Débats 
pointed out that England might gain by the destruction of 
the maritime equilibrium, and a market for English indus- 
try would be opened where the bonds of customs, of lan- 
guage and of political interest would give them the advan- 
tage over France, while France had nothing to gain, but, 
by supporting England, would only cover with the French 
flag the establishment of a state exclusively based on slavery 
and declaring itself that slavery was its corner-stone.*® 

When Roebuck reported to the Commons the famous in- 


44 Constitutionnel, July 3, 1863, H.-Marie Martin. 
45 Journal des Deébats, July 5, 1863, Prévost-Paradol. 


ARMISTICE PROPOSAL AND QUESTION OF RECOGNITION 103 


terview granted to himself and Lindsay by the Emperor of 
France,*® the Moniteur gave another version of the matter, 
to the effect that when the members asked the Emperor to 
make an official proposal to England, he answered that Eng- 
land had turned down his proposal of October, but that 
nevertheless the ambassador at London had received instruc- 
tions to sound upon that point the intentions of Palmerston 
and to give him to understand that if the English cabinet be- 
lieved that the recognition of the South might put an end to 
the war, the Emperor would be disposed to follow.*7 The 
Constitutionnel commented on this to the effect that it was 
evidence that the Emperor had not sought to influence Par- 
liament through two of its members but had only given ex- 
planations in an interview which he had no reason to re- 
fuse.*® Whatever were the facts about the Roebuck inter- 
view, an official statement explaining it would not be of 
much value as to the real facts. Slidell reported that Roe- 
buck and Lindsay “ were authorized to state in the House of 
Commons that the Emperor was not only willing but anxious 
to recognise the Confederate States with the cooperation of 
England.” He said that Mr. Lindsay would give Mr. Mason 
a written memorandum of the interview.*® However, he 
had had an interview with Napoleon on June 18, in which 
the Emperor said that “he was more fully convinced than 
ever of the propriety ” of recognizing the Confederacy, “ but 
that the commerce of France and the success of the Mexi- 
can expedition would be jeopardised by a rupture with the 
United States.” If, however, England would cooperate in 
recognition there need be no anticipation of war.®° His real 
opinions on the subject of recognition had no doubt been 
made quite clear to the two Englishmen as well as to the 
Confederate representative. How far Napoleon would be 
willing to go alone was the serious question. Slidell himself 
had written in the spring that he believed Napoleon would 


46 Parl. Debates, vol. 171, June 30, 1863, Roebuck in the House 
of Commons. 

47 Moniteur, July 5, 1862. 

48 Constitutionnel, July 6, 1863, Edouard Simon. 

49 Slidell to Benjamin, No. 39, June 25, 1863 (Pickett Papers). 

50 Tbid., No. 38, June 21, 1863 (Pickett Papers). 


104 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


have taken action separate from England on the question of 
the blockade had it not been for European complications; 
that, as a matter of fact, the France, “a journal enjoying in 
a high degree the confidence of the government,” had com- 
menced a series of articles dealing with the blockade at the 
inspiration of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but they had 
been discontinued on a hint received from the same quarter. 
Slidell says that “the cause of this change was the pros- 
pect of difficulty with Prussia growing out of a convention 
said to have been entered into by that power with Russia 
for the suppression of the Polish insurrection.” * At any 
rate, it is clear from the diplomatic correspondence of Sli- 
dell as well as the arguments of the Imperialist press, that 
Napoleon was willing and anxious to act with England in 
favor of the South although he was not willing to act alone. 

The summer of 1863 closed the serious attempts at in- 
terference in American affairs. That there had been no in- 
tervention was not due to any lack of zeal on the part of the 
Imperialist press. It can not even be said that the valiant 
defense of the Union by the Liberal press alone would have 
been sufficient to prevent action by Napoleon. The Mexican 
expedition was very unpopular, but it was carried on for a 
number of years. Public opinion in France had not the 
machinery to make itself felt as it did in England. It was 
the great change of opinion in England beginning at the end 
of 1862, that prevented foreign interference, and the cabinet 
meeting called for October 23, 1862, but not in fact held, 
was the turning point. 

Even the £3,000,000 cotton loan, placed upon the markets 
of London, Paris, Frankfort, Amsterdam and Liverpool by 
the firm of Erlanger & Co., of Frankfort and Paris, and 
quickly subscribed despite the fears that the Confederacy 
would follow the example of certain Southern States in the 
way of repudiation, so declined that in April the Confederacy 
had to buy bonds back heavily in order to keep up the price.*? 

51 Ibid., No. 28, Mar. 4, 1863 (Pickett Papers). 

52 Ernest A. Smith, The History of the Confederate Treasury; 


Constitutionnel, Mar. 22, 1863, London correspondence, John Wilks; 
Constitutionnel, Mar. 23, 1863. 


CHAPTER VI 


THE CONFEDERATE PROPAGANDA 


The Confederates had early recognized the need of in- 
fluencing public opinion. In London, they published their 
own organ, the Index. In France, they made determined 
efforts to bring the people to the support of the Confederate 
cause. 

In Slidell’s first dispatch, he devotes most of his report 
to the state of the public mind. Wherever he had been he 
had found opinion favorable to the South, though the 
question of slavery, which he was to find later would be 
eternally arising, was causing some trouble: 


It is true that you often hear expressed the regret that slavery 
exists amongst us, and the suggestion of a hope that some steps 
may be taken for its ultimate but gradual extinction, but, so far as 
my experience extends, this is never done in any offensive way, 
and the conversation is easily diverted to other and more agreeable 
topics. I make it a rule to enter into no discussion on the subject, 
for many of our best friends, who heartily advocate our cause, have 
theoretical views on the subject, which in general it is not worth 
while to combat. I should be inclined to think that the sentiment 
against slavery in the abstract is quite as wide-spread in France 
as it is in England, but that there is no considerable class of people 
here, who consider that its existence with us should control, or 
even modify, the policy of the nation in its relations with our Con- 
federacy. I believe that the Emperor, the members of his Cabinet, 
and the higher functionaries of his government generally, are quite 
indifferent on the subject of slavery, and that the opposition to us 
professedly based on it, which is manifested by the so-called liberal 
journals, and those in the interest of the Orléans family is more dic- 
tated by a sentiment of opposition to the Emperor, than by any de- 
cided feeling of hostility to the institution. 


He thought that the Republicans and Orleanists felt in- 
stinctively that the Emperor would soon recognize the South 
or declare the blockade ineffective, and wanted to be in a 
position to attack his policy. Slidell advised that the active 
support of some Paris journal be enlisted “in the way of 
editorial matter, and more especially for the free use of its 
columns for the dissemination of correct information of 

105 


106 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


what is passing among us,—such as our means of defense, 
the relative position and force of the combattants, results 
of battles and skirmishes, the personal superiority of our 
troops, and above all, the utter impossibility of reconstruc- 
tion, etc., etc.” He felt that the French people were getting 
their reports of such matters from Federal sources and that 
even when correct news was received it was frequently so 
late that the earlier exaggerated and false reports from 
New York and Boston had already done their work. He 
thought that as several journals were already well disposed, 
a very moderate sum of a few thousand dollars would secure 
the active support of one of them. He said that it was 
confidently asserted and generally believed that the Federal 
government had spent large sums in this way. 

On April 14, Edwin De Leon, formerly United States 
Consul-General at Alexandria, was sent by the Confederate 
State Department as a confidential agent for the purpose of 
influencing public opinion in Europe. He was given about 
$25,000, of which he was to give $2,700 to Henry Hotze in 
London. De Leon’s salary was to be $3,000 a year. On 
Jan. 11, 1863, De Leon was sent another thousand pounds.? 

Meantime, Henry Hotze, Confederate commercial agent 
and press agent at London, was not unmindful of French 
opinion. He did not take so optimistic a view of conditions 
there as Slidell, and wrote that the French public were 
“either wholly indifferent to the events in America or sym- 
pathise faintly with the North, partly from sentimental con- 
siderations and partly because they see in the power of the 
United States a counterpoise to that of Great Britain.” ® 

De Leon was soon in Paris. He reported that he had been 
in communication with Ferdinand de Lesseps, a kinsman 
of the Empress, and other men “ friendly to us,” and that 
the Patrie, Constitutionnel and Pays, and all the semi-of- 

1 Slidell to State Dept., No. 1, Feb. 11, 1862 (Pickett Papers). 

2 Benjamin to De Leon, No. 1, Apr. 14, 1862; No. 3, Jan. 11, 1863 
(Pickett Papers). 


3 Hotze to Secretary of State, No. 7, Apr. 25, 1862 (Pickett 
Papers). 


THE CONFEDERATE PROPAGANDA 107 


ficial papers were friendly. He even had hopes of securing 
the support of the Orleanists.* He soon found himself con- 
fronted by the question of slavery, however. “ Strange as 
it may seem there is really more feeling for the Black on this 
side of the channel than on the other—as the sentimental 
side of the French character has been enlisted in the sup- 
posed sufferings of this race. The North from the com- 
mencement of the struggle has spent money very freely in 
the manufacture of Foreign Opinion, especially in Paris 
and Brussels, where very high sums have been paid, and to 
counteract these influences I have been compelled to use ex- 
traordinary exertions and extraordinary means. . . .” He 
claimed for the South, now, the semi-official papers, some 
of the clerical journals before hostile, and the organs of the 
manufacturers and industrial classes at Lyons, Bordeaux, 
Havre and Rouen. Meantime he had published a pamphlet, 
Le Vérité sur les Etats confédérés d’Amerique, which was 
intended as a sort of handbook for the defenders of the 
Southern cause. He thus describes it: “ You will observe 
that the ground is boldly taken in that publication, that the 
South is able to vindicate her own independence without 
Foreign assistance, and is rapidly doing so— that her re- 
sources are ample for her needs—that she has nothing to 
apologise for in her ‘ peculiar institution,’ but has ever been 
the best friend of the black race—that the question of slav- 
ery really is not at the bottom of this quarrel—and that the 
negroes at the South sympathise with their Southern friends 
and hate and distrust the Yankees as they have good right 
to do.” He reports that he has employed a corps of writers 
to keep the subject before the public, and he mentions some 
other persons who have labored in the press for the South— 
Pecquet du Bellet, Edward Gaulhac, of New Orleans, and 
Charles Girard, and in London, George McHenry and 
Hotze.° 

In October, Hotze repeated his declaration of the spring, 


4De Leon to Benjamin, No. 1, July 30, 1862 (Pickett Papers). 
5 Ibid., No. 2, Sept. 30, 1862 (Pickett Papers). 


108 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


that, in general, the nation, if not wholly indifferent, was 
friendly disposed toward the North,® though in this connec- 
tion it is interesting to note that three months later Slidell 
spoke of “an immense change of public opinion to our ad- 
vantage” within the last six or eight months, and that those 
who had been indifferent or lukewarm were now warm par- 
tisans of the South, while the greater part of those who had 
sympathized with the North now admitted their error. He 
added, “I may safely assert that the sentiment of the in- 
telligent classes is nearly unanimous in our favor.”* A year 
later, Hotze divided the anti-slavery prejudice into two 
phases, the English phase and the French phase. After dis- 
cussing the English phase he turns to the French and says 
that this, which is “‘ far more dangerous and difficult to deal 
with, is where the prejudice has passed into, or has not yet 
ceased to be, one of those fixed principles, which neither in- 
dividuals nor nations permit to be called in question.” He 
continues : 


This is actually the case in France and Continental countries gen- 
erally. There no such violent anti-slavery demonstrations are made 
as in England, simply because there is no one against whom to make 
them. Slavery is there classed with atheism, socialism, or other 
topics, on which, however eccentric one’s views may be or however 
certain one is of the secret sympathy of one’s hearers, it is a rule of 
decency and decorum not to make them the subject of argument or 
to obtrude them upon well-bred ears. I have entered into this seem- 
ingly uncalled-for disquisition because I fear that judging only 
from a distance and from outward appearances you may mistake 
the relative strength of the prejudice in England and in France. In 
the latter country it is infinitely more unanimous and unassailable. 
With the exception of the Emperor and his nearest personal ad- 
herents, all the intelligence, the science, the social respectability, is 
leagued with the ignorance and the radicalism in a deep-rooted 
antipathy—rather than active hostility—against us. This is what 
has paralysed the wise intentions of the Emperor heretofore, and 
what paralyzes them still. It is much easier for the English, ac- 
customed to a hierarchy of classes at home, and to a haughty domin- 
ion abroad, to understand a heirarchy of races than it is for the 
French, the apostles of universal equality and who have sacrificed 
so much to their creed. Few of our friends understand the full 
force of this fact in its bearing upon the political action of the 
Government. The Emperor, from the very magnitude of his power, 
cannot afford to offend so universal a feeling, and he cannot act as 


6 Hotze to Benjamin, No. 13, Oct. 24, 1862 (Pickett Papers). 
7 Slidell to Benjamin, No. 24, Jan. 21, 1863 (Pickett Papers). 


THE CONFEDERATE PROPAGANDA 109 


he wishes unless by conciliating that feeling with some manifest 
and dazzling material advantage, or by creating such a situation as 
to give him the excuse of necessity. I regret being obliged to take 
a less sanguine view of our expectations from France, than may pos- 
sibly reach you through other channels, but it is above all my 
duty to write you what I believe to be the truth in reference to the 
currents of public opinion.§ 


A month later, he complains at the tone of the Southern 
press which seems favorable to France and unfavorable to 
England. Writing from England, he says: 


Now I am aware of the allowances that must be made for the 
prepossessions or prejudices inseparable from continued residence 
in a country, but I cannot help reiterating my earnest conviction 
that our only hope of permanent friendship and solid assistance is 
from England. What temporary relations between us and France 
may arise from the force of circumstances, I cannot foretel, but the 
fact remains clear to my mind, that here we have almost a unanimous 
nation as our friends, and in France, beside the Emperor and his 
immediate entourage, we have none. Here there is scarcely a man 
eminent in letters, in politics, or in society, who dares profess 
friendship for the North; there I cannot think of a familiar name 
that can be claimed for us. It is impossible to conceive of an 
antithesis more complete than that which exists between the public 
opinion of France and that of England in all that relates, directly or 
indirectly, to our cause. Our people see only the deceptive con- 
trast between the diplomacy, or more properly, diplomatic manners 
of the two countries—a contrast rather superficial and personal than 
real and national, and they do not see what the instinct of the North 
has long discerned that the heart of England beats for us and the 
heart of France for our enemies.® 


Benjamin said in reply: 


Your appreciation of the tone and temper of public opinion in 
France in your Nos. 29 and 31, although not in accordance with the 
views of the other correspondents of the Department, concurs entirely 
in the conclusions to which I had arrived, from the perusal of the 
principal organs of French journalism. It has been impossible to 
remain blind to the evidence of the articles which emanate from the 
best known names in French literature. In what is perhaps the 
most powerful and influential of the French periodicals, “La Revue 
des Deux Mondes,” there is scarcely an article signed by the members 
of its able corps of contributors, which does not contain some dis- 
paraging allusion to the South. Abolition sentiments are quietly as- 
sumed as philosophical axioms too self-evident to require comment or 
elaboration, and the result of this struggle is in all cases treated as 
a foregone conclusion, as nothing within the range of possibility, ex- 
cept the subjugation of the South and the emancipation of the 
whole body of the negroes. (The example of St. Domingo does 
not seem in the least to disturb the faith of these philanthropists in 


8 Hotze to Benjamin, No. 29, Sept. 26, 1863 (Pickett Papers). 
9 Ibid., No. 31, Oct. 31, 1863 (Pickett Papers). 


IIO FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


the entire justice and policy of a war waged for this end, and our 
resistance to the fate proposed for us, is treated as a crime against 
liberty and civilization.1° 

Meantime De Leon was not having much success, and in 
December, 1863, Slidell wrote to Benjamin complaining of 
his conduct of the mission assigned to him. De Leon had 
begun his service by opening some dispatches that Benjamin 
had given him to take to Slidell, who had delayed until this 
time in reporting the matter. Slidell said that he had had no 
difficulty before the arrival of De Leon in getting articles 
and news published in the papers. But De Leon, he said, so 
far as he knew, had not had access to or intercourse with 
a single public man of any consequence, that his associations 
with the press had been confined to two or three subalterns, 
and that De Leon had not, so far as he knew, rendered the 
slightest service to the Confederate cause in France. More- 
over, whatever influence De Leon might have had, had been 
lost by the publication in the Federal newspapers of a let- 
ter of De Leon which had been intercepted on its way to its 
destination.1+ De Leon had said: “ At the expiration of 
eighteen months, ‘France wants money’ literally, and not 
figuratively. They are a far more mercenary race than the 
English, and we must buy golded opinions from them if at 
all. Such was the secret of Dr. Franklin’s success.” ?” 
When this found its way into the Liberal papers, De Leon’s 
usefulness was at an end. In view of all these things, De 
Leon was removed, and his work was taken up by Hotze. 

Hotze said that his plan of operations differed in theory 
and practice from that of his predecessor. He said that he 
acted by means of persons rather than things, and he relied 
more upon “ self-love, ambition, enthusiasm, admiration of 
our cause, and other passions, than upon the power of 
money.” He had some doubts that the plan would succeed 
in France, for the French were more cynical than the Eng- 
lish, and moreover the French journalist regarded his pro- 


11 Slidell to Benjamin, No. 50 (bis), Dec. 6, 1863 (Pickett Papers). 
12 New York Daily Tribune, Nov. 16, 1863 (evening edition). 


THE CONFEDERATE PROPAGANDA III 


fession “as purely that of an advocate who earns his fee.” 
He thought that he might approach the French public mind 
through the men of science, “ whose position relative to the 
political and journalistic talent is precisely the reverse of 
what it is in England, and who are far advanced in correct 
views of the place assigned by providence to different 
branches of the human family.”1?% He suggested that a 
staff of native writers be employed to disseminate news and 
articles desired by the Confederacy. There is in his corre- 
spondence a letter to one Felix Aucaigne, offering to make 
him a Paris correspondent of the Index, but his duties would 
be confined to writing articles for the French press, using the 
Index as his guide. Hotze said that this plan had “ worked 
wonders ”’ in the Italian press.*4 

If Aucaigne was one of those who were to be won by en- 
thusiasm, “ admiration of our cause ” and other passions not 
mercenary, it is small wonder that the Confederates were 
no more successful, for on March 11, 1864, this individual 
came to Bigelow to sell his services for the sum of $2,000, 
writing for the Patrie. He said that his “ conscience”? now 
compelled him to support the North which was now anti- 
slavery enough for him. The next day he came again ask- 
ing an additional $100 a month. Bigelow refused his serv- 
ices, saying that the pro-Southern journals were doing the 
United States a real service by identifying the Southern 
cause with slavery, so that although the Corps Législatif was 
filled with people interested in dividing the Union, yet no 
word had been lisped, either in the Imperial address or in the 
reply or in the debates, in favor of the Confederates or to 
the prejudice of the Federals, for fear of public opinion.*® 

In April, Hotze said that if he had been preceded in Lon- 
don by an agent who disbursed large sums of money, in the 
manner in which they had been spent in France, he would 

14 Tbid., No. 37, Feb. 13, 1864 (Pickett Papers). 

15 Bigelow, Retrospections of an Active Life, vol. ii, p. 161, Bigelow 


to Seward, Mar. 11, 1864; vol. ii, p. 165, Bigelow to Seward, Mar. 
24, 1864. 


Liz2 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


have met English journalists of a very different stamp from 
those he had found and made friends of.1* In the summer 
he reported that the French press was indifferent rather 
than hostile, that there were only two daily Paris papers ab- 
solutely hostile, at least three friendly, though languid, and 
the rest ready to accept the more popular side. He said that 
several papers had been offered to him, among them a daily 
Parisian paper, on various terms. But he had refused 
them.1* He claimed as friendly, the Moniteur, the Consti- 
tutionnel, the Patrie, the Pays, the France, the Nation, and 
numerous smaller papers. As opponents, he admitted the 
Journal des Débats, the Siécle, the Temps, and the Opinion 
Nationale, but thought the three former had lapsed into a 
quasi neutrality or at least a sullen silence. “In point of 
circulation then, we have at least three fourths in Paris, and 
probably the same in the Departments, though my estimate in 
this latter respect is purely speculative.” He thought his sys- 
tem was making great progress.*® 

But while Hotze was making these claims, the Phare de la 
Loire was able to say that if it was mistaken on the American 
question, it was in such illustrious company as that of Victor 
Hugo, Berryer, Louis Blanc, all the economists of the school 
of free trade, of European democracy, and of such organs as 
the Opinion Nationale, the Siécle, the Revue des Deux 
Mondes, the Journal des Débats, the Temps, the Nord, the 
Gironde, the Journal du Havre, the Progres of Lyon, the 
Mémorial des Deux-Sévres, the Union de l’Ouest, the In- 
dépendence Belge, and other European papers.’® To this list 
was added the Courrier du Dimanche,?° and a provincial 
paper, the Courrier of La Rochelle.** 

16 Hotze to Benjamin, No. 41, Apr. 16, 1864 (Pickett Papers). 

17 [bid., No. 43, June 3, 1864 (Pickett Papers). 

18 Tbid., No. 47, July 29, 1864 (Pickett Papers). 

19 Phare de la Loire, Nov. 26, 1864, E. Mangin. 

20 Tbid., Nov. 27, 1864, E. Mangin. 

21 Tbid., Dec. 1, 1864, E. Mangin. John Stuart Mill wrote to Mot- 
ley from Avignon, Oct. 31, 1862, “All liberal Frenchmen seem 
to have been with you from the first. They did not know more 


about the subject than the English, but their instincts were truer” 
(Motley’s Correspondence, vol. ii, p. 96). The Saturday Review 


THE CONFEDERATE PROPAGANDA II3 


On the whole, the clerical party was in sympathy with the 
South. Said the Phare de la Loire: “ In the American ques- 
tion, our ultramontaines have, with quite rare exceptions, 
given their sympathies to the cause of secession and slavery. 
The Catholic tradition compels them to it and it is only in 
violation of that imperious tradition that Berryer, the bishop 
of Orleans, and the staff of the Union de Ouest have pro- 
nounced very strongly against forced labor and against the 
Southern anarchy.” 22 To this may be added the evidence 
of the Journal des Débats: “It can not be dissembled that 
French public opinion in general and Catholic opinion have 
always been favorable to the cause of the South and to the 
cause of slavery, and men like Mgr. Dupanloup and Mr. 
Augustin Cochin, who dare to protest against that sinful 
tendency, are very rare in the Church and the Catholic 
party.” The attitude of the Catholics was explained by the 
fact that they had regarded emancipation as an English and 
Protestant idea, associated with Biblical societies, and by the 
fact that while the church might not be said to have been in 
favor of slavery, still its idea had been charity rather than 
liberty, tutelage rather than emancipation. ‘‘ Human nature 
being, in its eyes, vitiated from its origin, it is incapable 
of conducting itself alone, and the white race has need of 
leading-strings as well as the black race. The Church would 
say that in place of giving a negro a liberty which would 
be only a burden to him, and with which he would die of 
hunger and abandonment, it would like better to give him 
nourishment of soul and body, nurseries for his infancy, 
hospitals for his‘old age. Assuredly, if slavery were only 
what the Church desires, the slaves themselves would not de- 
sire abolition; but history answers for us.’ ?* The Siécle 
complained at the attitude on this question “among the 
(Oct. 3, 1863) thought that a majority of the educated classes in 
France were friendly to the Union, and the Spectator (Oct. 3, 1863) 
thought that the cultivated portion of English society had more 
sympathy with the Slave Power than the cultivated portion of 
French society (Rhodes, vol. iv, p. 390). 


22 Phare de la Loire, May 22, 1865, E. Mangin. 
23 Journal des Débats, May 8, 1865, John Lemoinne. 


§ 


114 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


upper classes, among the conservatives, among the Cath- 
olics.” 4 | 

As a matter of fact, the truth seems to be that propaganda, 
pro-Union or pro-Confederate, had not much influence in 
shaping French opinion. Parties—Imperialists, and the 
great body of Catholics and Legitimists, on the one hand, and 
liberals of all shades, Orleanists, Republicans, the liberal 
wing of the Catholics and Legitimists, on the other—took 
their stand from the predilections of their own principles and 
the dictation of policy. 


24 Siecle, July 7, 1864, Louis Jourdan. 


CHAPTER Vit 


THE EMPIRE IN MExIco 


There is a story about Napoleon III to the effect that 
once when playing a game of “ petits papiers,” he was asked 
what was his favorite pastime, and he answered, “ Seeking 
the solution of insoluble questions.” Napoleon was given to 
vast dreams, and a favorite field for his schemes was in the 
region of Central America. He had early conceived the idea 
of a canal connecting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. His 
dream of an empire in Mexico came near to bringing him 
into conflict with the United States. The story of his in- 
tervention in that country, and the dramatic empire of Maxi- 
milian of Austria, is a corollary to his efforts in favor of the 
Southern Confederacy. 

It is not necessary here to go into the diplomatic and mili- 
tary events. The story of the foreign claims, the Jecker 
bonds, the Convention of London, the tripartite interven- 
tion of France, England, and Spain, the withdrawal of the 
two latter countries from the expedition, the slow progress 
of the French forces into the back country, the establishment 
of Maximilian’s empire and its gradual decay, and the final 
heroic end of the deluded prince, is well known. The his- 
tory of the diplomatic part played by the United States has 
been set forth and subjected to criticism. The part played 
by Napoleon’s Mexican venture in French opinion, in its 
connection with the United States, is worthy of some further 
study. 

There is no doubt that Napoleon’s relations with the United 
States were dominated by considerations for the Mexican em- 
pire, and the Imperialist papers took their cue from him. 
This was evident enough to the English cabinet, which re- 
fused to be used by him in his plan to erect a Latin and Cath- 
olic empire against Anglo-Saxon aggression, but to a large 


115 


I16 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


extent, Mexico was an unseen factor in French relations 
with the United States, for the censorship laws did not per- 
mit the liberals, at least through the newspapers, to say all 
that they thought. 

At first, the Mexican expedition did not meet with great 
disapproval. The disrupted state of Mexico was well known, 
and that it was unable or unwilling to pay its just debts was 
clear. A plan to take over the custom houses was accepted 
as a proper method of dealing with the matter.t News of 
violence by Mexicans toward foreigners aroused a demand 
for prompt and effective repression of such acts, as there 
were at least five thousand French subjects there.2 Even a 
plan for the temporary occupation of the country, while the 
Mexicans were left free to establish a strong government, 
was looked upon with favor,’ though it was seen clearly that 
the expedition was a challenge to the Monroe Doctrine.* As 
a matter of fact, this purely American doctrine rankled in 
the breasts of even the best friends of America, and Eugene 
Forcade, of the Revue des Deux Mondes, thought that the 
Civil War would not be entirely in vain if it gave the Ameri- 
cans a lesson in modesty, tolerance and humanity. It was 
regretted that the United States had not departed from its 
“ yain-glorious isolation’ and taken part in the expedition.* 
The Débats took alarm at the number of troops accompany- 
ing the expedition, and the evident intention to establish an 
empire, but did not express an active opposition. There 
were wild reports to the effect that the expedition was in- 
tended to break the blockade of the South.?, The Constitu- 
tionnel complained that the Presse, Siécle and Opinion Na- 
tionale had been taken with a sudden tenderness for the 
Mexican republic and for President Juarez.2 The liberal 





1 Journal des Débats, Sept. 26, 1861, Louis Alloury. 

2 Ibid., Oct. 4, 1861, Louis Alloury. 

3 Ibid., Oct. 9, 1861, Prevost-Paradol. 

“Ibid., Nov. 11, 1861, J.-J. Weiss. 

5 Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. xxxv, pp. 755-7, Oct. 1, 1861, E. 
Forcade. 

6 Journal des Débats, Jan. 29, 1862, J.-J. Weiss. 

7 Correspondant, vol. liv, p. 567, Nov., 1861, P. Douhaire. 

8 Constitutionnel, Feb. 16, 1862, Auguste Vitu. 


THE EMPIRE IN MEXICO LY 


papers were quite willing to support an expedition which 
aimed at the protection of French national interests, or se- 
curing moral and material reparations,® but they were not 
willing to support it if the purpose was to consult with the 
Mexican people as to the form of their government and to 
send armies to “ facilitate their deliberations.” If the pur- 
pose was, as suggested by the Patrie, to solve the Venetian 
question by offering to the Hapsburgs the throne of the 
Montezumas in return for Venetia, the Siécle thought that 
would be going a long distance.?° 

On Mar. 13, there came up in the Corps Législatif an 
amendment to the Address, reading: “ We see the begin- 
ning of the Mexican expedition with regret. Its purpose 
appears to be to intervene in the internal affairs of a nation. 
We call upon the government to pursue only the reparation 
of our grievances.” This amendment was supported by 
Jules Favre, Hénon, Darimon, Ernest Picard and Emile 
Ollivier, the same deputies (the “ Cing’’) that had introduced 
the first amendment in regard to the civil war, on the same 
day.14 

The course of events in Mexico was foretold with great 
exactness by Taxtile Delord. The overthrow of the present 
government would lead to the establishment of another gov- 
ernment by France, the expedition would be converted into 
an intervention, the intervention into occupation. From 
that there would come complications in the new world and 
dangers which might have their effect in the old world.” 
The Presse feared that the expedition would lead, not only 
to difficulties in Mexico, but to complications with the United 
States and the peoples of Hispanic America." 

It was not long before the English and Spanish troops 
were withdrawn, and the French troops came into conflict 
with the Mexicans before Puebla. The Constitutionnel was 

9 Presse, Feb. 17, 1862, A. Peyrat. 

10 Siécle, Feb. 1, 1862, Taxile Delord. 

11 Corps Législatif, Mar. 13, 1862. 


12 Siecle, Apr. 20, 1862, Taxile Delord. 
13 Presse, May 20, 1862, A. Peyrat. 


118 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


able to raise the cry that the honor of the flag was engaged, 
and the Débats thought its argument merited “ special at- 
tention,” ** but the Liberal journal stressed the point that the 
expedition was limited to the reparation of French griev- 
ances,!> and expressed the belief that the fall of Puebla 
might be considered the termination of the expedition.?® 

As early as June, 1862, it had been reported in the papers 
that the United States had negotiated a treaty, providing for 
a loan to Mexico, with a mortgage on some of the provinces 
of Mexico.’7 This was looked upon as an attempt by the 
United States to secure more territory from Mexico which 
could not pay its debt. In February, 1863, when another 
amendment unfavorable to the Mexican expedition was being 
discussed, Baron JérOme David said that the United States 
had conquered a third of Mexico and now they wanted the 
remainder. He referred to Buchanan’s message of 1858, 
proposing a temporary protectorate of the United States 
over Chihuahua and Sonora, and his message of 1859, ask- 
ing if the United States should permit Mexico to destroy 
itself. Jules Favre, speaking for the amendment, issued the 
warning that if the government continued in its present 
course, it would find itself in conflict with the United States 
and fighting side by side with the South.* The Débats sug- 
gested that the Mexican expedition, and the spectacle of 
France disputing with the Anglo-Saxon race the heritage of 
the Spanish republics in dissolution, would arouse the anxiety 
of England, which would encourage a war between France 
and the United States which would bring an end to the ex- 
tension of French influence.?® 

A common argument in favor of the expedition was the 
necessity of placing a barrier against the spirit of encroach- 
ment which animated the Southern states. Thus, it might 

14 Journal des Débats, June 14, 1862, Louis Alloury. 

15 Tbid., July 7, 1862, L. Alloury. 

16 Thid., June 13, 1863, L. Alloury. 

17 Siecle, June 24, 1862, Taxile Delord. 


18 Corps Législatif, Feb. 6, 1863. 
19 Journal des Débats, July 3, 7363, J.-J. Weiss. 


THE EMPIRE IN MEXICO II9 


be argued that the North had a real interest in the success of 
the Mexican expedition. “ The object of the North, which 
reproves slavery and desires to prevent its extension, will be 
attained, if, under the temporary patronage of the allied 
powers, Mexico constitutes itself in a stable manner, for 
the adventurers of the South, knowing what reception would 
be given thenceforth to their aggressions, would give up their 
project of dismembering it to make of its fragments new 
slave states incorporated into their group. What would it 
matter to the North if it drew back the limits of the repub- 
lic? The territory that it possesses is so vast that, however 
ambitious, one could be contented with less.” If a limit were 
drawn to the extension of slavery, while at the same time the 
Monroe Doctrine was respected and Mexico remained an in- 
dependent power, the United States would have no cause for 
complaint but much cause for satisfaction.2° At the same 
time there were some who wanted France to recognize the 
South and unite it with Mexico in one Confederation.*? 
Prevost-Paradol said that the conquest of Mexico would 
have the inevitable consequence of bringing about sooner 
or later a war between France and the United States, a result 
that would fill all the enemies of liberty in the world with 
joy. These “enemies of liberty ” were now advocating in- 
tervention in favor of the South in order to assure, by the 
dissolution of the United States, the security of the new em- 
pire. This eminent publicist even asserted that the Southern 
Confederation could not exist without Mexico, and if France 
should be so blind as to lend its aid to the establishment of 
the slave Confederation and unfortunate enough to succeed 
in that design, the new state would not be long in astonish- 
ing the world with its ingratitude. If the Union should be’ 
restored, it would not submit to the occupation of Mexico by 
European arms and the establishment of a monarchy under 
the protection of France. The United States could no more 
Michel Chevalier. 


21 Correspondant, vol. lvii, pp. 449-462, Oct., 1862, H. Mercier de 
Lacombe. 


120 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


permit such an occupation by France, than France could per- 
mit the occupation of Morocco by England and the calling 
in of some prince to reign under its influence.?2 Prevost- 
Paradol thus saw the Monroe Doctrine in its true light, 
as merely a protective policy on the part of the United 
States, a policy adhered to by all states. Bigelow wrote to 
Seward about this time that the hostile papers were cir- 
culating reports of dispatches and speeches made by Seward 
to the French government, in which he asserted the deter- 
mination to stand by the Monroe Doctrine, a position which 
Bigelow said was very unpopular in France. As a matter 
of fact, Bigelow was himself an opponent of this doctrine.” 
The attitude of so friendly a paper as the Journal des Débats 
has been seen. The Presse was not behind in denunciation 
of the Monroe Doctrine. “The United States, which pro- 
claimed it, obeyed secret desires that various attempts at 
annexation have betrayed.” It was only because it loved 
the freedom of the transatlantic republics that it lamented 
to see that liberty soiled by such a doctrine which did not 
suppress intervention but only restrained it to a single 
state.** 

In September, the Revue des Deux Mondes became re- 
markably outspoken in its criticism of the policy of the 
French government. Referring to the Mexican expedition, 
it said: “ Certain frivolous and reckless spirits would like 

. to change an eccentric expedition into a system of 
permanent hostility toward the republic of the United States. 
If those ideas had only appeared in anonymous brochures, 
we should be little disturbed at it. Unfortunately, they coin- 
cide with the tendencies of the policy of our government. 

. Our government, since the beginning of the civil war 
in America, has shown an unfortunate partiality for the 
secessionist party. . . . In attempting to found an em- 

22 Courrier du Dimanche, Aug. 23, 1863, letter of Prévost-Paradol. 

23 Bigelow to Seward, rie 28, 1863, Retrospections of an Ac- 
tive Life, vol. 11, pp. 45-47 


24 Presse, Sept. 2, 1863, ne Jauret. See also La France, Sept. 2, 
1863, J. Cohen. 


THE EMPIRE IN MEXICO i20 


pire in Mexico, it is unfortunately true that we are creating 
gratuitously an antagonism between American patriotism and 
France.” It was admitted that the civil war probably would 
give France time to establish a Mexican empire. But when 
the war was over, either the armies would be turned against 
the infraction of the Monroe Doctrine, or individuals from 
the armies would enlist against France without govern- 
ment sanction. The question, then, confronting France was 
whether it should put off the conflict until it had time to 
withdraw from Mexico, or provoke a conflict now, a con- 
flict in which victory would be fatal to France, since it would 
destroy one of the strongest and most useful of the crea- 
tions of France. It was hoped that the Mexican journals 
published under French patronage would not speak of the 
recognition of the South by Mexico, and that France would 
be relieved from the expedition by the acceptance by Maxi- 
milian of the crown of Mexico.”® 

On January 25, 1864, in the Corps Législatif the follow- 
ing amendment was proposed by the liberals: “ We see with 
regret the government persist in the Mexican expedition. 
We can not be a party to that ruinous enterprise, and we 
are the interpreters of public opinion in demanding that it 
be brought to an end immediately.” 

Guéroult took this occasion to introduce a letter of the 
Emperor to General Forey, which gave as reasons for the 
expedition the erection of a barrier against encroachments 
of the United States to the south, and the establishment of 
a market and source of supplies for France.”® 

25 Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. xlvii, pp. 487-490, Sept. 15, 1863, 


E. Forcade. 
26 In the letter, Napoleon said: 


“Tl ne manquera pas de gens qui vous demanderont pourquoi nous 
allons dépenser des hommes et de l’argent pour fonder un gouverne- 
ment regulier au Mexique. 

“Dans |’état actuel de la civilisation du monde, la prospérité de 
l Amérique n’est pas indifférent a l’Europe, car c’est elle qui alimente 
nos fabriques et fait vivre notre commerce. Nous avons intérét a 
ce que Ja république des Etats-Unis soit puissante et prospére, mais 
nous n’en avons aucun a ce quelle s’empare de tout le golfe du 
Mexique, domine de 1a les Antilles, ainsi que l’Amérique du Sud, et 


122 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


Guéroult said that the idea of placing the Latin and Cath- 
olic races as a barrier before the Anglo-Saxon and Protes- 
tant races was certainly a grand political idea but he doubted 
its practicability. The expedition, he said, would never have 
been undertaken if there had been no civil war in the United 
States, and it was evident that the creation of an empire 
would not be agreeable to the North. Hence, it had been 
hoped and counted on that the scission between the North 
and South would be accomplished. ‘“‘ That desire became so 
lively that persons deceived themselves, and, you recall, all 
the French press favorable to the government showed itself 
singularly favorable to the cause of the South to the point 
of estranging the North; and you recall that last summer 
the discontent of the North had reached such a point that a 
Russian fleet, anchoring at New York, was received with 
such great enthusiasm that there could be seen in it a certain 
irritation against France.” The position of France was all 
the more unfortunate as it was the enemy of slavery, which 
was the cause of the secession. Moreover, if the South had 
won, it would not have been the sincere friend of Mexico, 
for the filibustering expeditions were of Southern origin. 
But in any case, the civil war in the United States was only 
temporary. Like all wars it would have an end, and then the 
republic or republics of the United States would look askance 
at the establishment of a monarchy on their frontiers. 





soit la seule dispensatrice des produits du nouveau monde. Nous 
voyons aujourd’hui, par une triste experience, combien est précaire 
le sort d’une industrie qui est réduite a chercher sa matiére premiére 
sur un marché unique dont elle subit toutes les vicissitudes. 

“Si, au contraire, le Mexique conserve son indépendance et main- 
tient l’intégrité de son territoire, si un gouvernement stable s’y con- 
stitue avec l’assistance de la France, nous aurons rendu a la race 
latine, de l’autre coté de l’Océan, sa force et son prestige; nous 
aurons garanti leur sécurité a nos colonies des Antilles et a celles de 
l’Espagne; nous aurons établi notre influence bienfaisante au centre 
de l’Amérique; et cette influence, en créant des débouchés immenses 
a notre commerce, nous procurera les matiéres indispensables a notre 
industrie. 

“cc 

Le Mexique, ainsi régénéré, nous sera toujours favorable, non- 
seulement par reconnaissance, mais aussi parce que ses intéréts 
seront d’accord avec les notres et qu'il trouvera un point d’appui 
dans ses bons rapports avec les puissances européennes.” 


THE EMPIRE IN MEXICO 123 


Then the United States, without declaring war, without en- 
gaging in a direct combat with France, might permit fifty 
thousand volunteers to go to Mexico.?7. The next day, Thiers 
expressed the fear that fifty or a hundred thousand adven- 
turers would leave for Mexico after the end of the civil war, 
and opposed further complications in Mexico.28 The Dé- 
bats subscribed to the opinions of Guéroult, and hoped that 
the troops would be withdrawn, not immediately, not within 
twenty-four hours, but as promptly as was consistent with 
dignity and the security of those who had become allies of 
France.”® 

The Imperialist papers tried to minimize the danger from 
the United States. The Revue Contemporaine said that 
France had no reason to fear the Monroe Doctrine in Mex- 
ico, for that would not apply when France did not desire 
sovereignty in that country.°° The Constitutionnel reminded 
its readers that the Monroe Doctrine, in the exaggerated 
consequences applied to it by its commentators, called for the 
hegemony of the United States over all of America, while 
before the war a political school had been growing up in 
New York and Washington which aimed at the arbitration 
by the United States of the affairs of Europe, which the 
most ardent among them complaisantly proclaimed in deca- 
dence.*1_ The friendly tone of Davis’ message of 1863 to- 
ward Mexico was commented upon,*? and it had been reported 
that Richmond was illuminated when it received news of 
the taking of Puebla.** It also ridiculed Berryer who seemed 
to be in fear of displeasing the American Union and of draw- 
ing its anger upon France.** But while the Constitutionnel 
took this tone of hostility to the North and pointed out the 

28 Tbid., Jan. 26, 1864. 

29 Journal des Débats, Jan. 27, 1864, Louis Alloury. 

30 Revue Contemporaine, vol. Ixix, pp. 612-613, Aug. 15, 1862, J.-E. 
em citattostniel Dec. 18, 1862, Edouard Simon. 

32 Tbid., Dec. 26, 1863, H.-Marie Martin. 


33 Tbid., June 23, 1863, Auguste Vitu. 
34 Tbid., Jan. 28, 1864, Paulin Limayrac. 


I24 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


friendliness of the South, it insisted that the United States 
had no desire to prevent a neighbor nation from giving it- 
self a government of its own choice. The resolution of the 
House of Representatives of April 4, 1864,°5 gave this paper 
some difficulty, but it pointed out that a resolution of the 
House of Representatives had no validity.** This resolution 
of the House of Representatives was said by the Débats to be 
nothing more than the expression of the position that the 
United States had taken from the beginning.*’ The official 
Moniteur said that the vote merely expressed a certain dis- 
trust that had been caused by the favorable results of the 
Mexican expedition, but its importance should not be exag- 
gerated. The resolution of the House of Representatives 
could have no practical value, and the Senate had recognized 
this by adjourning without taking it up. It was said to be 
only a political move taken in view of the coming presiden- 
tial election, or a concession to the prejudices of the masses.** 
The Presse at first took the position that the vote had no im- 
portance,®*® but another writer the next day expressed the 
contrary opinion, that the resolution was in reality a warning 
to be taken into serious consideration. ‘“‘ The European 
governments do not take the American character enough 
into consideration. They are wrong! Peril is not avoided 
by closing the eyes; it is by opening them and opening them 
soon enough.” *° The Phare de la Loire said that the exist- 
ence of the young empire depended upon the dispositions of 
It declared that the Congress of the United States were unwilling by 
silence to leave the nations of the world under the impression that 
they were indifferent spectators of the deplorable events now trans- 
piring in the republic of Mexico, and that they therefore thought fit 
to declare that it did not accord with the policy of the United States 
to acknowledge any monarchical government erected on the ruins 
of any republican government in America under the auspices of any 
European power (Congressional Globe, 38th Cong., 1 Sess., p. 1408). 

86 Constitutionnel, Apr. 26, 1864, Paulin Limayrac. 

87 Journal des Débats, Apr. 27, 1864, L. Alloury. 
1 ae Apr. 27, 1864. See also La France, Apr. 23, 1864, 
- Vonen. 


89 Presse, Apr. 21, 1864, G. Jauret. 
40 Tbid., Apr. 22, 1864, Emile de Girardin. 


THE EMPIRE IN MEXICO ber da 


the United States, and that if the Union came out trium- 
phant from its domestic struggle it would be a disquieting 
neighbor for Maximilian I,** but the attitude of the new sov- 
ereign toward the Confederates, it said, would probably de- 
termine the attitude of the United States toward the Mexican 
Empire.*” 

In a long article entitled, “ The United States and Mexico,” 
in the Constitutionnel, Paulin Limayrac attempted to mini- 
mize the danger from the United States. Jules Favre in 
the Corps Législatif had dwelt upon this phase of the mat- 
ter as a reason for withdrawal from Mexico, and in par-— 
ticular had referred to Seward’s dispatch of September 26, 
1863, expressing the opinion that the people of Mexico 
desired a republican form of government. The Constitution- 
nel answered that it was not to be deduced from the Mon- 
roe Doctrine that an American state was to be debarred from 
choosing any form of government that it liked, and that 
the assertion of Mr. Seward had been disproved by the 
facts. Whatever the admirers of the republican form of 
government might say, it was no longer possible to deny 
today that Mexico preferred the monarchical form. It was 
admitted that Mr. Seward was in good faith when he ex- 
pressed the opinion that Mexico was sincerely republican, 
and that he had left it to Mr. Dayton to suggest on occasion 
that the establishment of a monarchy in Mexico might be 
the source of difficulties with France. But he had spoken 
in the hypothesis that the monarchical form would really be 
repugnant to the Mexican nation, and accepted only under 
force. France did not have to defend itself against the ac- 
cusation of having overthrown a republican government in 
the name of the monarchical principle, against the will of a 
people, and the United States had no intention of overthrow- 
ing a monarchy in the name of their republican principle, 
when the monarchy had been accepted by the people. This 
had been affirmed in Seward’s dispatch of October 23, 1863. 


41 Phare de la Loire, May 9, 1864, Ev. Mangin. 
42 Tbid., May 11, 1864, Ev. Mangin. 


126 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


Mr. Seward, said the Constitutionnel, had been very con- 
ciliatory and had said that he would refuse recognition to a 
government the establishment of which depended upon the 
eventualities of war. It was repeated that the recent dec- 
laration of the House of Representatives need be given little 
importance as the Senate had adjourned without action, and 
the cabinet at Washington had upon its own initiative made 
frank and categorical explanations. It was not believed that 
after the Civil War the United States would support bands 
of former United States soldiers for the republican army in 
Mexico, for if the division of the country resulted from the 
war, the North would be too far away from Mexico, and the 
South, after the victory, would be glad to stay at peace; if 
the South were defeated in battle but not conquered, there 
would be a long military occupation which would absorb all 
the resources of the North; and if the Union were restored 
on its old basis, the North would use all the means in its 
power to prevent extensions which would only serve to 
augment the power of the South. As a matter of fact, 
Mexico, well organized, would be a great market for the 
United States. “ The American people is a proud people, 
and we do not pretend that it ever places its interests above 
its honor, but when it has comprehended all that it has to 
gain from the new state of things without any real injury 
to its legitimate pride, it is intelligent enough to renounce 
purile susceptibilities that its government was forthwith wise 
enough not to unduly excite, despite certain American ora- 
tors and certain French orators who insist upon represent- 
ing the irritabilities of a moment as irreconcilable animos- 
ities.” 48 

Commenting upon this article on the following day, the 
Siécle said that the credulity of the Constitutionnel was go- 
ing beyond bounds when Seward’s dispatch of October 23, 


also La France, Sept. 4, 1863, J. Cohen, and Sept. 15, 1863, P. 
Sylvestre. 


THE EMPIRE IN MEXICO 127 


1863, was invoked as ‘evidence of the good will of the gov- 
ernment at Washington.** | 

The Moniteur of July 5 commented upon the calm with 
which America had received the news of the arrival of 
Maximilian in Mexico, as a sign of the calming of the pub- 
lic mind, “which it is not without interest to point out.” * 
Liberals continued to speak of the danger from America. 
The Débats commented upon the irritation in the North 
against France, due to the Mexican expedition, and the irri- 
tation in the South against France for not having granted 
recognition. It was feared that the two parts of the Union 
would come to terms and join in an enterprise which would 
give satisfaction to both, and seal their reconciliation in the 
overthrow of the Mexican empire.*® The Presse commented 
upon the substitution in a bill of the title “ Mexican re- 
public” for “ Mexico,” by the Senate of the United States, 
and referred to an article in the Richmond Enquirer which 
spoke of the possibility of troops from both sides marching 
under the same flag against the invaders of Mexico, and an 
article in the London Index which spoke of the inconsist- 
ency and even treason of the French government and asserted 
that it would choose its own hemisphere as against Europe.* 
It was reported that the initiative had been taken in the 
conference at Hampton Roads by the Confederate commis- 
sioners, in the proposition to unite to put the Monroe Doc- 
trine into practice against foreign influence in America.*® 

As the Civil War drew to a close there was a change 
in the position taken by many of the Liberals. During the 
last few months, the Journal des Débats was not even second 
to the Constitutionnel in publishing numerous articles tend- 
ing to show that there would be no trouble with the United 
States, and the Revue des Deux Mondes took the same posi- 

44 Siécle, May 18, 1864, Emile de la Bédolliére. 

45 Moniteur, July 5, 1864. 

46 Journal des Débats, Feb. 3, 1865, F. Camus. 


47 Presse, Feb. 4, 1865, Georges Jauret. 
48 Ibid., Mar. 5, 1865, Eugéne Chatard. 


128 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


tion. Such a paper as the Presse, however, continued to 
issue warnings of trouble with the United States. The most 
serious fear was that if the United States did not declare 
war, it would permit men who had served in its armies to 
enroll in the armies of Juarez. It was an undoubted satis- 
faction to the Journal des Débats to note the fears of the 
journals who had supported the Confederate loan, and 
praised the acts of the Confederate cruisers, that now similar 
relations would be established between the United States 
and the government of Juarez, and financial aid would be 
given in that country to the republicans of Mexico, while 
cruisers would depart from ports of the United States armed 
with authority from Juarez to prey upon the commerce of 
his enemies.°° In the Corps Législatif, where another 
amendment unfavorable to the expedition was offered in 
1865, Jules Favre feared that the United States, released 
from civil war, would, without any violation of treaties, per- 
mit a horde of adventurers to cross its frontiers,°! while 
Rouher, speaking for the government, professed his faith 
in the good dispositions of the United States.*? 

It would appear from the above that up to almost the 
close of the war, the Liberals had issued repeated warnings 
that if the French troops were not withdrawn from Mexico, 
there would be trouble with the United States, while the 
Imperialists expressed a belief that the United States had 
neither the intention nor the desire to interfere. As the war 
approached its end, the leading Liberal organs went over to 
the position of the Imperialists, while a part of the Im- 
perialist press showed considerable nervousness about the 
matter. 

That the Imperialists should have minimized the danger 
from the United States does not agree with a report of 
Dayton to Seward in the fall of 1863, in which he says that 
49 Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. Ivi, p. 1064, Apr. 15, 1865, E. 
Forcade. 

50 Journal des Débats, May 29, 1865, Prévost-Paradol. 


51 Corps Législatif, April 10, 1865, June 8, 1865. 
52 Thid., June 9, 1865. 


THE EMPIRE IN MEXICO 129 


in a conversation with Drouyn de l’Huys, “reference was 
made to the almost universal report that our government 
only awaits the termination of our domestic troubles to drive 
the French out of Mexico. This idea is carefully nursed and 
circulated by the friends of secession here, and is doing us 
injury with the government.” He said that the French 
naturally concluded that if they were to have trouble it would 
be safest to choose their own time.®® This statement of Day- 
ton has been accepted as expressing the true condition of 
things, but it does not harmonize with the opinions expressed 
in the leading journals, for as has been seen, it was the most 
devoted friends of the Union, not the friends of secession, 
who had warned the government of its danger. But Dayton’s 
observation no doubt applied to the section of opinion that 
placed the success of secession above that of the Mexican 
expedition. 

As a matter of fact, the danger of conflict with the United 
States was only one of the reasons for French withdrawal 
from Mexico. The great drain upon the country’s resources, 
the loss of life, the actual failure of the expedition to ac- 
complish its purpose, and the complications of European 
politics were all potent factors. This study of the relation 
between the Mexican expedition and the war in America, as 
revealed in public opinion, would give a very distorted 
view of the attitude of the public mind toward the Mexican 
expedition if it were not carried in mind that this was only 
one of the phases under discussion.** 

53 Dayton to Seward, No. 345, Sept. 14, 1863. 

54 This matter is-discussed in Annual Report of the American His- 


torical Assoc., 1902, vol. i, pp. 315-328, “ Reasons for the Withdrawal 
of the French from Mexico,” by Clyde Augustus Duniway. 


CHAPTER VIII 


From GETTYSBURG TO THE CLOSE OF THE WAR 


The Union victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg were 
of course heralded as great victories by the friends of the 
Union in France, but the Journal des Débats pointed out 
that the inability of Northern generalship to plan a cam- 
paign far in advance was probably the only thing that pre- 
vented the complete destruction of Lee’s army, and Mead’s 
victory had saved the Capital without anything having been 
done to render impossible the return of the Gauls.t. The 
Constitutionnel admitted the Northern successes, but said 
they were amply counterbalanced by the intestine differences 
of the North, such as the disorders in New York, in 
which many persons were killed. The civil war, it said, 
is not only between the North and the South, but it is 
declared in the home of the Federals.2 It was remarked 
that in the riots in New York the negroes were particularly 
the object of the fury of the uprising. No surprise, there- 
fore, need be felt that the negroes of the South did not re- 
spond to the decrees of emancipation by putting themselves 
under the protection of the Federal flag.* The ingenuity of 
the staff of the Constitutionnel came to its rescue on August 
3, when Lee’s defeat was presented as evidence of the equi- 
librium between the two armies, for this was the fourth time, 
it said, that the Confederates, invincible on their own terri- 
tory, had failed in their offensive plans. This proved that a 
war of that kind did not have any issue, neither of the two 
parties possessing at present or being able to procure the 
necessary military power to defeat the other. It, therefore, 
placed little importance on Lee’s retreat, and said that the 

1 Journal des Débats, July 21, 1863, J.-J. Weiss. 

2 Constitutionnel, July 27, 1863, Jonciéres. 

3 Tbid., July 28, 1863, Louis Couture. 

130 


FROM GETTYSBURG TO THE CLOSE OF THE WAR 131 


momentary advantage of the Federals had turned their 
heads; that now the Herald of New York was proposing to 
continue the conscription and to profit from the recent happy 
course of things to declare war on France and England.* 
As a matter of fact, it was argued that the North could not 
win without conscription and this was not to be depended 
upon, for it was contrary to all Anglo-Saxon precedents. It 
was admitted that the law was not likely to be declared un- 
constitutional by the Surpreme Court, for article 2, section 2, 
of the Constitution says that the President shall name the 
members of that court, with the advice of the Senate, while 
article 3, section 1, adds that they are named “ during good 
behavior ”’ (pour tout le temps qu’ils se conduisent bien), in 
other words, for so long a time as those who have the right 
to change them do not cease to be able to count upon them. 
But the real test would come when the President tried to 
conscript three hundred thousand new soldiers for a war 
which no one longer desired.° 

In another article it was said that the end of the North 
was conquest, the forced submission of the states of the 
South. No value could be placed upon the pretension of re- 
constituting the Union, for union between sovereign states 
implied the free and continuous consent of each of them. 
The Union had thus already been destroyed in blood. Con- 
quest had failed. The North would not be willing to spend 
the men and money needed for a prolonged and indefinite 
war to be followed by a period when the exhausted South 
must receive pecuniary aid, and the draft opposition indi- 
cated an unwillingness to serve in the war. Moreover, the 
North had tried to invade the South four times and had been 
defeated each time, while the South had tried and failed 
twice. And so, even if Lincoln should find the soldiers he 
wanted, what catastrophes and ruins there remained for 
America! what sufferings yet for the industry of Europe.’ 

4Ibid., Aug. 3, 1863, Auguste Vitu. 

5 Ibid., Aug. 14, 1863, Louis Couture. 


6 Tbid., Aug. 15, 1863, H.-Marie Martin. 
7 Ibid., Aug. 19, 1863, A. Grenier. 


132 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


That emancipation was not the end of the war was proved 
by Lincoln’s letter to the editor-in-chief of the Tribune. 
The emancipation proclamation was not intended to benefit 
the blacks, but to stir up a slave rising. Moreover, the mili- 
tary authorities had treated the black regiments as cannon 
food—at Ft. Wagner and Port Hudson the negroes were 
sent before, and when they drew back from the artillery fire 
of the enemy they were driven back by the Federal soldiers 
at the point of the bayonet.® 

About this time the Confederate ship, Florida, was ad- 
mitted to the port of Brest for repairs, and the Débats took 
occasion to vent its opinions on the Confederate naval pol- 
icy, as follows: 


‘The Phare de la Loire has raised on that subject complaints that 
we find well founded. It would be well, indeed, if it were possible, 
to interdict access to our ports to veritable sea-robbers, for the 
Florida is nothing else. Now we believe that that is possible. The 
rights of belligerents have without doubt been conceded to the 
Southern States, but it is evidently on condition that they conform 
to the rules of international law. Now, if it is possible strictly to 
sustain that the Southern States have the right to arm privateers, 
since they have not acceded to the Treaty of Paris, it is not possible 
to admit that privateers armed by the South, assimilated by a tol- 
erance too generous with ships of war (one sees that clearly today), 
may substitute themselves validly for maritime tribunals and make 
themselves judges of the validity of their prizes. They have not the 
right to stop ships that they meet on the seas, as they do, to take 
possession of the cargo, whether it belongs to Americans of the 
North or to neutrals, and to burn the ship, while a naval captain, 
wearing the uniform of his country, and offering many other guar- 
antees of uprightness and impartiality, would be obliged to conduct 
his prize before a court of justice. Evidently that is intolerable. 
It is in vain that the Southerners allege that their ports being block- 
aded, they have not maritime tribunals. That is their affair and not 
ours. That they should attack American ships of war and that 
they should oblige them to raise the blockade, that is their right; but 
to take possession of the goods of others without legal judgment, 
that in all tongues, is called robbery. 

We do not know if it is true, as is claimed, that the Florida has 
seized merchandise belonging to neutrals, that it has burned the 
Southern Cross, going from Magatlan to Marseilles with a cargo of 
dye woods belonging to a Frenchman, that it has stopped a three- 
masted French ship, the Fleurida-Para, in order to leave on it per- 
sons made prisoner from burned ships. But if all those facts are 
correct, we think with the Phare de la Loire, that “the entrance 
of the privateer to Brest offers to the French authorities an excellent 
occasion to obtain justice for its griefs and to inflict for the in- 
juries caused to our commerce a chastisement so many times merited.” 


8 Ibid., Aug. 25, 1863, H.-Marie Martin. 


FROM GETTYSBURG TO THE CLOSE OF THE WAR 133 


Jefferson Davis’ notification that he would give letters of 
marque contained the statement that the officers must obey 
the laws of the Confederate States and their instructions. 
“It appears, therefore, evident that this is not a question of 
some exceptional cases, but that those privateers, in commit- 
ting such misdeeds, obey their instructions, and that is a 
thing that Europe is justified in not tolerating.” ® The right 
of the Confederate ships to burn Federal vessels without 
taking them to a prize court had been questioned before this, 
and the Siecle had suggested that the right of belligerency 
should be denied to a state which even granted letters of 
marque.’® This paper said that as the Florida had entered 
Brest “unarmed and unequipped”’ she should not be per- 
mitted to rearm and add new equipage.1t The semi-official 
papers, of course, took the other point of view. The position 
of the government was settled by the Moniteur which finally 
announced that the Florida was not a privateer but a part of 
the Confederate marine, its officers furnished with regular 
commissions, and with all the character of an ordinary war- 
ship.1?, As for the questions raised by the opposition papers 
as to the right of a privateer to burn or sink prizes, the Con- 
stitutionnel said that without “seeking to apologize for a 
measure which certainly ought to be considered as exer- 
cising too rigorously the rights of war carried to their ex- 
treme limits,” that even French law permitted such acts in 
more or less urgent cases.7* 

The news of the reception given in New York to the of- 
ficers of the Russian squadron then visiting that port gave 
‘the Liberals an opportunity to refer to the sagacity of Rus- 
sia which was wise enough to so conduct itself as to gain 
the gratitude of the Americans, a sagacity which, by infer- 
ence, the French government did not possess.‘* As a matter 

9 Journal des Débats, Sept. 3, 1863, L. Alloury. 

10 Siécle, June 13, 1863, T.-N. Benard. 

11 Ibid., Sept. 8, 1863, T.-N. Benard. 

12 Moniteur, Sept. 16, 1863. 


13 Constitutionnel, Sept. 13, 1863, Paulin Limayrac. 
14 Journal des Débats, Oct. 17, 1863, J.-J. Weiss. 


134 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


of fact the friends of Poland were much alarmed by the fear 
that Russia would be successful in winning the friendship 
of America, and that that country would place its hand in 
the bloody hand of Russia.*® 

But while the Liberals dwelt upon the friendship between 
the United States and Russia, the Imperialists could indulge 
in expositions of the growing enmity between the United 
States and England. It was a common thing to predict that 
at the end of the war the United States, or what was left of 
it, would attempt to annex Canada. On October 22, the 
Constitutionnel argued that whether the government at 
Washington was successful or not in the present war, sooner 
or later it would find itself incapable of resisting the pop- 
ular pressure. If the North should win, it would be im- 
possible to restrain the soldiers, puffed up with victory and 
imbued with the idea that they ought to procure vengeance 
for the hostile or merely indifferent attitude of England. If 
the North should lose, the Federal government itself would 
be tempted to seek to the north compensation for the losses 
sustained to the south.*® 

By the end of the year 1863, even the Liberals were los- 
ing hope that the United States would be maintained and 
the institution of slavery, so odious to them, abolished. Al- 
most a year before, the Journal des Débats in perhaps its 
only admission of any doubt as to the ultimate triumph of the 
Union, hearing of a Union defeat before Vicksburg, the 
loss of Springfield, Missouri, another defeat in Texas, had 
confessed its despair. ‘“‘ What possesses the Union! it has 
enemies in Europe that it can only disarm by prompt vic- 
tories. The republic of the South, for reasons that we have . 
developed more than once, is, we believe, a pure impossibil- 
ity; no defeat of the Federals will establish it. But the 
Union must not permit it to be believed, by too frequent re- 
verses, that it has become as impossible as the slave repub- 
lic.” 27 Where the Débats faltered once, others lost hope. 
(38 Sidele, Oct! 30,1863, Léon Pige! 


16 Constitutionnel, Oct. 22, 1863, H.-Marie Martin. 
17 Journal des Deébats, Jan. 25, 1863, J.-J. Weiss. 


FROM GETTYSBURG TO THE CLOSE OF THE WAR 135 


This was particularly true as they saw, or thought they saw, 
the Union losing the liberties which made it attractive to 
them. Under the stress of war a despotism seemed to be 
growing up on the ruins of American liberties. The arrest 
of Mr. Vallandigham was much dwelt upon, and to Liberals 
it seemed like a repetition of the arrest of Emile de Girardin 
by order of General Cavaignac.** The Liberals could rec- 
oncile themselves more to Confederate success when the con- 
tinuance of the war was leading to things like this. Just 
before Gettysburg, the Presse had said that the reunion by 
force of the separated States was becoming more impossible 
each day. The struggle was no more than a work of de- 
struction inspired by a savage obstinacy. There remained 
nothing more but to trace out the boundaries.1® At the same 
time, the Siécle reached the conclusion that unfortunately it 
was probable that slavery would survive the war, though it 
would have received a blow that would be fatal in the end.?° 
In October, the Presse asserted that union was an “ almost 
chimerical”’ hope. Union could be brought about only by 
the toleration of slavery, and the South could maintain its 
independence, if victorious in the war, only by the abolition 
of slavery.” 

On the other hand, the Imperialists were beginning to ad- 
mit that slavery stood in the way of sympathy for the South. 
On September 14, the Revue Contemporaine admitted that 
“slavery has contributed enormously to the prolongation of 
the struggle in depriving the South of that moral concourse 
that opinion, and in the long run diplomacy, usually pay 
to peoples who carry on sustained efforts in the interest of 
their autonomy. If Europe has refused, and still refuses, 
to recognize the government of Mr. Jefferson Davis, which 
offers all the marks and all the guaranties of a government 
de facto, it is only because the public conscience seems to 
forbid that European governments concur in any way in the 

18 Presse, June 8, 1863, Eugéne Chatard. 

19 Tbid., June 24, 1863, Eugéne Chatard. 


20 Siecle, June 27, 1863, Louis Jourdan. 
21 Presse, Oct. 29, 1863, Eugéne Chatard. 


136 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


foundation and consolidation of a State which is based upon 
slavery. The day when an energetic resolution of the gov- 
ernment at Richmond causes that cause of estrangement to 
disappear, nothing will be in the way of the recognition of 
the Confederation.” 7? This admission by one of the most 
consistent supporters of the South showed that it had given 
up the hope by this time of securing aid to the South with- 
out the abolition of slavery, and gives greater significance 
to those negotiations which it has been suspected were con- 
nected with the mysterious mission of Duncan F. Kenner.”* 
Not long after this, it was reported in the English news- 
papers that Vice-President Stephens of the Confederate 
States was expected to go to Paris with powers to conclude 
a treaty with France containing a clause which would pro- 
vide for the abolition of slavery. The Siecle said that if 
that was true his mission would be a failure, for the time for 
recognition was passed. In arming negroes and speaking of 
abolition, the South was merely demonstrating that it was 
at the end of its resources, and its concessions would not se- 
cure the sympathy of liberal Europe.** 

Early in the new year there were signs of increased Im- 
perialist activity. On January 12, there appeared in the 
semi-official Patrie, an article that gave considerable annoy- 
ance to the representatives of the United States and corre- 
sponding satisfaction to the Confederates. It was entitled 
“Russia and the United States of America,” and its inspira- 
tion was the visit of the Russian squadron to New York. An 
analogy was drawn between the situation in the United 
States and that in Russia. In both countries the “sacred 
precepts of humanity ” were trampled under foot in a suc- 
cession of massacres and pillages. A number of atrocities by 
Federal troops were mentioned and compared with condi- 
tions in Poland. Butler’s New Orleans order was placed 
beside Muraviev’s ill treatment of Polish women. Confis- 

22 Revue Contemporaine, vol. Ixx, p. 207, Sept. 14, 1863, J.-E. Horn. 

23 See Callahan, The Diplomatic History of the Southern Confed- 


eracy, chap. xi. 
24 Siecle, Oct. 2, 1863, Taxile Delord. 


FROM GETTYSBURG TO THE CLOSE OF THE WAR 137 


cations of property by the United States and by Russia were 
compared. “‘ The existence of the Union, as well as the in- 
tegrity of the Russian Empire can not be maintained except 
by frightful massacres. Let us cease then being indignant 
toward Butler and Berg, toward Schenck and Annenkoff. 
They are only the instruments of a superior will, or better, 
of a fatal policy.” The solution was simply to demand of 
Lincoln and the Czar that they renounce an impossible re- 
pression, and accord complete independence to Poland and 
the Confederacy. This solution was called for not only by 
humanity but by justice. “Is it right that fifty million 
Muscovites should unite to retain ten or twelve million Poles 
under a detested yoke? Is it right that twenty million 
Northerners, Germans and Irishmen should unite to impose 
upon eight million Southerners an association that they 
spurn?”’ If violence should triumph on either continent, it 
would be a shame to have remained impassive before the 
consummation of the iniquity, as well as a blow at the inde- 
pendence and interests of Europe. The familiar arguments 
were used to show that slavery was not the issue in America, 
and the danger was pointed out of America coming out of 
the war with subjected provinces and a warlike spirit, 
threatening Canada, the French Antilles, and Spanish 
America. The Patrie, therefore, had only disdain for those, 
who, in the presence of events that threatened to compro- 
mise the equilibrium of the world, would abandon Poland 
and withdraw the troops from Mexico.?® ‘The article was 
signed by the proprietor, Delamarre, who informed Slidell 
that the article had “ not only been inspired by the Emperor 
but had been examined and approved by him before its pub- 
lication’ and that “his communications had been directly 
with the Emperor without the intervention or knowledge of 
any of the ministers.” This statement seems to have been 
confirmed by Mocquard, chef du cabinet of the Emperor. 
Slidell said that all this was “more encouraging than any- 
thing which has occurred here for several months,” although 


25 Patrie, Jan. 12, 1864, Delamarre. 


138 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


he entertained no sanguine hope of any early action.® 
Malespine, of the Opinion Nationale, organ of the Prince 
Napoleon, also said this article was ascribed to Imperial 
hands.?* 

Meantime, information was being circulated in Paris that 
did not get into the newspapers.*® As early as September, 
1863, John Bigelow had secured documents proving that the 
Confederates were building war vessels in France for their 
navy. The documents were presented to the French for- 
eign office by the American minister, Dayton. Although 
these vessels were ostensibly being built for private use in 
“the Chinese and Pacific seas, between China, Japan, and 
San Francisco,’ with a contemplated eventual sale to the 
governments of China and Japan, there is no doubt now that 
Napoleon understood the true purpose of the ships, and 
Bigelow knew that the ministry of marine could not have 
been deceived by the alleged purpose when the permission 
to build and arm the ships was granted. It would not do, 
therefore, to leave the matter to the secret processes of diplo-_ 
macy, and Bigelow decided to appeal from the government to 
the people of France. The first step toward this was to pro- 
cure from Antoine Pierre Berryer, a Liberal though a Legiti- 
mist, member of the Corps Législatif, and perhaps the fore- 
most lawyer in France, a formal written opinion reciting the 
facts and setting forth the provisions of laws and decrees 
which had been violated, the parties involved, and the legal 
procedure necessary to secure punishment. This opinion 
was sent to the Opinion Nationale and it had been set up in 
type and was ready for the press when notice was received 
from the Minister of the Interior that publication would not 
be permitted. Bigelow was not surprised at this, though he 
had hoped that it might succeed in getting into print. He 

26 Slidell to Benjamin, No. 53, Jan. 14, 1864 (part of this is from 
a penciled translation from code in the Pickett Papers). 

27 Retrospections of an Active Life, Bigelow, vol. ii, p. 133. 

28 On the Confederate ships built in France, see Bigelow, France 


and the Confederate Navy, and Retrospections of an Active Life, and 
Bulloch, Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe. 


FROM GETTYSBURG TO THE CLOSE OF THE WAR 139 


made it a point after this to mention the incident to every- 
one who would understand the significance of the matter, 
and continued his efforts to get the story of the Confeder- 
ate ships before the public until in January the opportunity 
seemed to present itself. He learned early in that month 
that an amendment to the Address, supported by Arman, the 
ship-builder who had contracted for the Confederate ships 
and a member of the Corps Législatif, would be brought up 
in a few days. This amendment read: “We are united 
in the hope of seeing realized the good results foreseen by 
your majesty, and we pray that a friendly mediation may 
finally accomplish the reconciliation of the various states 
of the American Union, for which the interests of 
the people and of European commerce more loudly 
call.” 2° It was arranged that when this amendment was 
called up Arman would be questioned about the ships he was 
building, and thus afford an opportunity to bring the facts 
before the public through the published reports of the de- 
bates. When the proposed amendment was reached in the 
ordinary order of business, however, it was passed over 
without having been brought up for discussion. The govern- 
ment evidently had thought it best to keep quiet for a while. 
Through the Opinion Nationale, however, Bigelow finally 
got the documents into print, and in an article of April 30, 
Arman and the government were indirectly charged with 
having conspired against a friendly power. This was the 
only Parisian daily to discuss the matter. The government 
passed the word to the Imperialist papers not to mention it, 
and the opposition papers were intimidated by circulating the 
report that the Opinion was being prosecuted in the courts 

29 Bigelow, “ France and the Confederate Navy,’ p. 31. In the 
Confederate diplomatic papers, there is in manuscript an amend- 
ment, bearing the names of Arman, Conseil, Dettheil, Jubinal, Pic- 
cioni, the Comte de Las Cases et de Parien, to the Address of this 
year, reading: “ Nous nous associons par suite a l’esperance de voir 
réaliser les bons résultats prévus par Votre Majesté, et nous formons 
aussi des voeux pour qu’une médiation amicale puisse enfin amener, 
entre les anciens Etats de !’Union américaine, une conciliation que 


réclament chaque jour davantage les interéts de ces peuples amis, 
et ceux du commerce européen.” 


140 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


by Arman for having published the article. The Phare de 
la Loire, however, a provincial paper, published at Nantes, 
was not silent,°° and its interest continued up to the fall of 
that year when it cast suspicion upon the final transfer of one 
of the ships to the Prussian government.*t As a matter of 
fact, only one of the six ships built in France ever flew the 
Confederate flag. This vessel, an iron-clad ram, the delivery 
of which to the Confederacy had been prevented by an order 
of the French government, variously known as the Sphinx, 
the Stoerkodder, the Olinde and finally as the Stonewall, 
seems to have been contracted for by the Danish government 
but was turned back to the builders after reaching Copen- 
hagen and then passed into the possession of the Confed- 
erate government. It reached the Confederacy, however, too 
late to be of service.*? 

Even as late as the summer of 1864 there were rumors 
of interference in American affairs. It was reported that 
Leopold I, of Belgium, father-in-law of Maximilian of Mex- 
ico, had departed for Vichy to confer with Napoleon as to 
common action toward the United States. These reports 
were not taken very seriously, however, and the Phare de 
la Loire suggested that in return for European mediation, 
Lincoln might propose solutions for the Polish, Roman and 
Venetian, Italian and Schleswig-Holstein questions.** 

In November came the news of the seizure of the Florida 
in the harbor of Bahia, Brazil. The act was condemned by 
practically all the papers. The Journal des Débats called it a 
brutal violation of the sovereignty of Brazil and a flagrant 
violation of the rights of neutrals.** Dayton said that the 
accounts published in all the European papers, the Moniteur 
among the rest, made it out to be a gross outrage on Brazil, 
committed after express warning from her authorities, and an 

80 Phare de la Loire, May 1, May 14, June 2, 1864. 

31 Tbid., Sept. 11, 12, 1864, E. Mangin. 

82 Bulloch, Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe; 
Bigelow, France and the Confederate Navy, and Retrospections of 
an Active Life. 


83 Phare de la Loire, July 26, 28, 1864, E. Mangin. 
84 Journal des Débats, Nov. 14, 1864, Ernest Dottain. 


FROM GETTYSBURG TO THE CLOSE OF THE WAR I4I 


express promise on the part of the United States consul to 
respect the neutrality of the port. He thought that if the 
facts were correctly stated, it would have been better for the 
United States if the Florida had remained in the hands of the 
Confederates.** The Phare de la Loire was an exception. 
It praised the captain for his energetic conduct toward the 
“pirates, whose glorious mission consisted in burning un- 
fortunate merchant ships at sea,” as “amply justified by a 
long series of audacious deeds at the charge of the Confed- 
erates: *° 

The friends of the Confederacy were pinning their hopes 
on the next presidential campaign in the Northern States. 
As early as March the Constitutionnel was repeating and ap- 
parently accepting as true, statements to the effect that Lin- 
coln was using the presidential office to further his own 
political ambitions, ordering military expeditions with the ob- 
ject of influencing the next election, and to the same end 
proposing the organization of rebel states where one-tenth 
of the electors should take the oath of allegiance to the 
United States.*7 It was said that McClellan did not want to 
cease efforts to force the South to submit, but he was op- 
posed to the arbitrary measures of the central government, 
while among the Democrats a large number desired the end 
of a deplorable war which was dangerous to liberty.2® On 
the eve of news of the results of the election it was ad- 
mitted that Lincoln probably would be chosen, for he had 
the advantage of being in power, and the states of Louisi- 
ana, Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri would be controlled 
by the military authorities, while Nevada would bring three 
votes to him.*® The Journal des Débats argued that the fate 
of the United States did not depend upon the election, for 
McClellan would not, if elected, consent to secession.*® Lin- 


35 Dayton to Seward, No. 560, Nov. 8, 1864. 

36 Phare de la Loire, Nov. 12, 1864, Mangin. 

37 Constitutionnel, Mar. 27, 1864, H.-Marie Martin. 
38 Tbid., Aug. 29, 1864, H.-Marie Martin. 

39 Tbid., Nov. 21, 1864, H.-Marie Martin. 

40 Journal des Débats, Sept. 14, 1864, F. Camus. 


142 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


coln represented the courageous party which saw in the 
present war an opportunity to settle the question of 
slavery, and which desired the maintenance of the Union, 
while McClellan represented the party which desired 
the reestablishment of the Union, but which would not 
draw back from any sacrifice to bring peace, and which 
considered the emancipation proclamation illegal and re- 
grettable.4t As for McClellan’s objection to conscription, 
loans, and abuses and misery of all kinds, the Débats said 
that if he had found the secret of doing without them, he 
had been wrong in not revealing that admirable secret to the 
central government. It was pointed out that George Pendle- 
ton, the candidate for Vice-President, was accused of favor- 
ing a new confederation of the West.*? The Liberals had 
more respect for McClellan than they had for his party, 
which they regarded as the party of peace at any price. “ The 
election of a Democratic candidate is the last chance upon 
which the Confederates count; the reelection of Lincoln 
would take away all hope from them,” ** and they were united 
behind the letter of Agénor de Gasparin, which was to ap- 
pear in the New York papers on election day, urging the re- 
election of Lincoln, to secure the maintenance of the Union, 
peace and the abolition of slavery.** 

The news of the election of Lincoln was a relief and a 
joy to the Liberals. The Journal des Débats said: 


There are indeed few events in contemporary history which have 
as much importance and which should leave so deep a trace as the 
reelection of Mr. Lincoln in the United States. As we remarked 
about a month ago, it is_the first time that a people in possession of 
universal suffrage has been called to pronounce directly and finally 
for or against the continuation of a painful war. None of the na- 
tions of the old world has yet been submitted to such a test, no 
government has yet been reduced to try it. . . . In electing Mr. 
Lincoln by a sweeping majority, the American people has given to 
the world a not unexpected, but very remarkable proof of intelli- 
gence and patriotism. It has shown, first, that the federative form 
did not prevent the national sentiment from developing quite quickly 


41 Tbid., Sept. 16, 1864, Prévost-Paradol. 

42 Thid., Oct. 4, 1864, Prevost-Paradol. 

a Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. liii, p. 766, Oct. 1, 1864, E. For- 
cade. 

44 Siécle, Nov. 6, 1864, Louis Jourdan. 


FROM GETTYSBURG TO THE CLOSE OF THE WAR 143 


in the United States and from throwing out roots deep enough to 
carry it through the roughest experiences. It has proved, more- 
over, that it can choose with discernment the executors of its will 
and it has not permitted itself to be deceived by appearances; it has, 
finally, pronounced in a solemn manner upon the main point of the 
struggle, declaring on the one hand to the entire world that the 
Union would not perish and announcing on the other hand to the 
South that it must submit sooner or later or succumb,*5 


Thus the great Liberal editor rejoiced in the triumph of 
democratic institutions. The Revue des Deux Mondes was 
pleased with the orderly progress of the election “in the 
midst of the freest competition of parties,’ and no doubt 
felt that liberalism had scored a point in that the war had 
not ‘‘ deranged the mechanism of the noble and glorious re- 
publican constitution of the Union.” It seemed that the 
American people had been guided in that great ordeal by a 
veritable instinct of national preservation. There had been 
fears for four years for the fate of the American republic. 
“The cause of liberty, of democracy, of human progress, is 
so unfortunate in this second half of the 19th century, that 
one might fear at times that it was threatened by a new dis- 
aster and condemned to see the work of Washington crumble 
in a premature downfall. The attitude that the American 
people has just taken is calculated to console, reassure and 
encourage in Europe the friends of liberty. Modern Europe 
and the young American republic have often reacted one upon 
the other in the vicissitudes of their revolutions. Persuaded 
that those reciprocal influences of one people upon the other 
ought to become more and more active, we accept the great 
manifestation of the American people as a happy augury of 
the awakening of generous ideas on our ald continent.” *° 

Soon after the election, a curious theory was promulgated 
in Imperialist circles, the Patrie being seemingly the center 
of disturbance. According to this doctrine, the manner of 
Lincoln’s election should lead to a recognition of the Con- 
federacy, for while in his first election all the States of the 

45 Journal des Débats, Nov. 27, 1864, Prevost-Paradol. 


48 Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. liv, pp. 751-60, Dec. 1, 1864, E 
Forcade. 


144 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


Union had taken part, and he had, therefore, in that case 
been the chosen president of the nation as a whole, in this 
election not all of the States had taken part and therefore 
Lincoln had not been chosen president of the whole country. 
He should be recognized only as president of the States 
that had taken part in his election, and the Confederacy 
should be recognized as a separate nation. It was even sug- 
gested that the French government had approached the Eng- 
lish government on this question. The Revue des Deux 
Mondes brushed this aside as casuistry and chicanery.*? 

The Siecle passed it by with a sarcastic reference to the. 
Patrie.*® The Phare de la Loire asked if the Patrie thought 
that the recognition by Europe of the Emperor of Mexico 
was a mistake, since his domination did not extend over the 
whole country, though the liberal paper was careful to ex- 
plain that it did not intend to draw an impossible comparison 
between the position of Maximilian and Mr. Lincoln. The 
Opinion Nationale argued that even if the separatist states 
had taken part in the election and voted against Lincoln, 
still he would have had more than an absolute majority of 
the electoral votes.*® The theory of the Patrie may have 
been a curious political proposition rather than a serious 
proposal with chances of realization, but it evidently caused 
some stir among the opposition. 

The war was now fast approaching its end. With the 
Confederacy almost at the point of defeat, the Richmond 
Enquirer, which was supposed to reflect the ideas of Jeffer- 
son Davis, was quoted as saying that if emancipation could 
assure recognition and the guaranty of Southern independ- 
ence by France and England, the people would not hesitate. 
There had been rumors of such proposals before.®® The lat- 
est move of the Confederacy was accepted as an admission 
of defeat.°1 | The Siécle said that if the South had desired 

47 Tbid., vol. lv, pp. 543-4, Jan. 15, 1865, E. Forcade. 

48 Siecle, Dec. 3, 1864, Taxile Delord. 

#9 Phare de la Loire, Nov. 24, 1864, E. Mangin. 


50 See above, p. 136. 
51 Phare de la Loire, Jan. 17, 1865, E. Mangin. 


FROM GETTYSBURG TO THE CLOSE OF THE WAR 145 


to isolate its cause from that of the partisans of an odious 
exploitation, it should have been beforehand with the meas- 
ure of humanity and not simply have resigned itself to it.5? 

By April 19, the Constitutionnel had come to the con- 
clusion that the war was over, but the troubles of the North, 
it said, were only begun. It was impossible to think that 
after such a war the Confederates would make a complete 
submission, and the occupation of the South would be as ex- 
pensive as the war had been. Moreover, the paper emancipa- 
tion had not solved the question of what to do with the 
negro, who was incapable of working under a free system.** 
However, on July 4, it was admitted that the question of 
state sovereignty had been settled by force of arms.°* The 
Pays was just as reluctant to admit that the war was over. 
It predicted “ guerilla warfare—terrible, merciless, and of 
which it is at present impossible to foresee the end.” *> To 
the Revue Contemporaine belongs the distinction of having 
proved the impossibility of the old. The prophets of this 
magazine predicted that the Republicans, puffed up with 
their victory and warned by their present experiences, would 
strengthen the Federal authority and sacrifice the autonomy 
of the States to the interests of the central government, 
while the South and the Northern democrats would combat 
energetically for the maintenance of local liberties. If the 
Republicans should be successful, the United States, de- 
prived of its liberties, would proceed gradually toward a 
military despotism. If the Democrats should be successful, 
and the already loose bonds of the central government were 
still further loosened, then at the least shock, at the smallest 
conflict, the great republic would be dissolved, peacefully but 
irrevocably. Really, the Revue Contemporaine didn’t see 
any good in such a large country with the prospect of an 


52 Siécle, Jan. 21, 1865, Emile de la Bédolliére. 

53 Constitutionnel, Apr. 19, 1865, Jonciéres. 

54 Tbid., July 4, 1865, H.-Marie Martin. 

55 Pays, Apr. 16, 1865, L. Chauret. Translation from Amer. Dip. 
Gor 1605, part! 2.) p. 282.3 


10 


146 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


enormous population, being under one government anyway.*® 

Liberals, however, accepted the fall of Richmond as mark- 
ing the end. The Débats then passed this judgment: “‘ Thus 
comes to an end, after four years of battles, one of the most 
cruel wars of modern times, and one of the most deplorable 
ones, considered not by its results (since it will have as a 
necessary consequence, whatever the issue, the destruction 
of slavery), but by its immediate causes. The obstinacy, the 
haughty covetousness of a few men loosed that scourge upon 
the American continent. It is those, it is those blind and 
badly counseled men from the point of view of their own 
interests, who bear the heavy responsibility of the blood 
that has been spilt.”°" The Opinion Nationale, discussing 
the fall of Richmond, said: “ America will continue to 
flourish in liberty, and to give to the Old World an example 
which it cannot long continue to disregard or reject. An- 
other cause, also, a cause dear to civilization, to justice, and 
to humanity, triumphs with the North—it is the cause of ab- 
olitionism. The colored race may rejoice now. Its fetters 
are forever broken. The African is a freeman in the free 
republic of the United States. . . . Let us, then, return a 
fitting homage of praise and thanksgiving to the men who in 
the New World so well deserve the thanks of humanity, 
progress, and liberty.” °* The Temps testified that it had 
never, even in the darkest times, entertained any doubt as to 
the final result. Not only were the resources of the North 
superior, “ but the faith we have in the destinies of humanity 
warned us that Washington’s work should not perish, and 
that the great American republic would pass triumphantly 
through this ordeal. The trial was deserved, for they had 
tolerated slavery; but if history has any meaning, if it re- 
cords anything beyond the action of blind forces, they were 
to come out of it victors. God forbid that we should insult 


56 Revue Contemporaine, vol. Ixxix, pp. 867-870, Apr. 30, 1865, 
Alexander Pey. 

57 Journal des Débats, Apr. 16, 1865, F. Camus. 

58 Opinion Nationale, Apr. 16, 1865. Translation from Amer. Dip. 
Cor., 1865, part 2, p. 280. 


FROM GETTYSBURG TO THE CLOSE OF THE WAR 147 


the fallen! They defended heroically, with might and main, 
a cause which they believed to be just. But they were 
wrong. They had departed from the path of justice. We 
should respect their misfortune; we should have compassion 
on it; but we must also rejoice over their defeat, for their 
victory would have been a misfortune to humanity.” ®*° 

But though the Liberals were thus decided in their de- 
nunciation of the Confederacy, they were equally insistent 
that American democracy justify itself in clemency to the 
defeated. “‘ However unfortunate may have been the error 
of the Southern states, we have the firm hope that the 
Union will open its arms to the people of the South with a 
magnificent spirit of conciliation. We have faith in the 
generous impulses of peoples inspired by a good cause 
triumphant.” °° The Débats hoped that even if there were 
not a complete amnesty granted, that the penalty, even for 
the chief of the Confederation, Jefferson Davis, would not 
be too severe, and that in thus following a policy of mag- 
nanimity the Civil War of the United States would be given 
“that unique character of grandeur and generosity that it 
has kept up to the present. If that victorious democracy, 
irritated by the most shameful outrage, adds, as we warmly 
- desire, that extraordinary example of moderation to the 
various lessons which it has given us for four years, it will 
have done what no monarchical or republican government 
has yet done.” But the Constitutionnel, Patrie and other 
journals were ridiculed for not being satisfied that men, 
who, as said the Débats, had dismembered their country, in- 
voked foreign aid, and spilled rivers of blood, should simply 
be permitted to return to their homes. They were demand- 
ing extraordinary clemency for the civil leader of the rebel- 
lion. ‘‘ Do they desire beyond. this, that he should be ac- 
quitted with eulogies? Should he be given a pension, or 
made an ambassador?” ®t Nevertheless, the Liberal paper 

59 Temps, Apr. 16, 1865, A. Nefftzer. Translation from Amer. Dip. 
Cor., 1865, part 2, p. 281. 

60 Revue des Deux Mondes, vol. lvi, p. 510, Mar. 15, 1865, E. 


Forcade. 
61 Journal des Débats, May 29, 1865, Prévost-Paradol. 


148 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


was not satisfied with Johnson’s “pardon,” which did not 
go far enough. It was feared that the United States was 
starting on a career of revenge and oppression. 

It remained for the Corps Législatif to speak its last word 
upon the war. The discourse of the Crown and the 
“projet” of the address to the Crown had both neglected 
to say anything in regard to the American war. On April 
15, 1865, an amendment was brought up, offered by Beth- 
mont, Carnot, Dorian, Jules Favre, Garnier-Pagés, Glais- 
Bizoin, Guéroult, Havin, Hénon, Lanjuinais, J. Magnin, 
Marie, E. Pelletan, E. Picard, and Jules Simon, reading: 

We have proclaimed, from the beginning, our sympathies for the 
northern states of America. 

Thanks to heroic efforts, slavery is abolished. We shall be happy 
to see the powerful Republic of the United States, the natural ally 
of France, reestablished, and we shall hail with joy a triumph which 
will have cost nothing to the cause of liberty. 

Eugéne Pelletan tried to speak in favor of this amend- 
ment, but he was interrupted by frequent cries of “Aux 
voix,” and the like, and he was forced to desist. The amend- 
ment was defeated by a vote of 195 to 24.°° Bigelow says 
that Pelletan was prepared for a long speech, but the news 
of Lee’s flight reached the members a few moments before 
he began, and the majority did not want American rela- ° 
tions with France discussed. 

The tragic death of Lincoln brought expressions of sor- 
row and praise of his character from everywhere. Bige- 
low was besieged in his house, receiving deputations of stu- 
dents and others who had come to express their sympathy 
and sorrow. They became so demonstrative that the police 
had to interfere and only very limited numbers were per- 
mitted in the streets. It was said that three thousand of 
them would have united in a formal expression of their 
feelings had the police not intervened. Some even were sent 
to prison for expressing their feelings intemperately. Bige- 
low counted sixteen policemen from his window, patrolling 

62 Tbid., June 13, 1865, F. Camus; June 15, 1865, Ernest Dottain. 


83 Corps Législatif, Apr. 15, 1865. 
64 Bigelow, Retrospections of an Active Life, vol. ii, pp. 480-481. 


FROM GETTYSBURG TO THE CLOSE OF THE WAR 149 


the neighborhood. He says: “I had no idea that Mr. Lin- 
coln had such a hold upon the heart of the young gentle- 
men of France, or that his loss would be so properly appre- 
ciated.” ®* Organizations of all sorts from over France 
sent testimonials of their sympathy.®® Shortly after Lin- 
coln’s death, Laboulaye was making an address on the sub- 
ject of Benjamin Franklin, at the Conservatoire des Arts et 
Métiers, and he took occasion to speak of Lincoln. “ Never 
in my life as a professor have my words awakened so much 
sympathy. Three times in succession the hall applauded 
with an enthusiasm which was not for the speaker, but for 
the noble victim of a cowardly assassin.” ®’ His life and the 
drama in which he had been so prominent an actor were 
proof that America was not the country of prose, of the 
worship of the Dollar. Who could tell of a tragedy com- 
parable to the life and death of Lincoln? ®* Said the Siecle, 
“ Lincoln will remain the austere and sacred personification 
of a great epoch, the truest expression of democracy.” 
Some Liberal papers started a popular subscription of ten 
centimes to buy a medal to be presented to the widow of 
Lincoln, but it had not reckoned with the law. The sub- 
scription was stopped by the police.” 


65 Bigelow to Seward, No. 86, Apr. 28, 1865; Taxile Delord, His- 
toire du Second Empire, vol. iv, p. 16. 

66 These testimonials were published in a supplementary volume 
(vol. iv) of the United States Diplomatic Correspondence for 1865, 
along with testimonials from other countries. In vol. ii for 1865 is 
one from “The French Committee of Emancipation,” provisionally 
composed of the Duke de Broglie, Guizot, Laboulaye, Augustin 
Cochin, Audley, Prince de Broglie, Leopold de Gaillard, Charles 
Gaumont, Leon Lavedan, Henry Martin, Guillaume Monod, Count 
de Montalembert, Henry Moreau, E. de Pressensé, H. Wallon, and 
Cornelis de Witt (Bigelow to Seward, No. 96, May 19, 1865). 

67 Bigelow, Retrospections of an Active Life, vol. ii, p. 526. 

68 Charivari, May 5, 1865, Paul Girard. 

69 Siécle, Apr. 28, 1865, Henry Martin. 

70 Bigelow, Retrospections of an Active Life, vol. iii, pp. 53-54; 
Taxile Delord, Histoire du Second Empire, vol. iv, p. 17. 


CHAPTER ais 


CONCLUSION 


The assassination of Lincoln marks the end of an epoch. 
During the last four years of war, the “ American question ” 
had not yielded prominence in the great French journals to 
the important developments then taking place in Italy, in 
Poland and in Germany. The interest displayed by the 
newspapers, particularly those of Liberal sentiments, is sur- 
prising, Almost from the beginning, the Imperialists were, 
not the friends of the South but the enemies of the Union. 
Still it is not to be supposed that the South received sup- 
port purely from motives of policy. A great people united 
in a struggle for independence could not fail to awaken 
sympathy at a time when the doctrine of nationality had 
taken such a hold upon the French people. Neither could 
the heroism, the military qualities of the Southern troops, 
and the quiet suffering of the women at home, fail to awaken 
admiration in what is perhaps the greatest military nation of 
modern times. Prevost-Paradol, one of the most brilliant of 
French editors, reviewing French opinion during the war, 
says: 

Everyone among us then took sides, and each enrolled himself 
morally in one or the other of the two armies according to the 
habits of his mind and the inclinations of his heart. A large num- 
ber of Frenchmen have contracted in the midst of our sterile rev- 
olutions and aiter so many deceptions, a sort of general aversion to 
democracy and for them the probable fall of that Republic was not 
without comfort. Still others, friends of democracy, but of democ- 
racy, disciplined, conducted by a single master, or rather incarnate in 
a chief, saw with no less joy the approach of a dissolution which 
would give proof to their theories and show once more that democ- 
racy can not exist on this earth except in resigning itself not to be 
free. Fashion, the spirit of imitation, the presumed interest of our 
Mexican enterprise came to aid those sentiments, and the South was 
so little in default of partisans among us, that some days ago 


the news of the taking of Richmond was saluted by a cry of sorrow 
in the midst even of our Corps Législatif.1 


1 He refers to the cry of “Tant pis” that was raised when the 
defeat of the South was announced in the session of April 15. 


150 


CONCLUSION 151 


On the other hand, the political instinct which interested enlightened 
Frenchmen in the maintenance of the American power, becoming 
more and more necessary to the equilibrium of the world, the desire 
to see a great democratic state surmount that terrible experience and 
continue to give the example of the most complete liberty combined 
with the most absolute equality, the need, finally, of conveying some- 
where a sympathy, an admiration, a hope, to which the old world 
offered too little nutriment, assured to the cause of the North nu- 
merous friends, jealous of maintaining at least in that matter, the 
political tradition of France and the liberal spirit of our nation. We 
were among those... . ? 

A writer in the Journal des Débats in explanation of the 
generally favorable attitude toward the South which, he 
believed, was taken in France, said that it was like the pref- 
erence for the Cavaliers as against the Roundheads, and 
was a curious mixture of patriotism, chivalry and military 
spirit. As Louisiana had once been a colony of France, 
they had imagined that all the separatists were of French 
ancestry. The undoubted bravery of the Southern troops 
had appealed to their military spirit, and with many French- 
men the abolition of slavery appeared to be an English im- 
portation, the suppression of the slave trade seemed insep- 
arable from the right of visit, and in defending the liberty 
of the blacks abolitionists were in danger of being accused 
of following the lead of England.* To this should be added 
the opinion of the great Catholic historian and statesman, 
Montalembert, written just after the close of the war: “I do 
not say, please God, that all friends of the south are en- 
emies of justice and liberty; still less do I say that all par- 
tisans of the north ought to be regarded as truly and sin- 
cerely liberals. But I say that an instinct, involuntary per- 
haps, all powerful and unconquerable, has at once arrayed 
on the side of the proslavery people all the open or secret 
partisans of the fanaticism and absolutism of Europe. I say 
that all the open or secret enemies, political or theological, 
of liberty, have been in favor of the south.’ # 


2 Courrier du Dimanche, May to, 1865, letter of Prévost-Paradol. 
3 Journal des Débats, May 8, 1865, John Lemoinne. 

4 Correspondant, May, 1865, v. lxv, pp. 5-53, Ch. de Montalembert. 
This is a long and eloquent statement of the Liberal view of the prin- 
ciples involved. It is translated in full in Dipiomatic Correspond- 
ence, Bigelow to Seward, No. 110, May 31, 1865. 


152 FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


The war ended, Liberals could rejoice that slavery was 
abolished, and their American democracy maintained, and 
maintained, too, without the production of the military dic- 
tator that pessimists had thought must come.® 

There can be no doubt that the South received much sin- 
cere sympathy in France, a sympathy that was fostered by 
all the powerful organs of the government, and shared, per- 
haps, in a passive way by the great masses of the supporters 
of Napoleon. Still, the determining issue was slavery. 
Few Frenchmen could excuse human servitude, and Liberals 
could regard it only with horror. It is true that their con- 
ception of the institution as it existed in America was a pic- 
ture of only its worst side, but Liberals were quick to seize 
upon the essential principle, and to them this was the all in 
all. To them, slavery was an unalloyed evil, a lingering 
remnant of barbarism, crass materialism carried to its ul- 
timate conclusion. Convinced that it was to uphold this in- 
stitution that the South had gone to war, their sympathies 
could lie only with the North, and it was an additional satis- 
faction to believe that in the victory of the Union the ability 
of a democracy to maintain its existence had been established. 


5 Courrier du Dimanche, May 14, 1865, letter of Prévost-Paradol. 


ice jer) 





ir Mi -|5 Ol 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


Controversial literature published during the war. 


Les blancs et les noirs en Amérique et le coton dans les 
deux mondes, par l’auteur de La Paix en Europe par I’alliance 
Anglo-Frangaise. 1862. 43 pp. 

Aucaigne een L’Alliance Russo-Américaine. 1863. 32 pp. 

Barrillon [Francois Guillaume ] Politique de la France et de Vhu- 
manité dans le conflit américain. 1861. 40 pp. 

Bellot des Miniéres (Ernest) La question américaine. 1861. About 
45 pp.; later eds. with 74 pp. 

Boislecomte ({[André Olivier Ernest] Sain de) De la crise améri- 
caine et de celle des nationalités en Europe. 1862. 155 pp. (By 
a former minister of the French Republic to Italy and the 
United States.) 

C. (F.) La Guerre civile en Amérique et lesclavage. 1861. 31 pp. 

Carrey (Emile) Grandeur et avenir des Etats-Unis. 1863. 48 pp. 

Cochin (Augustin) L’Abolition de l’esclavage. I861. 2 v. 

De Léon (Edwin) La Vérité sur les Etats confédérés d’Amérique. 
1862. 32 pp. (By a former U. S. consul to Egypt.) 

Fisch (Georges) Les Etats-Unis en 1861, 1862. 239 pp. (Part of 
this had appeared in the Revue Chrétienne.) 

Fresnel (R.-F.) Que lEurope a attentive aux evénéments pos- 
sibles en Amérique. 1862. 61 p 

Gasparin (Agénor de) Teac. ‘devant Europe. Principes et 
intéréts. 1862. 556 pp. 

—— (Agénor de) Un Grand peuple qui se reléve. Les Etats-Unis 
en 1861. 1861. 415 pp. 

—— (A[génor de]) Une Parole de paix o le différend entre l’Angle- 
terre et les Etats-Unis. 1862. 31 p 

— (Agénor de) Edouard Laboulaye, ra tek Martin, Augustin Cochin, 
Reply to the Loyal National League of New York (trans.). 
1864. 30 pp. 

Girard nek Les Etats confédérés d’Amérique visités en 1863. 1864. 





160 
Crbaouillct (A[lcide Pierre]) La Reconnaissance du Sud. 1862. 


30 pp. 
Haut (Marc de) La Crise américaine, ses causes, ses résultats prob- 
ables, ses rapports avec l’Europe et la France. 1862. 168 pp. 
Joinville (Francois F. P.L. M.) Prince de. Guerre d’Amérique, Cam- 
pagne du Potomac (Mars-Juillet 1862). First appeared in Re- 
vue des Deux Mondes, Oct. 15, 1862, under the title, Campagne 
de ’Armée du Potomac. Mars-Juillet 1862, under the pseu- 
donym, A. /Trognon. 

[Laboulaye (Edouard René Lefebvre de)] Paris en Amérique. About 


450 pp. 
—— (Edouard René Lefebvre). (A paper on the presidential elec- 
tion.) 1864. 14 pp. . 
—— (Edouard [René Lefebvre]) Les btats-Unis et la France. (Re- 
print of articles of Aug. 26 and 27, 1862, in Journal des Débats.) 
72 pp. 
153 


154. FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


—— (Edouard [René Lefebvre] Pourquoi le Nord ne peut accepter 
la séparation. (First appeared in Revue Nationale in December, 
1862.) About 16 pp. 

Lacouture (Edouard) La Verité sur la guerre d’Amérique. 1862. 
160 pp. 

Merson (Ernest) La Guerre d’Amérique et la médiation. 1862. 
III pp. 

Milliroux (J.-F.) L’Abolition de l’esclavage par 1l’Angleterre, la 
France, les Etats-Unis. 1866. 16 pp. 

——  Apercus sur les institutions et les mcoeurs des Américains. 1862. 
173 Pp. 

[Mortimer (J.)] La sécession aux Etats-Unis et son origine, par 
un journaliste américain. 1861. 30 pp. 

[Musson (Eugéne)] Lettre a Napoléon III sur Il’esclavage aux 
Etats du Sud, par un créole de la Louisiane. 1862. 160 pp. 
Nouette-Delorme (Emile) Les Etats-Unis et l’Europe. 1863. 30 pp. 
Pecquet-du-Bellet (Paul) Ja Révolution amérique dévoilée. 1861. 


31 pp. 

Pelletan (Eugene) Adresse au Roi Coton. 1863. 43 pp. 

Picard (A.) Le Conflit américain et sa solution probable. 1862. 
32 pp. (Extrait de l’Avenir commercial, juin-juillet 1862.) 

Prévost (F[erdinand]) and P[aul] Pecquet [du Bellet] Le Blocus 
américain. I861. 30 pp. 

Prévost-Paradol [Lucien Anatole]. Quelques pages d’histoire con- 
temporaine. (Letters published in the Courrier du Dimanche, 
some of which deal with the war.) 

Remak (Stephen S.) La Paix en Amérique. 1865. 161 pp. (By a 
member of the Philadelphia bar, former consul of U. S. at 
Trieste. ) 

Renouf (Sidney) L’Union américaine et l’Europe. 1861. 16 pp. 

Sargent (F. W.) Les Etats confédérés et l’esclavage. (By F. W. 
Sargent, of Philadelphia.) 1864. 177 pp. 

Sayve (Le Comte de) Etude sur la révolution des Etats-Unis. 1863. 
47 pp. (Appeared in I’Echo de la Presse, Dec. 9 to 15, 1862.) 

Schobert (Le Baron) Paix a l’Amérique. 1862. 32 pp. 

Soret (H.) Histoire du conflit américain, de ses causes, de ses 
résultats. 1863. 46 pp. 


Newspapers (with daily circulation figures for 1863 as given in A. V. 
Kirwan, “ Modern France: Its Journalism, Literature and 
Society,” 1863). 

Constitutionnel. Paris. 24,000. 

Journal des Débats. Paris. 12,000. 

Moniteur Universel. Paris. 20,000 to 25,000. 

Presse. Paris. (1861 missing). 25,000. 

Siecle. Paris. (1861 missing). 55,000 to 60,000. 

Pays. Paris. (1860-1861). 

Phare de la Loire. Nantes. (May 1864 on). 

France. Paris. (Established in 1863). Small circulation. 

Patrie. Paris. (1865 missing). 40,000. 

Courrier du Dimanche (Letters of Prévost-Paradol). Paris. 

Charivari. Paris. (A few months missing). 

The circulation of the pro-Union “ Opinion Nationale,” referred 
to a number of times in the text, was apparently 25,000. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 155 


Other periodicals. 
Revue des Deux Mondes. 
Revue Contemporaine. 
Revue Britannique. 
Correspondant. 
Illustration. 
Monde Illustré. 
Revue Germanique. 


Published government papers. 
Debates, Sénat and Corps Législatif. (Appeared in Moniteur). 
Diplomatic correspondence of the United States. 
Commercial Relations of the United States with Foreign Nations. 
Richardson, James D. A Compilation of the Messages and 
Papers of the Confederacy. 1905. 
Archives Diplomatique. 
Documents Diplomatique. 
Parliamentary Debates, Great Britain. 


Manuscript government papers. _ 
Pickett papers. The diplomatic papers of the Confederate States 
of America, now in the Library of Congress. 


Special articles. 

Sears, Louis Martin. French Opinion of Our Civil War. In 
Mid-West Quarterly, vol. 2, pp. 357-366, July, rors. 

—. A Neglected Critic of Our Civil War. In Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review, vol. 1, pp. 532-545, March, 1915. 

——. A Confederate Diplomat at the Court of Napoleon III. 
American Historical Review, vol. 26, pp. 255-281, Jan., 1921, 

Duniway, Clyde Augustus. Reasons for the Withdrawal of the 
French from Mexico. In Annual Report of the American 
Historical Association, 1902, vol. I, pp. 315-328. 


Memoirs and Histories. 

Adams, Charles Francis. The Crisis of Foreign Intervention in 
the War of Secession, September-November, 1862. In Pro- 
ceedings, Massachusetts Historical Society, Apr., 1914, vol. 
xlvii, pp. 372-424. 

Bigelow, John. France and the Confederate Navy. 1888. 

Retrospections of an Active Life. 1909, 1913. 
—, geome Recollections of the Late Antoine Pierre Berryer. 

1860. 

——. Some Recollections of the Late Edouard Laboulaye. 

[1889 ?]. 

Blanc, Louis. Letters on England. Originally appeared 1861- 

1864. (Collected). 

Bulloch, James D. The Secret Service of the Confederate States 

in Europe. 1884. 

Butler, Pierce. Judah P. Benjamin. 1906. 

Callahan, James Morton. The Diplomatic History of the South- 
ern Confederacy. 10901. | 

Chasles, Philaréte. Etudes sur la Littérature et las Moeurs des 

Anglo-Américains au XIX® Siécle. [1851]. 

Chevalier, Michel. Lettres sur l’Amérique du Nord. 3d ed. 

1838. 





156 


FRENCH OPINION ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 


Darimon, Alfred. Histoire d’un Parti. 1885-1880. 

Delord, Taxile. Histoire du Second Empire. 1869-1875. 

DuBose, John Witherspoon. The Life and Times of William | 
Lowndes Yancey. 1892. 

Evans, Thomas W. The Second French Empire. 1905. 

Hugo, Victor. GEuvres. Letters of 1859, 1860, 1867. 

Jerrold, Blanchard. The Life of Napoleon III. 1874-1882. 

Laboulaye, Edouard. CEéuvres de W. E. Channing, de 1’Esclavage 
(Introduction). 1855. 

——. (Euvres Sociales de Channing (Introduction). Introd. 
1852, 1853. ‘ 

LaGorce, Pierre F. G. de. Histoire du Second Empire. 1899- 


1905. 

Lamartine, Alphonse de. Cours Familier de Littérature, CX VII* 
Entretien, Une Page Unique d’Histoire Naturelle, par Audu- 
bon. 1865. 

Latané, John Holladay. The United States and Latin America. 
1920. 

Martin, Percy F. Maximilian in Mexico. 1I914. 

Mason, Virginia. The Public Life and Diplomatic Correspond- 
ence of James M. Mason. 1903. 

Newton, Thomas W. L., Lord. Lord Lyons. 1913. 

Ollivier, Emile. L’ Empire Libéral. 1895-1015. 

Pecquet Du Bellet, Paul. The Diplomacy of the Confederate 
Cabinet of Richmond and its Agents Abroad. (Unpublished 
copy in Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress). 

Senior, Nassau William. Conversations with Distinguished Per- 
sons. 1880. 

Seward, Frederick W. The Life of W. H. Seward. 1877, 1801. 

Smith, Ernest A. The History of the Confederate Treasury. 


IQOI. 
Tocqueville, Alexis de. De la Démocratie en Amérique. 1835. 


INDEX 


Abolition, proposed by South, 
136, 144-145. See Slavery. 
Abolitionists, 17-18. 


Address of Emperor. See Na- 
poleon III. 
Address to Emperor. See Pro- 


jet d’adresse. 
Algerian cotton, 63-64. 
Anglo-French understanding, 42- 
43. 
Arman, 70-71, 98, 139-140. 
Armistice, 87 ff. 
Aucaigne, Felix, 111. 


Beckwith, 34. 

Benjamin, on the French press, 
109—II0. 

Berryer, Antoine Pierre, 138-130. 

Bigelow, John, 15, 34, 53, 138 ff. 

Billault, 68. 

Pach | 694-37: 

Blockade, 20, 66, 88, 104. 

Boissy, Marquis de, 68, 98. 

Brown, John, 26. 

Buchanan, James, 20, 22, 27, 35. 

Butler, Gen. B. F., 80-81, 136- 


137. 

Campaign of 1864, 141-143. 

Canada, 19, 41, 134. 

Canal, between Mississippi Val- 
ley and Atlantic, 23-24. 

Catholics, 11, 113-114, I5I. 

Causes of the war, 22 ff., 42, 65, 
132. 

Censorship, 14, 65. 

Channing, William Ellery, to. 

Commerce destroyers, 67, 132- 
135; 

Commerce of South, 23-24. 

Commercial treaty, 61. 

Confederacy and Mexico, 18-109, 
123. 

Confederate ships, 138-140. 

Constitution, Montgomery, 10. 

Constitution, United States. See 
Secession. 


Constitutionnel, character of, 10, 
SO TALL: 

Corps Législatif, 14, 60, 68-71, 
98-100, 117-118, 121-123, 128, 
130, 148, I50-I5I. 

Cotton, manufactories in South, 
24; burnings, 73, 75-76. See 
French interests in war. 

Cotton loan, 104. 

Cuba, Io. 


Davis, Jefferson, 24, 94. 

Dayton, W. L., 38, 43, 138. 

Decree of Nov. 24, 1860, 14. 

De Leon, Edwin, 106-107, IIo. 

Democracy, I4-I5, 23, 29-31, 70, 
143, 145-147, 150-152. 

Democratic party in the United 
States, 17. 

De Tocqueville, Alexis, 9. 

District of Columbia, municipal 
system of, 16. 


Emancipation. See Slavery. 

Emancipation proclamation, pre- 
liminary, 85; final, 95. 

England, and armistice proposal, 
89, 92-93; attitude of, 109. 

English cabinet, 76, 87, 100-101, 
104. 


Faulkner, C. J., 37. 

Filibustering, 32, 118-119, 122. 

Florida, the, 140-141. 

France (newspaper ), character of, 
104. 

French interests in war, 32-34, 
43, 46-47, 50, 56 i, 70-71, 74- 


75, 84, 90, 93. | 
French press, attitude of, 112. 


Garibaldi, 34-35. 
Gasparin, Agénor de, 31. 
Gettysburg, battle of, 130. 
Guéroult, 15. 


157 


158 


Hampton Roads conference, 127. 
Hotze, Henry, 106 ff. 

Hughes, Archbishop, 11, 12. 
Hugo, Victor, Io n. 


Immigrants, European, 30. 

Imperialists, 10, 26, 114, 128-120, 
134-135, 150. 

Index (newspaper), 105. 

Industrial crisis. See French in- 
terests in war. 

Intervention. See Mediation. - 

Issues of war, 9 ff. 


Johnson’s pardon, 148. 

Journal des Débats, character of, 
II; internal discord in South, 
opinion of, 18. 


Kenner, Duncan F., 136. 


Laboulaye, Edouard, 149. 

Laurens, Henry, 51, 53. 

Law of nations, 40 ff., 72-73. 

Legitimists, 114. 

Lemercier, Anatole, 90. 

Leopold I of Belgium, 140. 

Lesseps, Ferdinand de, 106. 

Liberal Empire, 14. 

Liberals, 10, 13-14, 17, 20, 26, 31, 
65, 78, 105, 114, 128, 134-135, 
147-148. 

Lincoln, Abraham, 16, 22, 25-27, 
35-30, 77, 85, 94-05, 132, 142- 
144, 148-149. 

Lindsay, in House of Commons, 
81-82, 103. 

Livre Jaune, 15. 

Louisiana cession, 99. 


McClellan, George B., 141-142. 

Mann, A. Dudley, 36. 

Mason, James M., 4o ff. 

Maximilian of Mexico, 121 ff. 
See Mexico. 

Mediation, 43, 45-46, 65 ff., 95- 
97. 

Mercier, 71-72. 

Mexico, 16, 19, 101, 115 ff., 118, 
122 ff., 140, 150. 

Missouri Compromise, 22-23, 27. 

Monde, character of, II. 

Monetary disturbance, 63. 


INDEX 


Monroe Doctrine, 94, I19—120, 
127. 

Montalembert, Ch. de, on the 
war, ISI. 


Morny, Count de, 36. 


Napoleon, Prince Imperial, 37. 

Napoleon III, 68, 71, 76, 87, 95—- 
97, 103, 105, II5, I2I-122, 137. 

Negroes, treatment of, by North, 
130, 132. 


Opinion Nationale, character of, 
37, 138. 

Orleanists, II, 37, 105, 107, 114. 

Orleans princes, 45. 


Patrie, makes comparison between 
North and South, 10-11; char- 
acter of, 37-33. 

Pays, character of, 10, 30, 43. 

Persigny, 26, 38, 96-97. 

Press, attitude of United States 
toward articles in, 38-39. See 
Censorship. 

Prévost-Paradol, 13. 

Privateering, 19. See Commerce 
destroyers. 

Projet d’adresse, 67-71, 98~-100, 
148. 

Propaganda, Confederate, 105 ff. 


Reclus, Elisée, 11. 

Recognition of Confederacy, 
views on, 38, 43-44, 47-48, 52, 
79, 81, 87 ff., 100 ff. 

Republican Party, in United 
States, 17, 22, 26. 

Republicans, of France, 12, 37, 
52, 105, I14. 

Riots in New York, 130. 

Roebuck, motion for recognition 
of Confederacy in House of 
Commons, 100 ff., 103. 

Rost Pay Ags, 

Russia, 89, 93, 133-134, 136-137. 


Sanford, Henry S., 34. 

Scott, Gen. Winfield, 53. 

Secession, legality of, 25, 27-30, 
73-74; possibilities of success 
of, 18-22, 84-85, 131, 134. 

Sénat, 14, 60, 67-68, 08. 

Seward, William H., 38. 


INDEX 


Siecle, character of, 12, 52. 

Silk, 58 ff. 

Slavery, 9-14, 19, 22-25, 27—30, 
37, 73-74, 76, 84-86, 92-94, 105, 
107-110, 113, 130, 132, 135- 
136, 146, 148, 151-152. See 
also Emancipation Proclama- 
tion, Abolition Proposed by 
South, and Abolitionists. 

Slidell, John, 40, 76, 105 ff. 

Societé du Prince Impérial, 60. 

South Carolina, 17. 

Southern nationality, 23. 

Stone fleet, 65-66. 

Stowe, Harriet Beecher, Io, 45. 

Sumter, Fort, 109. 


Tariff, 26-27, 30, 32-33, 42, 60. 


Thouvenel, 38, 45, 52. 
Trent, the, 40 ff. 


Uncle Tom’s Cabin, ro. 
Union, thought impossible, 145. 


Vallandigham, 135. 


Walewski, Count, 38. 
Washington, George, 25. 
Western States, 18, 100. 
Wheat, 33, 56-57. 
Wilkes, Capt., 40 ff. 
Wilmot Proviso, 30. 


Yancey; Wii U5) 36,77. 
Yellow Book. See Livre Jaune. 


‘VITA 


W. Reed West was born in Washington, D. C., August 27, 
1894, and obtained his preliminary education in the public 
schools of Washington. He received the degree of Bachelor 
of Arts from the George Washington University in 1918, and 
in 1919 he entered the Johns Hopkins University, pursuing 
graduate courses in History, Political Science and Political 
Economy. 


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